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The occurrence of high profile political events coupled with the wave of firm 
internationalisation have, in recent years, aroused interest in understanding the 
phenomenon of political risk. Although risk perception and political risk assessment 
are already established topics, there is limited knowledge about managerial perception 
of political risk while undertaking international business activities. And, while it can 
be argued that the way managers perceive risk is important to the subsequent 
assessment of such risk, the literature on risk perception and the literature on risk 
assessment have not been connected. Furthermore, there is a well-established body of 
literature on risk perception using and supporting the relevance of the psychometric 
framework – this framework has been successfully used to study risks like 
technological and environmental risks but not political risk in particular. Moreover, 
the existing political risk literature has not used any generally acknowledged approach 
like the psychometric framework to enhance our understanding of political risk 
perception. 
This study presents findings on managerial perception and assessment of political risk 
in the context of the developing economy of Kuwait, and the recent unique series of 
political events known as the Arab Spring. It argues that understanding both risk 
perception and assessment, and their inter-relationship, is important in understanding 
how and why international firms respond to political risk. Data for this study was 
collected through a mixed methods approach of a questionnaire survey and interviews 
to achieve two broad objectives: to study managerial political risk perception of 
Kuwaiti international firms based on the psychometric approach; and to study the 
political risk assessment and how this relates to political risk perception. The 
psychometric framework-based questionnaire survey data was collected from 120 
managers from across 44 firms. The interview data was collected using face-to-face, 
semi-structured interviews with 34 managers in 34 Kuwaiti firms.  
The main findings revealed that the general model, and the specific risk attributes, 
used in the traditional psychometric approach are highly applicable to political risk 
perception. They also showed clear differences in managers’ perceptions of 
governmental and non-governmental risks, with higher risk perceptions being 
associated with non-governmental risk.  In addition, the findings indicate that there is 
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no influence of firms’ characteristics on political risk perceptions. This confirms the 
basic assumption of the psychometric approach, which is that the characteristics of the 
perceived risk, not the characteristics of the individual perceiver, are what primarily 
determine risk perception. The findings also indicated that the level of 
institutionalisation of political risk assessment is not significantly correlated with any 
obvious firm characteristic. In addition, managers were found to resist quantitative 
assessment despite their high awareness of political risk (especially for non-
governmental risks). 
There are two main intended contributions of this study to the literature on political 
risk. First, by applying the psychometric paradigm to political risk, this study has not 
only extended the applicability of the psychometric framework but also made a 
connection between the political risk literature and risk perception literature. Second, 
the specific observations reported by the study – for example, the way managers 
dichotomise risks between governmental and non-governmental sources and the 
reasons why managers resist quantitative assessment – make a contribution to our 
understanding of how political risks to firms are considered and prioritised at an 
organisational level.  
The findings from this study also have practical implications for managers of 
international firms. For example, the strong explanation of political risk perceptions 
provided by the psychometric framework may help managers predict the risk 
perceptions of other managers who they may have to persuade or negotiate with. 
Understanding the reasons why managers dichotomise governmental and non-
governmental risk also has practical importance, as it helps them to reflect on their 
own circumstances and assess whether this dichotomisation is appropriate to these 
circumstances. Similarly, knowing the way that other managers rationalise the use, or 
non-use, of quantitative assessment allows a firm to assess whether such reasons fit 
their own problems, and so come to a deeper understanding of how much formal 
assessment of political risk is appropriate to their situation.  
There are several limitations to this study. Some relate to its external validity, because 
it is difficult to generalise the findings outside of Kuwait, and some to its internal 
validity, because the firms included in the sample may not be completely 
representative. Other limitations include possible sampling bias due to the self-
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selection process by potential respondents, and using only a single respondent 
manager per firm in the interview study. Also it is a cross sectional study, not a 
longitudinal one, and the characteristic of managerial position is the only individual 
characteristic considered as potentially affecting political risk perception. 
The recommendations for future work would therefore include carrying out similar 
studies that consider larger samples and different contexts to improve internal and 
external validity. Such studies should include longitudinal designs and consider other 
individual characteristics besides managerial position (such as age, gender and 
education), and their effect on managerial political risk perception. 
 
Keywords: Risk Perception; Political Risk; Psychometric Paradigm; International 
Business; Political Risk Assessment. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Study background and motivation  
In recent years, many investors have looked at globalisation as a significant 
opportunity to expand and benefit from international market opportunities. But, unlike 
investing in a local country, operating in international markets has created 
vulnerability to a higher degree of risk for investors (Stephens, 1998; Xiaopeng and 
Pheng, 2013). In international business, political risk has gained increased interest as 
one of the most prominent risks that deserves considerable attention (Jakobsen, 2010; 
Zahra, 2011; Al Khattab, et al., 2015). The failure by international firms to 
appropriately address political risk may culminate in substantially increased costs and 
losses (Hood and Nawaz, 2004; Xiaopeng and Pheng, 2013; Al Khattab, 2015). One 
example from the fieldwork of this research was a financial service company heavily 
committed to investments in Syria; it had most of its investments in real estate and 
factories, and some involvement in banking and insurance. It did not adequately 
address the political risk and its operation stopped almost completely as a result of the 
civil war. Another company had many investments in Yemen, mainly in real estate 
and development of whole provinces, including the building of roads, houses, malls, 
schools and other infrastructure, and the only steps it took to manage political risk was 
to work with the government at the time as a partner, without assessing the potential 
risks explicitly. This proved to be inadequate because the instability of the 
government meant that the company’s investments were insufficiently protected and it 
faced considerable financial losses. Such political risk is universal – important in both 
developing and developed countries. Events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the 
US showed that political risk has no boundaries (Baek and Qian, 2011).  
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There is no consensus on the definition of political risk given the diversity of risks 
among international firms (Burmester, 2000). However, there are two general views 
that define political risk: the first is that political risk arises by definition from 
governmental sources (e.g. Butler and Jeoquin, 1998; Buckley, 2000; Butler, 2008), 
and the second view is that political risk goes well beyond governmental sources and 
includes other sources such as societal events (e.g. Alon and Martin, 1998; Alon and 
Herbert, 2009; Jakobsen, 2010). This study adopts the second view, whereby political 
risk is not just related to governmental sources. The justification for this is that this 
study is conducted in the context of the Arab Spring in which there were risks to 
international business which we would call political but which do not arise directly 
from governmental sources, for example massive public demonstrations.  
In this thesis, the aim is to investigate how this political risk is both individually 
perceived and organisationally assessed by managers for whom it is significant. 
Investigating both perception and assessment reflects the way that, in risk studies 
generally, research on how individuals and social groups perceive risk has become as 
important as research on how risk should be assessed. An individual’s judgement of 
risk does not rely in some simple way on estimates of the probability and 
consequences of an event; other psychological and social factors typically influence 
their judgements (Slovic, 1999). Yet this perception is highly relevant to how risks are 
managed. Not only is the public perception of risk central to the acceptance of 
technologies and operations in modern society, but also the way that people perceive 
risk is central to the way they behave. This behaviour can then be an important 
determinant of the risk that they experience. Accordingly, it can be argued that 
organisational risk responses should be understood as a combination of people’s 
perception and institutionalised frameworks for assessment.  
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The term ‘institutionalisation’ is used to characterise “the process by which political 
risk assessment ‘becomes more explicit and systematic” within a firm (Blank et al., 
1980,  p.7). Institutionalisation of political risk assessment denotes a process that 
belongs to the organisation, not simply to individuals, serves organisational goals and 
is conducted according to organisational standards. Yet it requires individuals’ 
judgments as it may be triggered by an individual’s judgment that it is needed, and it 
may be steered by individuals’ prior perceptions. Equally, individuals’ perceptions 
may be modified by the institutionalised assessment. So a full understanding of how 
political risk is, and should be, responded to within organisations, requires an 
investigation of both institutionalised assessment and perception. 
Although risk perception and political risk assessment are not new topics, and 
researchers have emphasised the importance of these two topics separately, there is 
limited knowledge about managerial perception of political risk and very little 
treatment of assessment and perception jointly. The literatures on risk perception and 
on risk assessment have not been connected. For example, in work exploring the 
institutionalisation of political risk assessment (e.g. Blank et al., 1980; Pahud de 
Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Kobrin, 1982; Hashmi and Baker, 1988; Al Khattab et 
al., 2008a), no explicit attempt has been made to understand the relationship with risk 
perception. 
Furthermore, there is a well-established body of literature on risk perception more 
generally which has not influenced research on political risk responses. Probably the 
most important and commonly used approach for investigating risk perception has 
been a ‘psychometric’ framework, which has been successfully applied to other risks 
of societal significance (e.g. technological and environmental risks). There is therefore 
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an opportunity to explore whether the psychometric framework is equally applicable 
to political risk as it is to the other categories of risks addressed in the literature. 
Previous studies in political risk perception have been carried out only by asking 
managers to rate how concerned they were about political risks (Al Khattab et al., 
2007), or the impact of political risk on the decision of market entry (Zarkada-Fraser 
and Fraser, 2002), or the impact of political risks on their business activities (Keillor 
et al., 2005). Applying the psychometric framework to political risk should not only 
add to this work by providing an alternative approach to analysis, it should also help 
in understanding the connection between the political risk literature and risk 
perception literature. This will establish how close the ‘risk’ in political risk is to the 
‘risk’ in environmental, safety and health risk.  
There is another feature of much past work on political risk assessment that this thesis 
tries to address. Previous studies have typically addressed political risk to investors 
operating from developed countries like Canada (e.g. Rice and Mahmoud, 1990), the 
North Atlantic generally (e.g. Stapenhurst, 1992b), the US (e.g. Subramanian et al., 
1993) and the UK (e.g Zarkada-Fraser and Fraser, 2002). As a result, emerging and 
developing countries have received limited attention. Some of these, however, have 
been highly significant sources of international investment, and political risks 
experienced by investors in these countries are as significant and interesting as those 
experienced by those investing from the developed world. The author is a Kuwaiti 
national, and teaches in a Kuwaiti business school, so naturally has an interest in the 
political risks encountered by organisations from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries, and Kuwait in particular as a member of the GCC.  Moreover, the recent 
prominent political events that have occurred in this part of the world under the 
general heading of the ‘Arab Spring’ provide a context in which political risk is 
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especially stark, in which the status and stability of government has been especially 
uncertain, and where there has been no clear end-point or resolution. Such a context 
should provide a rich setting for studying how political risks are responded to, and if 
international firms take political risk seriously, especially as the literature on political 
risk suggests that such firms have a low standard of political risk assessment and that 
it tends to be reactive and subjective. 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
The previous section makes an argument for the need to further understand the 
connection between political risk and risk perception, and to draw on risk perception 
work more widely by applying the psychometric approach to political risk. Moreover, 
the context of a developing economy whose investments are vulnerable to the recent 
political instability of the Arab Spring appears to be a promising setting for this 
investigation. Accordingly, this study addresses two broad objectives. The first is to 
study the managerial political risk perception of Kuwaiti international firms based on 
the ‘psychometric approach’. The second objective is to study the political risk 
assessment and how this relates to political risk perception by conducting a series of 
interviews. This leads to the following research questions and sub-questions:  
RQ1: What are managers’ political risk perceptions in Kuwaiti international firms?  
RQ1.1: How well does a framework based on explaining risk perception in 
terms of a risk’s attributes apply to managers’ risk perceptions? 
RQ1.2: What is the influence of firms’ characteristics on managerial 
political risk perception? 
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RQ2: What is the relationship between Kuwaiti managers’ risk perception and 
political risk assessment in international Kuwaiti firms? 
RQ 2.1: How institutionalised is political risk assessment and what is the 
influence of firms’ characteristics?  
RQ 2.2: What characterises political risk assessment in these firms and their 
connections with risk perceptions? 
To address these research questions, this study was conducted in both government-
owned and non-government owned Kuwaiti international firms using a mixed 
methods approach involving a questionnaire survey and interviews. The questionnaire 
survey was based on the psychometric framework and was intended to answer 
research question one. This framework was based on analysing the relationships 
among three main dimensions: the specific political risks that are encountered, the 
general attributes of these risks, and the individual dispositions of risk perceivers. The 
analysis carried out in the traditional psychometric approach aims specifically to 
explain differences in the perceptions of different risks in terms of variations in their 
perceived attributes. But other analyses are possible, and in this thesis the different 
analyses are compared to assess how variations in risk perceptions are best explained. 
The previous literature on political risks also pointed to the relationship between firm 
characteristics (e.g. number of countries in which the firm is operating, type of 
industry and the size of the firm) and political risks (see Chapter Three, Section 3.5 
and 3.7). Therefore, the research questions also ask whether these characteristics could 
explain the variation in risk perception better than the psychometric framework.  
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The interview data was collected through face-to-face semi-structured interviews with 
34 managers in 34 Kuwaiti firms and focused on both political risk perception and 
political risk assessment. Besides validating the questionnaire survey results, the 
interview study aimed to respond to the second research question concerned with the 
connection between perception and assessment. 
Research question 2.1 aims to understand more specifically the connection between 
the level of institutionalisation of assessment and firms’ characteristics. Understanding 
this connection is relevant because it suggests that something other than perception of 
risk drives the risk assessment. If we question whether people’s perception determines 
their assessment or not, then the firms’ characteristics are also relevant to consider.  
1.3 Study context: Kuwait and the Arab Spring 
This study was conducted in the context of the extensive political changes that took 
place during the ‘Arab Spring’. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
underwent the destabilising events that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and which 
later extended into many other Arab countries and became what is called the ‘Arab 
Spring’. The repercussions of this instability are still unfolding and impacting all Arab 
countries politically, economically, and financially. A number of countries, however, 
have been relatively protected because of their abundant natural resources, while 
others have experienced the full impact of the ‘Arab Spring’ and have still not 
stabilised (Ramady, 2014). Kuwait – the geographical context of this study – is found 
in the Middle East region which, as reported by Aon Corporation (2015), is one of the 
riskiest regions in the world. Recently, the Aon Corporation (2015) reported that 57% 
of the Middle Eastern countries possess a high to severe risk rating, characterised by 
problematic geopolitical events.  The Arab Spring in particular has created uncertainty 
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in the business environment of the countries in the Middle East region, reportedly 
causing heavy losses to firms operating in the region (Sottilotta, 2015). 
Kuwait is one of the smallest but richest countries in the Middle-East and has the 
highest per capita GDP in this region after Qatar (Burney et al., 2013).  The main 
language of Kuwait is Arabic, but English is also spoken in the country. Kuwait has a 
population of around 4,044,000 people as per 2014 national census. And the majority 
of the population (70%) are non-nationals who come to the country purposely for 
work (World Population Review, 2016). Kuwait is highly dependent on international 
trade and expatriate labour for its economic growth (Al-najem et al., 2013), and its 
economy largely depends on the exportation of natural resources, mainly gas and oil. 
Because gas and oil contribute heavily to Kuwaiti national income, the government is 
said to have concentrated heavily on these sectors and paid limited attention to other 
sectors (Al-najem et al., 2013).  
Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is a regional co-
operation system among six of the Gulf countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The constitution of the GCC was based 
on principles such as the reconstruction of identity, a single culture and a nation. 
Benbouziane and Benamar (2010) illustrate that factors such as shared religion, 
ethnicity, language, culture, political regime, geographical location, regulations and 
social conditions, strengthened the bonding among these countries and enhanced the 
establishment of the GCC. The GCC have an Economic Agreement to coordinate, 
integrate and co-operate in different economic areas, such as having a free trade zone, 
economic union, and a common market (Laabas and Limam, 2002). In relation to the 
economic factors, the main revenue of the GCC countries comes from oil: GCC 
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countries also have approximately 45% of the world’s oil reserves and around 25% of 
crude oil exports (Al-Khouri, 2010).  
Furthermore, Kuwait is located amidst three dominant and powerful neighbours: 
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, which have longed to control events in the country. 
Although American and British forces are present to offer protection to the country, 
this has, at the same time, intensified personal anxiety and fear. To some scholars (e.g. 
Al-Kazemi and Ali, 2002), this could explain why the majority of Kuwaitis invest 
their savings abroad. The outflows of foreign direct investments constitute a large 
proportion of Kuwait’s total investments (Behbehani and Al Hallaq, 2013). By the 
year 2013, Kuwait had become the GCC’s and Arab world’s largest outflow investor, 
with $8.4 billion in FDI outwards (Hussein, 2014). FDI outwards emerged in Kuwait's 
economy since 1953 through investing oil revenues abroad. The institution that 
conducts public sector Kuwaiti investments abroad is the Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA). This Authority takes the responsibility for administering and 
managing Kuwait government’s funds which include the General Reserve Fund and 
the Future Generations Fund. The General Reserve Fund consists of investments in 
Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. The Future Generations fund 
consists of investments in countries other than the MENA region (KIA, 2016), and has 
managed about $213 billion (Setser and Ziemba, 2009). Kuwaiti foreign investments, 
both governmental and private, are in the form of real estate, equities, hedge funds and 
cash deposits. Approximately 55% of Kuwait’s investments are in Canada and Latin 
America, 25% in Europe, 15% in Asia and 5% in emerging markets (KIA, 2016). 
Although Kuwait invests heavily in the West, it is also ranked first among contributors 
to investments in Arab countries, followed by United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia. The Arab countries they invested in most included Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, 
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Egypt and Morocco (Investment Climate in Arab Countries, 2016). There are very 
limited public statistics to provide any more details than these. 
Although Kuwait has historically been influenced by Arab values and culture as well 
as Islamic beliefs and norms, it has a number of unique features that distinguish it 
from other Arab countries. For example, over a relatively long period of time, the 
Kuwaitis, unlike their neighbours, have been exposed to new ideas, cultures and 
customs (Al-Kazemi and Ali, 2002). As a result, the Kuwaitis demonstrate two 
opposing values of strong individualism, on the one hand, and a close connection to 
primary (tribal, sectarian) groups, on the other (Ali et al., 1997). More generally 
however, Arab employees and managers are only relatively individualistic and have 
moderate collectivist tendencies (Hofstede, 1983).  
The conditions of doing business in Kuwait are generally unfavourable in terms of, for  
example, initiating a business, accessing electricity, raising credit, and protecting 
minor investors (Hussein, 2014). Kuwait made it especially difficult to start a business 
in 2014 by increasing the minimum capital requirement and by increasing the 
commercial license fee (Hussein, 2014). This all makes this specific context an 
especially revealing one, potentially, for the study of how managers see political risks 
– both as matters of individual perception and as matters of formal, organisational 
assessment. There is this very strong impetus to make outward investments which 
incur political risk (almost by definition) so the Kuwaiti environment is one where 
political risk is extremely important conceptually – and one where political risk 
perceptions and assessments should therefore be clear and prominent. The context of 
the Arab Spring heightens this sense of risk still more.  
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of eight chapters, outlined as follows: 
Chapter One provides a background and motivation to the study. It briefly explains the 
gaps identified in the literature which need to be addressed. The objectives and 
research questions necessary for addressing these gaps are also outlined in this 
chapter. This chapter also briefly explains how the research questions are to be 
answered and provides a brief description of the study context of Kuwait and the Arab 
Spring. 
Chapter Two provides a review of the risk perception literature. In this chapter, the 
psychometric paradigm and cultural theory are discussed as the most often cited and 
utilised approaches in studying risk perception. These approaches are then compared 
in order to select a suitable approach for the present research. Other aspects that are 
central to risk perception such as trust, perceived risks, benefits and affects are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter Three contains an extension of the literature review focussing on political 
risk. In this chapter, the nature of political risk and how political risk is assessed is 
discussed. The nature of political risk is discussed in terms of how political risk is 
defined, how it is classified and the impact of political risks on international firms and 
their institutionalisation level. The chapter proceeds by discussing the 
institutionalisation of political risk assessment.  
Chapter Four explains the research methodology used. It begins by defining the 
literature gap and the research questions that were formulated based on reviewing the 
literature. The chapter provides a brief discussion of the philosophical commitments 
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and the general research design. This chapter discusses the mixed methods approach 
that was used in the study i.e. a questionnaire study and an interview study, and 
explains how these two methods were implemented. 
Chapter Five contains the analysis of psychometric based questionnaire data to answer 
the questions relating to the managers’ political risk perceptions in Kuwaiti 
international firms. This chapter entails both descriptive and inferential analysis of the 
data.   
Chapter Six follows and analyses the qualitative data collected via face to face semi-
structured interviews to answer the research question relating to the relationship 
between Kuwaiti managers’ risk perception and the institutionalisation of political risk 
assessment in international Kuwaiti firms. This chapter is divided into two main parts: 
the first part is a more structured way of categorising the data using three main 
indicators suggested in the literature to investigate the institutionalisation level  of 
political risk assessment. It also examines the relationship between this level of 
institutionalisation and firm characteristics. The second part is the thematic analysis of 
the interviews, which identifies the relationship between the institutionalisation of 
political risk assessment and political risk perception.  
Chapter Seven contains the discussion of findings organised under two broad parts: 
one is the discussion of the questionnaire survey findings and the other is the 
discussion of the findings from the interviews. 
Finally, Chapter Eight provides conclusions, which include the summary of findings, 
contributions of the findings to literature, practical implications, study limitations and 
implications for future research directions. 
 13 
 
CHAPTER TWO: RISK PERCEPTION LITERATURE 
2.1 Overview 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the risk perception literature in detail. It 
discusses the approaches that have been most often cited and utilised in studying risk 
perception - the psychometric paradigm and cultural theory. These approaches are 
compared in order to select a suitable approach for this present research. In addition, 
there is a detailed discussion of the selected approaches, dealing with such aspects as 
empirical studies and limitations. Furthermore, this chapter sheds light on other areas 
that are central to risk perception, such as trust, and perceived benefits and affect. 
2.2 Risk perception 
Risk research has particularly focused on three broad perspectives: risk perception, 
risk assessment and risk mitigation. Risk perception is “the subjective assessment of 
the probability of a specified type of accident happening and how concerned we are 
with the consequences” (Sjöberg et al., 2004, p.8). Risk assessment is “the scientific 
process of defining the components and implications of a hazard in precise, usually 
quantitative terms” (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, p. 14). Risk mitigation is “to act 
directly on the pre-identified risks in order to reduce either the occurrence probability 
or the degree of severity of its consequences” (Tuncel and Alpan, 2010, p.251) . The 
main focus of this current research is risk perception and risk assessment, but the point 
at which the assessment turns to mitigation is often unclear in practice. Becoming 
aware of investment risk through assessment, for example, might itself be important to 
the way an investment is monitored and managed even though it does not lead to a 
specific mitigating action. 
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Research on how individuals and social groups perceive risk has become an important 
research area not only for its important role in the acceptance of technologies and 
operations in modern society but also for the role that risk perception plays in forming 
the way that people behave. This behaviour is often an important determinant of the 
risk people experience. Accordingly, Slovic et al. (1982) suggest that the origins of 
risk perception research came from decision making and cognitive psychology. 
According to Sjöberg et al. (2004), researchers' interest in risk perception started in 
the 1960s, when the debate regarding nuclear power began. Researchers attempted to 
understand and explain lay people’s perception of such a technology by proposing and 
developing several models and theories to test individuals’ and groups’ risk perception 
regarding various technologies and activities. Their methods included the revealed 
preferences approach by Starr (1969), the psychometric paradigm by Fischhoff et al. 
(1978), and cultural theory from Douglas and Wildavsky (1983).   
Within the revealed preferences approach, Starr (1969) attempted to explore the basis 
upon which people decide that something is safe enough, and identifying how people 
weigh risks against benefits. More specifically, Starr looked at different products and 
services and measured how much we pay for them and how many fatalities they 
cause. His argument was that we reveal our risk attitudes to purchased goods and 
services by the amount of money spent on them. Correspondingly, if the number of 
fatalities that these products and services cause is high, we evaluate them as being 
risky. Starr (1969) tested the principle that acceptance of risks is correlated with the 
benefits associated with it and also that the voluntariness of an event or a technology 
plays a major role in its acceptance, in that we tend to tolerate voluntary activities 
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such as skiing, and have less tolerance for involuntary ones such as food preservatives 
(Starr, 1969).  
Starr’s model has a number of limitations. For example, Otway and Cohen (1975) and 
Fischhoff et al. (1978) argued that Starr based his conclusion on computing historical 
data regarding the risks and benefits of different activities. A conclusion based on 
such an analysis will be biased as the historical data does not reflect current 
preferences. Starr’s model “assumes that past behaviour is a valid indicator of present 
preferences” (Fischhoff et al., 1978, p.129). Moreover, the revealed preferences 
approach relies mainly on people’s expenditure to measure perceived benefit. Thus, 
this approach could only be estimated if there was a free market. However, in 
developing and emerging countries, such as Kuwait, governments normally monitor 
and control the economy through a wide range of tools and regulations, such as 
monetary policy and taxation. In such a situation we cannot conclusively say that 
individuals’ preferences reflect their risk perception. Similarly, when decisions are 
made within organisations, the revealed preferences approach simply cannot be 
applied where decisions do not involve purchases. Nonetheless, the revealed 
preferences model provided a momentum for future study within the cognitive 
paradigm.  
2.3 The psychometric approach 
As mentioned earlier, the revealed preference model suggested that acceptance of 
risks is correlated with the benefits associated with that risk. In addition, this model 
shows that the voluntariness of an event or a technology also plays a major role in its 
acceptance. However, rather than just focusing on the benefits and the voluntariness of 
each hazard, in their development of the psychometric paradigm Fischhoff et al. 
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(1978) extended Starr’s work to include nine major attributes of hazards. These 
attributes were defined according to whether they were: 
 Voluntary or involuntary 
 Immediate or delayed effect 
 Known or unknown by those exposed  
 Known or unknown by scientists 
 Controllable or uncontrollable 
 New or old 
 Chronic or catastrophic  
 Severe or not severe  consequences 
 Common or dreaded.  
These attributes have been used in many subsequent studies (such as Longford et al., 
1999; Siegrist et al., 2005; Al-Rawad and Al Khattab, 2015; Bassarak et al., 2015).  
The authors of such studies asked people to rate a list of a diverse series of hazards 
according to these attributes. The attributes are then grouped into main factors, using 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). These factors are given interpretive names and 
then used to plot the different hazards on a ‘cognitive map’. According to Slovic 
(1987, p.283) the three most important factors found in repeated studies are (in 
decreasing order of explanatory importance): 
‘Dread Risk’- “This is characterized by a perceived lack of control, dread, 
catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and inequitable distribution of risks and 
benefits” 
‘Unknown Risk’ - “defines a hazard judged to be unobservable, unknown, new, and 
delayed in their manifestation of harm”, and 
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‘Numbers Exposed’- “reflecting the number of people exposed to the risk”.  
The consistent finding in previous studies is that the most important factor that came 
out from the Principal Component Analysis is dread; for example, Fischhoff et al.’s 
(1978) and Slovic’s (1987) empirical studies.  
According to Rohrmann and Renn (2000), the psychometric framework  is based on 
four main points: firstly, risk is considered to be a subjective concept, influenced by 
other factors, rather than being an objective reality. Secondly, risk criteria should 
incorporate different aspects such as “technical/physical, and social/psychological 
ones” (p.17). Thirdly, the framework was proposed to understand the risk perception 
of the general public rather than of experts. Fourthly, by the use of statistical 
techniques such as factor analysis, the framework can identify a cognitive map that 
represents risk perception in a coherent way. The problems and limitations of the 
paradigm are discussed later in this chapter. 
2.3.1 Empirical studies 
A considerable amount of literature has been published using the psychometric 
approach. This investigates a variety of different hazards, different kinds of 
participants and sampling processes, different countries and cultures and different 
types of analysis. There follows a review of the main streams of research into the risk 
perception using the psychometric approach. 
2.3.1.1 Type of hazard 
Risk perception studies, normally, use a predefined and heterogeneous range of 
hazards in order to test a layperson’s risk perception (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000). For 
example, Fischhoff et al. (1978) made a study of 30 various activities and 
technologies (e.g. smoking, bicycles, skiing, food colouring, and nuclear power). 
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Bastide et al. (1989) made a study using a different set of 30 risks (e.g. drugs, oil 
refineries, motorcycles and mountain climbing). Other studies, such as Marris et al. 
(1997), Marris et al. (1998), Langford et al. (1999), Siegrist et al. (2005), Siegrist et al. 
(2007), Bronfman and Cifuentes (2003), Al-Rawad and Al Khattab (2015), Sjöberg 
(1996) and Keown (1989), all used heterogeneous sets of hazards.     
Other researchers, however, have focused on a specific technology or activity that 
may represent a major concern to individuals. For example, Siegrist et al. (2007) 
conducted a study that mainly concerned the use of nanotechnology. They aimed to 
contrast the risk perception of laypeople and experts. Their study showed that the risk 
perception of laypeople was based on 3 factors: trust, perceived benefit and general 
attitudes towards technology; whereas that of experts was based primarily on one 
factor: confidence in governmental agencies. 
Similarly, other studies have focused on specific classes of hazards, such as food-
related hazards (Sparks and Shepherd, 1994), automobile structural defects (Slovic et 
al., 1987) and nuclear waste risks (Sjöberg, 2002a).   
2.3.1.2 Types of participant  
Psychometric studies have used several types of sampling and respondents. However, 
most of these studies have based their respondent samples on unplanned groups such 
as students, teachers, or other convenience samples that are not representative of the 
general public (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000). For instance, Slovic et al. (1980) based 
their study sample on 175 college students in order to test their perception regarding a 
list of 90 different activities, substances and technologies. Similarly, Kleinhesselink 
and Rosa (1991), Keown (1989), Teigen et al. (1988), and Englander et al. (1986) 
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have all based their research on student samples to study risk perception in different 
countries. 
The use of students as a core sample has been criticized on several occasions, and 
several studies avoid this. For example, Bronfman and Cifuentes (2003) used a 
representative sample of the general population in 32 municipalities in Santiago, 
Chile. The authors included in their random sampling people from different 
backgrounds, such as people with different levels of income and from different 
geographical locations.  
2.3.1.3 Countries and groups  
Cross-cultural differences have received significant attention from risk perception 
researchers. According to Boholm (1998), the aim of cross-cultural studies is to 
empirically examine the validity of the psychometric paradigm in different situations 
and countries other than the USA, in an attempt to diversify the basis of our 
understanding of public opinion.  
Several studies tried to repeat or adapt the original study of Slovic et al. (1980) in 
other countries and  cultural contexts. For instance, Teigen et al. (1988) attempted to 
compare respondents from Norway with others from the USA. Both studies used the 
same type of sample, set of hazards, and research instrument. One of their main 
findings was that the Norwegian respondents tended to be more concerned about 
specific hazards – for example, chemical substances used for agricultural purposes - 
than the Americans. Similar other cross-country comparisons have been conducted by 
Kleinhesselink and Rosa (1991) on Japan and the United States, Englander et al. 
(1986) on Hungary and the United States, Keown (1989) on Hong Kong and the 
United States, and Rohrmann and Chen (1999) on Australia and China. Significantly, 
 20 
 
Rohrmann and Chen (1999) found that the differences between countries were less 
evident than those between the different study groups within a single country. 
Other studies have attempted to understand inter-group differences within the same 
culture and society. Sjöberg (2002a) used the psychometric framework to study the 
differences of risk perception concerning nuclear waste between three groups: the 
public, engineers and nuclear experts. In this study, participants were asked to rate 20 
hazards on 21 risk attributes. Some of these attributes were taken from the classical 
psychometric model and other attributes were added, such as immoral risk. The added 
attributes aimed to measure a dimension that was not included in the traditional 
psychometric model i.e. tampering with nature. The researcher found significant 
differences in participants’ mean risk perception rating: the experts were found to 
have the lowest mean rating, followed by engineers and lastly the public. Another 
example is evident in Marris et al. (1998) who utilised the psychometric framework to 
study the differences of risk perception in groups having four different worldviews 
suggested by cultural theory in a specific city in  England. Cultural theory, including 
its worldviews, will be discussed in a separate section later in this chapter. But it is 
worth pointing out here that Marris et al. (1998) found  that each worldview  related to 
concerns with different hazards and that these different concerns were consistent with 
the assumptions of cultural theory. 
The general implication of these previous works is that there are systematic 
differences between individuals, groups and nationalities when their risk perceptions 
are measured and explained using the psychometric approach. Nevertheless, the 
general structure of the psychometric approach, explaining risk perceptions in terms of 
risk attributes, appears to work well in all these cases. It is true that the set of hazards 
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and the set of attributes used need to be adapted to the type of risk and the type of 
perceiver, but the psychometric framework that organises the investigations appears to 
be generally valid. The applicability of this framework to different kinds of risks in 
different contexts led to this researcher wanting to take it even further by putting it in 
the context of a completely different kind of risk, (i.e. political risk) and a different 
kind of perceiver (i.e. managers involved in international business). 
2.3.1.4 Focus and level of analysis  
As explained earlier, there are three dimensions in the psychometric approach: the 
attributes, the hazards and the participants. The traditional psychometric approach 
uses the participants’ rating for a number of hazards on different attributes (like 
voluntariness) and dependent variables (like acceptability and riskiness). The ratings 
are aggregated across participants and then analysed using Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA). The outcomes of PCA are factors which can be given interpretive 
names (such as dread risk). The dependent variables are regressed on to these factors 
in order to assess their explanatory power. These factors have been found to explain, 
on average, 70–90% of the variation in the dependent variables (Slovic et al., 1987; 
Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; Maris et al., 1997; Siegrist et al., 2007; Bronfman et al., 
2007). 
The traditional approach thus assumes that risk attributes explain differences between 
hazards, and this justifies the use of aggregated data (data averaged over participants 
prior to analysis). The traditional analysis answers the question: ‘Why are different 
risks perceived differently?’ Gardner et al. (1982) indicated that the use of aggregated 
data obscures differences among participants and inflates how the model predicts the 
risk perception. Therefore, several studies attempted to apply the psychometric 
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paradigm by using different complex analysis. But the result of these analyses yielded 
lower explanatory power compared with the traditional analysis. According to 
Bronfman et al. (2008), there are four different ways to apply the psychometric 
approach. These are illustrated in Table 2.1, and are: 
 A hazard focus in an aggregated level of analysis (the traditional approach): 
each hazard is one case, with a ratings averaged over the participants. 
 A participant focus in an aggregated level of analysis (averaged over hazards 
prior to analysis): each individual is one case, with ratings averaged over the 
hazards. 
 A hazard focus in a disaggregated level of analysis: each hazard is a case, but 
ratings of different participants are preserved so the interaction (the effect) of 
participant and attribute can also be used to explain differences in perception 
across hazards. 
 A participant focus in a disaggregated level of analysis: each participant is a 
case, but the interaction of hazard and attribute can be used to explain 








Table 2.1: Differentiating the level and focus of analysis in psychometric studies - 
adapted from Bronfman, et al. (2008) 
Level of 
analysis  
Focus of analysis 




The Traditional psychometric 
approach; based on   
A hazard × attribute rating 
matrix created  by averaging 
responses over all participants  
Aggregate-Level Participant-
Focused  
Based on a participant × attribute 
rating matrix created by averaging 
responses over all hazards or over 





 Based on a separate hazard × 




Based on a separate participant × 
attribute rating matrix for each 
hazard. 
Participant focus in an aggregated level of analysis (in the upper right quadrant in 
Table 2.1) was conducted by a number of authors, such as Savadori et al. (2004) and 
Barnett and Breakwell (2001). Savadori et al. (2004) studied the perception of experts 
and the public for biotechnology hazards in food and medicine.  The explanatory 
power of this study (R2) ranged from 30 to 45% depending on the type of hazard 
(medical versus food) and the group of participant (public versus experts).  
Another type of analysis using a disaggregated level, hazard-focused approach (in the 
lower left quadrant of Table 2.1) was conducted by Bronfman and and Cifuentes 
(2003), Marris et al. (1997) and Kraus and Slovic (1988). The Kraus and Slovic 
(1988) research reported the results of two studies, namely a traditional approach and 
disaggregated-level, hazard-focused approach. In study one (the traditional approach), 
the R2 for predicting riskiness for 32 hazards in seven attributes was an average of 
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94%. In study two, (disaggregated, participant-level, hazard-focus analysis) the 
resulting R2 was an average of 69%.  
The participant-focused, disaggregated level analysis (in the lower right quadrant of 
Table 2.1) was conducted by authors such as Gardner and Gould (1989), Sjöberg 
(1996), Marris et al. (1997) and Marris et al. (1998). Gardner and Gould (1989) 
conducted a study that involved participants from two states in US (totalling 1021 
participants). Participants were asked to rate six hazards in relation to four risk 
attributes and overall riskiness. When the overall riskiness was regressed on to the risk 
attributes rating individually for each hazard, R2 values showed that these attributes 
explained only an average of 29% of the variation between people in different states. 
Some authors used all four methods (as in Table 2.1), such as Willis et al. (2005) and 
Bronfman, et al. (2007). The aim of these studies was to evaluate the changes in the 
explanatory power when using all methods as “it is unclear whether observed 
reductions in the explanatory power of psychometric dimensions result from the 
change in the level of analysis [disaggregated instead of aggregated] or from the 
change in the focus of analysis [participants instead of hazards]” (Bronfman, et al., 
2007: 527). 
Willis et al. (2005) used all four methods (as in Table 2.1) to analyse the ecological 
risk perceptions for 30 laypeople, by rating 34 ecological hazards on 17 attributes and 
3 dependent variables, including acceptability, ecological risk and overall risk. For the 
overall risk, the R2 varies when using different methods. The highest R2 was found in 
traditional aggregate-level, hazard-focused (81%). It declined in aggregate-level, 
participant-focused and disaggregated level, hazard-focused (66% and 62% 
respectively). The lowest R2 was found in disaggregated level, participant-focused 
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(48%). For the other two dependent variables (acceptability and ecological risk), the 
results were similar. Willis et al. (2005) explained that there are two possible 
explanations for the lack of explanatory power. The first is related to the level of 
analysis (using of disaggregated data instead of aggregated data), and the second is 
related to the focus of analysis (participants instead of hazards).  
Similar to Willies et al. (2005), Bronfman et al. (2007) conducted a study using all 
four methods and the results were similar to those reported by Willis et al. (2005). 
Bronfman et al. (2007, p.549) argued that “psychometric dimensions do a better job of 
accounting for differences among hazards than differences among people”. This may 
be because respondents’ agreements results in a lack of variation in the predictive 
variables or dependent variables for different hazards (Kraus and Slovic, 1988). An 
alternative reason may be that the rating scales used in the questions were originally 
designed for measuring differences between hazards and not for differences between 
respondents (Bronfman et al., 2007).   
Willies et al. (2005) proposed a hybrid analysis strategy as a solution for the 
aggregated analysis dilemma. This strategy is based on regressing risk perception (e.g. 
riskiness judgments) onto the factors that were obtained from aggregated level for 
every participant separately. Results shows that the R2 for this strategy was very low 
(R2 = 0.458) and even lower than the disaggregated analysis (R2 = 0.667).  Willies et 
al. (2005) argued that his analysis is useful for showing the extent to which 
participants’ level of agreement about what makes some hazards more risky than 
others, and how much differences are related to the participants’ characteristics      
Siegrist et al. (2005) also suggested another method of analysis called three-mode 
Principal Component Analysis (3MPCA). In this type of analysis the data is analysed 
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without aggregating among one mode (such as among participants in the traditional 
approach) and without performing separate analyses for each item in one mode (such 
as for each hazard in participant-focused at disaggregated level). This type of analysis 
required pre-processing the data before analysis. This had to be done, firstly, through 
centring the data for each attribute and hazard; and then subtracting the average rating 
for each participant for that combination. According to Siegrist et al. (2005) and 
Bronfman et al. (2007) this centring would have a similar effect of aggregated data as 
it would eliminate the variation among participants. Bronfman et al. (2007) argued 
that although Siegrist et al. (2005) related individual-difference measures (such as 
general confidence, general trust and gender) to participant components, it is not clear 
how 3MPCA is able to predict riskiness and acceptability judgments that differ among 
participants and hazards. 
As discussed in the next sub-section, the appropriateness of this additional 
sophistication depends on the goal of the study, and whether the research questions 
particularly address quite complex interactions. The loss of the clarity of the original 
psychometric approach, which clearly aims to test the proposition that risk perceptions 
are explained by risk characteristics, is an important consideration. 
 2.3.2 Limitation of the psychometric approach 
Although the psychometric paradigm has been the dominant approach in studying risk 
perception, the model suffers from several limitations. The first limitation is the use of 
unrepresentative samples. For instance, as discussed in the previous section (2.3.1.2), 
much of the research in risk perception relies on students and other convenient 
samples (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000). The problem has been that these studies have 
aimed to describe risk perceptions in a general population but they have not used 
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samples that are representative of general populations. In this research, the target 
population is managers involved in international business in Kuwait, and the sampling 
– although limited by practical constraints – has been specifically directed to this end.  
The second limitation is the failure to clarify the risk target (Bronfman et.al 2007), 
which means respondents are asked about risk without specifying whether the risk 
bearer is oneself, one’s family, or unidentified members of the public. This limitation 
is addressed in this research by asking the participants to make a judgement 
specifically about risks to their international business. 
The third limitation is using aggregated data (data averaged over participants prior to 
analysis), and this obscures differences among participants. This led several 
researchers to apply the psychometric paradigm in different ways, including using a 
different level of analysis (disaggregated instead of aggregated), as well as using a 
different focus of analysis (participants instead of hazards), as discussed in Section 
2.3.1.4. Willies et al. (2005) contended that although it is true that, in principle, 
disaggregated level analyses are always better than the aggregated analyses, in 
practice some considerations may make disaggregated analyses difficult and less 
useful. These include the increased variability among individuals, the need for 
researcher’s subjective judgement in comparing between participants, and difficulties 
in precisely summarising and interpreting the result (Willies et al., 2005). 
The choice of whether to focus on hazards or participants depends on the goal of the 
study (Bronfman et al., 2007). The authors argue that if the goal of the study is to 
examine differences between hazards, then a hazard-focused analysis is more suitable. 
If, on the other hand, the goal of the study is to examine differences between 
 28 
 
individuals’ attitudes towards risks, then a participant-focused analysis is more 
suitable (Bronfman et al., 2007).  
The goal of this study is simply to understand the nature of political risk perception, 
and the original psychometric approach of explaining perception in terms of the 
attributes of different risks is appealing. Therefore the aggregated, hazard-focussed 
analysis will be used. But, since prior research in these domains points to potential 
limitations, two other analyses (aggregating across hazards and attributes) will also be 
undertaken to examine their explanatory power. 
2.4 Trust 
Another limitation of the psychometric paradigm is that it ignores the level of trust 
(Sjöberg, 1996) that the public have in experts and policy makers. Earle and 
Cvetkovich (1995, p.88) state that social trust can be loosely defined as “the process 
by which individuals assign to other persons, groups, agencies, or institutions the 
responsibility to work on certain tasks”. From a management perspective, Siegrist et 
al. (2000, p.354) define social trust as “the willingness to rely on those who have the 
responsibility for making decisions and taking actions related to the management of 
technology, the environment, medicine, or other realms”. Researchers have 
highlighted the fact that trust is an essential factor in shaping individuals’ risk 
perceptions. Slovic (1999) contends that the lack of trust that the public has in 
scientists often results in the former rejecting the risk assessments of the latter. The 
critical problem of trust is that it takes a long time to develop but only a very short 
time to destroy. 
Several researchers have attempted to study the role of trust in individuals’ risk 
perceptions. For example, while attempting to study risk perception of genetic 
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technology, Siegrist (2000) established that people who trusted organisations which 
used or regulated this technology showed a higher perception of the benefits gained 
from this technology than its risks. Flynn et al. (1992) conducted a study to examine 
aspects that determine resistance to a radioactive waste repository. They found that 
trust in management had a strong influence on risk perception. Elsewhere, Siegrist and 
Cvetkovich (2000) concluded that there is a strong relationship between social trust, 
and judgement about risks and benefits among people who are not well-informed 
about hazards. This finding coincides with previous literature suggesting that social 
trust informs decisions when people do not have sufficient knowledge (Earle and 
Cvetkovich, 1995). Another principal finding of Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000) is that 
the relationship between risk and benefit vanishes when trust is controlled.  
On another occasion, Siegrist et al. (2007) used the psychometric paradigm as a 
framework to understand why people perceived different hazards in different ways. 
They used trust as one of the risk attributes. Their research found that perceived risks 
are determined by two factors: the extent to which the applications are dreaded and the 
degree of trust in government agencies. They also found that both trust in 
governmental agencies and perceived benefit reduced perceived risks.   
On the other hand, Sjöberg (2001, p.189) argues that the relationship between trust 
and risk perception is not as strong as previous research suggested. He found that the 
‘unknown–effects factor’ is a ‘more important explanatory factor than trust for the public 
and politicians’. One possible reason for the weak relationship between trust and risk 
perception is that other factors, such as the effects of technology, are not well 
understood by experts and yet play a significant role in determining risk perception 
(Sjöberg, 2001). This means that people might trust experts and regard them as 
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competent, and yet not agree with their conclusions because experts do not always 
have the right answers (Sjöberg, 2001). Sjoberg is not the only author who suggested 
that trust has little influence on risk perception: others, such as Bord and O'Connor 
(1992) and Hallman and Wandersman (1995), made similar findings. While Sjoberg’s 
findings are important, it is unknown whether they can be replicated in different 
samples from different countries. The generalisability of his results is, therefore, 
questionable as they were based on samples taken from developed countries such as 
Sweden, and are likely to differ substantially from those in developing countries such 
as Kuwait. Nonetheless, Sjöberg (2001) agrees with Siegrist (2000) that it is better to 
focus on specific trust rather than general trust in order to understand risk perception. 
Specific trust is trust that is related to a particular authority and not to governments in 
general.  
The need to look at specific rather than general trust means, in the context of political 
risk, looking at the specific institutions, organisations and groups involved in any 
particular investment, such as the current governments, opposition parties, franchises, 
and other relevant parties. Because each company may have various operations in 
many different countries, the specific issues of trust for each company are likely to be 
very diverse. The decision was made, therefore, that the present thesis would draw on 
the general psychometric framework and not address the concept of trust. However, 
this is acknowledged as a potential line of further work in the Conclusion. 
2.5 Perceived risks, benefits and affects 
Some researchers have proposed perceived benefits to have a significant influence on 
individuals’ risk perceptions. However, researchers disagree regarding the type and 
form of this relationship. For instance, Fischhoff et al. (1978) suggest that  there is a 
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direct negative relationship between benefits gained from an activity or technology 
and its related risk. If, for instance, individuals perceive a technology or an activity - 
such as nuclear power - to have high benefits, then they would perceive risks 
associated with this technology to be low and vice versa. 
Alhakami and Slovic (1994), on the other hand, stated that the relationship between 
perceived risk and perceived benefit is not a direct one; however, they added “affect” 
to this relationship. Affect can also be called emotion (Slovic et al., 2004). To clarify, 
if an individual’s feeling towards an activity was positive then it is very likely to be 
perceived to have high benefits and low risks. Finucane et al. (2000) argued that while 
the relationship between perceived risks and perceived benefits in the world tend to be 
positive, in most people’s minds it is inversely related, because “people judge a risk 
not only by what they think about it but also by how they feel about it” (Slovic and 
Västfjäll 2010, p.389). 
Finucane et al. (2000) refer to the process in the findings of Alhakami and Slovic 
(1994) as ‘the affect heuristic’. Finucane et al. (2000) conducted two studies: the first 
study aimed to test the affect heuristic by manipulating time pressure. They found that 
people tend to use the affect heuristic when they have less time and their opportunity 
to analyse the risk is narrow. A second study aimed to test the effect of information 
designed on the overall evaluation of hazards. They found that changing people’s 
information about hazards leads to changes of their judgment about benefits and vice 
versa. These two studies are important because they reveal that affect has an influence 
on decision making. Finucane et al. (2000) claimed that the purpose of the two studies 
is not to exclude the use of the cognitive methods in risk perception, but rather to 
integrate the affect heuristic that plays an unequivocal role in risk perception and 
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perceived benefit. Dohle et al. (2010) suggested that the dread dimension mentioned 
in the psychometric framework is closely related to affect.  
Epstein (1994) argued that people can view risks in two different ways: the first is 
“risk as feeling” in which people react to danger in an intuitive and fast way. Epstein 
also included the experience in this type and called it the “experiential system”. The 
second is “risk as analysis”, in which people react to danger in a logical and formal 
way. Epstein calls this type the “rational system”. Slovic et al. (2004) suggest that 
both the rational system and the experiential system have rationality. Consequently, 
they suggested the name “analytical system” instead of “rational system”. Slovic et al. 
(2004) agree with Epstein (1994) on these two ways, but also suggest a third way in 
which people can view risks; they label this “risk as politics”, which occurs when the 
former two kinds of analysis clash. This clash occurs when laypeople, who generally 
judge risks in an intuitive and fast way, are in conflict with experts who judge risks in 
a logical and analytical way. 
Slovic et al. (2004) argue that affect is very crucial to the decision-making process 
because we can rightly avoid danger without performing an analysis, but we cannot 
avoid danger by performing an analysis without relying on affect, because affect 
comes before analysis. In a different publication, Slovic et al. (2005) reiterate that, 
while analysis is important in the decision-making process, affect can be more 
important because it is a faster and more efficient way to make decisions in complex 
situations. While Slovic et al. (2004) appreciate the importance of affect, they suggest 
that affect can be misleading sometimes because it can be manipulated by the media, 
and so they underline the importance of using affect in parallel with the 
analytic/rational system.  
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From the foregoing, it can be observed that affect plays an important role in risk 
perception. However, these studies were in the context of individuals responding as 
individuals, primarily to risks to safety and the natural environment. They did not 
have in mind individuals who were organisational members responding to business 
risks to their organisations and who were expected to make formal and logical 
judgements. 
2.6 Cultural theory  
According to Kasperson et al. (1988), risk perception and the level of acceptance of 
risk is formed through psychological, social and cultural processes. Hence, attempting 
to understand risk perception only through the psychometric approach may ignore 
other elements, such as cultural dimensions, that should be given more attention in the 
study of risk perception (Dake, 1992). A number of authors agree that risk perception 
of individuals is greatly influenced by the culture or the environment that they live in 
(e.g.Thompson et al., 1990;  Rippl, 2002; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983). 
Cultural theory - in particular grid-group cultural theory - was proposed by the British 
anthropologist Mary Douglas in her book Natural Symbols, originally published in 
1970. This theory was modified by Mary Douglas herself in 1978 and was later 
developed by Michael Thompson and Aaron Wildavsky, as well as others such as 
Steve Rayner and Richard Ellis. In some instances, the first three authors mentioned 
here (Douglas, Thompson, and Widavsky) have worked on the theory together; 
cultural theory is therefore an approach that has been developed over the past forty-
two years. Rippl (2002) however argues that cultural theory really emerged in the 
1980s, when sociologists and anthropologists started studying cultural and social 
factors closely, and investigated the influence of these factors on risk perception. 
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Thompson et al. (1990) embraced this theory and worked on developing it further, 
while Dake (1991) and Dake (1992) have tried to empirically test the theory by using 
quantitative methods. 
According to Douglas (1978) there are two dimensions that make up a framework to 
compare cultures. These two dimensions are: grid - constraints or rules imposed on 
choice; and group, which is a bounded social entity. Kemper and Collins (1990) argue 
that the grid dimension of cultural theory proposed by Douglas can be thought of as 
power, and the group dimension can be thought of as status. To further explain the 
group dimension, Caulkins (1999) argues that high group represents a social entity in 
which people spend a lot of time communicating with others in their group, and low 
group represents a social entity in which people communicate as individuals in 
‘unbounded social networks’. To better explain the grid dimension, Douglas (1992) 
makes a case that, when people move from low grid to high grid, their options become 
limited due to an increase in the external constraints.  
Based on the two dimensions proposed by Douglas (1978), Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1983 ) developed four types of cultures that individuals belong to: individualist, 
fatalist, hierarchic and egalitarian. These four types of cultures have been known as 
the grid/group classification, or cultural theory.  According to Schwarz and Thompson 
(1990), these four types of cultures are sometimes called rationalities or configurations 
Caulkins (1999, p.111) explains the different configurations as follows. The 
individualist configuration, which is characterised by low grid/low group, is the 
“familiar entrepreneurial or individualistic environment with few constraints and wide scope 
for forging and severing network connections freely”. The fatalist configuration, which is 
characterized by high grid/low group, is “constrained by exterior social forces without the 
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advantage of security within a group”. Hierarchic configuration, which is marked by high 
grid/high group, is the “classical Weberian bureaucracy with a clear organizational 
hierarchy and rule constrained rational action”. Finally, the egalitarian, which is 
characterised by low grid/high group, is represented by “sectarians who emphasize group 
solidarity and deplore extensive social differentiation”.  
Based on reviewing the literature, the following is a summary of these four different 
worldviews: 
Hierarchies: (strong group/strong grid) this group contains individuals who are 
strongly involved in their groups, and comply with the imposed rules. Their main risk 
concern is law and order.  
Egalitarians: (strong group/weak grid) people under this category can be described as 
suspicious of technology and viewing nature as fragile and in need of protection; they 
see risk in terms of possible harm.   
Individualists: (weak group/weak grid) people under this category have been 
described as viewing risk as opportunity. Their main concern is war and other threats 
to markets. 
Fatalists: (weak group/strong grid) people under this category feel they have little 
control over risks. They do not identify with any of the main concerns but for all 
practical purposes, they show similar patterns of behaviour to hierarchies.  
Some literature relates these four different configurations to trust in institutions. For 
example, Wildavsky and Dake (1990) argue that the conflict in cultures is correlated 
with ‘trust and distrust of societal institutions’ and is responsible for differences in 
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risk perception among individuals. For example, egalitarians have a high level of risk 
perception towards technology; they do not have trust in corporations to utilise this 
technology in a way in which everybody can equally benefit. Individuals, on the other 
hand, have a low level of risk perception towards technology; they encourage 
competition and don’t like to put restrictions on profitable products and services, such 
as technology. Hierarchists don’t have a high risk perception of technology, but rather 
they are more concerned about ‘social deviance’ caused by status differences. 
Similarly, Finucane and Holup (2005) argue that people do not trust experts or 
institutions in the context of egalitarianism, while people have trust in experts in the 
context of hierarchy. The authors further add that individualism stresses the 
achievements made by the individuals and calls for rewarding them.  
2.6.1 Cultural theory shortcomings 
As with the previous approaches, cultural theory approach has received several 
criticisms. For instance, Marris et al. (1998) , Boholm (1996) and  Sjöberg (1996) 
stated that cultural theory has two different versions: the stability version and the 
mobility version. According to Marris et al. (1998, p.637), the stability version 
“maintains that individuals will choose to attach themselves to institutions with the 
same type of social organization in different spheres of their lives (e.g. at home, at 
work, in leisure activities)” and mobility version “suggests that individuals might 
attach themselves to institutions with different grid and group characteristics in 
different spheres of their lives, or over time.” The two versions of cultural theory have 
caused some confusion among researchers about the unit of analysis: the stability 
version, for instance, focuses on individuals as a unit of analysis, whereas the mobility 
version, on the other hand, makes institutions the unit of analysis. 
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These two versions of the theory have caused some disagreements between 
researchers regarding the method of collecting data. Researchers supporting the 
stability version tend to use quantitative methods to empirically support the model, 
while the mobility version supporters use the qualitative method of data collection, 
including focus groups and observation, in order to see the effect of groups on 
individuals. Hence, both techniques have their weaknesses. For instance, analysing the 
data driven from the quantitative method may not enable the researchers to clearly 
differentiate between different types of individuals. Again, respondents may agree 
with several statements designed to test the egalitarian, but at the same time agree 
with statements designed to test the individualist. Accordingly, some researchers 
suggest using both methods to determine the cultural bias of individuals (Marris et al., 
1998). However, the qualitative methods cannot be applied in all situations and 
scenarios, such as the current research. In such cases, researchers will find it very 
difficult to conduct focus groups with corporate managers.  
This research doesn’t follow cultural theory as it doesn’t look at individuals in a 
society; it looks at organisations (and people with well-defined roles and functions 
within the organisation). This means that to define a cultural influence would mean 
looking at the different cultures and sub-cultures within an organisation, and trying to 
link these with the cultural categorisation in the general literature. This is difficult in a 
study that is not ethnographical but which is based on an interview programme.  
In addition, cultural theory has not been, in the past, a very good predictor of risk 
perceptions. Sjöberg (2002b) disagrees with the assumption that cultural theory can be 
used to understand risk perception. Moreover, Marris et al. (1998) found a low 
correlation between cultural biases and risk perception in their study. Similarly, 
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Sjöberg (1996) found that cultural theory was not efficient in studying risk perception 
in some cultures and countries, including Brazil and Sweden. Moreover, Caulkins 
(1999) claimed that cultural theory is sensible but that it has not undergone cross-
cultural testing. 
In a comparison conducted between the two approaches (psychometric paradigm and 
cultural theory), Sjöberg (1996) shows that the psychometric studies, which tested 
only the qualitative dimensions initially proposed with this approach, have a 20% 
explanatory power. However, cultural theory has only a 5% explanatory power 
(Sjöberg, 1996). Furthermore, Marris et al. (1997) conducted a questionnaire in which 
they accounted for elements from both the psychometric paradigm and cultural theory. 
The findings of the questionnaire suggested that the qualitative characteristics of 
psychometric paradigm had higher explanatory power than cultural biases.     
2.7 Conclusion 
The literature review has suggested that three main models have been used by 
researchers studying risk perceptions generally - namely, revealed preferences, the 
psychometric paradigm and cultural theory. The revealed preference approach has 
suffered from several limitations that appear to make the model unsuitable for the 
current research context, investigating the perception of political risks. For instance, 
the revealed preferences approach relies mainly on the market value of activities or 
technologies under investigation, which makes sense only if there is a free, observable 
market in the activities that create the risks. In the context of the investment activity 
and political risk, it is hard to argue that this is true. Firms rely on private information 
when making investment decisions, their investment opportunities are intimately 
related to their specific capabilities and history, and the costs and returns on the 
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investments are typically commercially confidential. So, although investments do 
reveal something about the political risk perceptions of investors, getting adequate 
information on those investments in a way that reveals risk perceptions does not seem 
feasible.  
Cultural theory, similarly, has weaknesses that appear to exceed its advantages. The 
literature cited earlier shows that in practice it has been hard to find a way of 
measuring culture that distinguishes successfully between different cultural types 
(such as Hierarchic Egalitarian, Individualist and Fatalist). Some of these difficulties 
have been addressed, for example using procedures like focus groups to better enable 
the research to distinguish between different types of individuals. Results also indicate 
that cultural type explains very little variance in risk perception once the standard, 
psychometric attributes have been taken into account.  
The advantage of the psychometric approach, on the other hand, is that it is an 
expressed preferences approach and it has been widely used and validated in several 
contexts, using different groups of respondents and sets of hazards. Yet, to the best of 
the present researcher’s knowledge, it has not been carried across from the general 
domains of safety and environmental risk to the domain of political risk, and it has not 
been used to investigate the perceptions of managers working in the context of 
organisations making investments that incur political risk.  
The psychometric approach appears to capture a basic feature of risk perception that is 
very likely to be true of political risks experienced by firms, and the attributes of the 
risk (such as its controllability) that shape risk perceptions. 
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However, as described, it has a number of limitations. Some of these limitations can 
be addressed by analysing the psychometric data in a slightly different way; for 
example, by comparing the relative explanatory strength of hazard-focussed analysis 
and participant-focussed analysis. Other limitations include its neglect of contextual 
factors (such as the organisation an individual works for, the nature of the individual’s 
role, the individual’s and organisation’s history) and the absence of a cultural theory 
framework. Therefore, the research design for this study, explained in Chapter Four, 
involves both a psychometric study and a qualitative, interview-based study. This 
attempts to investigate how managers perceive risk, but also how their perceptions 
combine with formal risk assessment, and how they relate to managers’ organisational 
contexts.  
Having discussed the risk perception literature in this chapter, the next chapter 
(Chapter 3) will survey the political risk literature. This will attempt to make the link 
between risk perception generally and political risk specifically. 
CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL RISK LITERATURE 
3.1 Introduction 
Political risk literature can be divided into two main parts (see Figure 3.1): one is the 
nature of political risk and the other is how it is assessed. The nature of the risk falls 
into three main sections: how political risk is defined, how it is classified and the 
impact of these risks on international firms. These three sections will be discussed in 
this chapter. The second part covers the assessment of political risk and falls into two 
sections: developing methods for assessing political risk (Rios-Morales et al., 2009; 
Azuaje et al., 2006; Alon and Martin, 1998) and evaluating the practice and process of 
the firms’ assessment, in particular the degree to which assessment can be said to be 
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institutionalised. As the main aim of this research is to examine political risk 
perception in relation to the institutionalisation level of risk assessment, the literature 
on developing methods for assessing political risk will not be covered.  
 
Figure 3.1: Political Risk Literature 
3.2 Definition of political risk 
Many previous researchers attempted to define political risk; however, there is no 
clear-cut definition in the literature. This absence of consensus has been attributed to 
the diversity of risks among international firms (Burmester, 2000). The general body 
of the literature, however, takes two main approaches to defining political risk.  The 
first defines political risk solely as government interference; the second defines it as 
any event of a political kind that affects the international operations of a firm, whether 
it arises from governmental actions or societal events. 
The first way of defining political risk relates to the actions and interference of host 
governments and their ability to “unexpectedly” alter the rules in a way that 
negatively affects the functions and operations of international firms (Butler and 
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Jeoquin, 1998, p.599). Similarly, Buckley (2000) defined political risk as the 
governmental actions that change an investment’s value. Furthermore, Butler (2008), 
agreed with Butler and Joaquin (1998), and Buckley (2000) and described political 
risk as the influence of ‘local forces’ on the business environment that might lead to 
unexpected changes, such as taxes, repatriation restrictions, restriction on employment 
laws for foreign investors and foreign exchange control. As argued by Minor (2003), 
and Bartlett et al. (2008), host governments can clearly have different interests from 
investors, such as protecting national organisations from foreign competitors and it is 
this fundamental possibility of difference in interest that creates risk. 
The second way of defining political risk sees host governments as just one of many 
actors that contribute to political risk, along with terrorists, rebel groups and other 
stakeholders (Jakobsen, 2010, p. 482). Restricting the agency of political risks to 
government produces unduly narrow assumptions (Boddewyn, 2005) and distracts 
analysis away from other important causes of political risk (Alon and Martin, 1998; 
Alon and Herbert, 2009). As pointed out by Iankova and Katz (2003), revolutions, 
riots and civil wars are examples of other risks originating from non-governmental 
sources that affect the business climate and reduce investors’ returns. Zarkada-Fraser 
and Fraser (2002) accordingly give the most comprehensive definition of political risk 
and this study adopts their definition as “an aggregate negative effect of governmental 
and societal actions and/or inertia on a select group, or all foreign concerns operating 




3.3 Classifications of political risk 
There are many approaches to classify political risk in the literature but they tend to 
fall into one of two categories: 
1. The first is related to the influence of the political risk - which typically is seen 
as micro versus macro (Robook, 1971; Alon and Martin, 1998; Alon and 
Herbert, 2009) according to the specificity of its effects.  
2. The second classification is related to the source of political risk; - typically 
governmental (or legal) risks and extra-governmental (or non-legal) risks 
(Rugman and Collinson 2009).   
Micro political risks are those that affect particular firms, industries, sectors, or 
projects (Robock, 1971; Alon and Martin, 1998; Alon and Herbert, 2009; Rugman and 
Collinson, 2009). Import restrictions that target a specific industry is an example of 
micro risk. Macro political risk, on the other hand, consists of more pervasive factors 
(Alon and Martin, 1998) and includes risk that affects all foreign enterprises (Rugman 
and Collinson, 2009), or all firms and businesses across industries in the host country 
(Alon and Martin, 1998) or entire geographic regions (Alon and Herbert, 2009). An 
example of such a macro political risk is civil war. 
In the second classification of political risk, governmental or legal risks harm foreign 
businesses “within the existing political, economic and legislative system” (Rugman 
and Collinson, 2009, p.391). Extra-governmental or non-legal risks remain outside the 
governmental and legal system (Rugman and Collinson, 2009). Examples of risks are 
shown in Table 3.1, classified vertically by how specific their effects are, and 






Table 3.1: Classification of political risks (adapted from Rugman and Collinson, 2009) 
 





 Newly elected government 
 New overarching trade 
agreements 
 General changes to policies or 
laws relating to foreign 
investors and investments 
 Coup  or civil war 
 Military attacks from other nations 
 Internal terrorist attacks  
 General corruption 
 Mafia-type activities  





 Firm specific legislation with 
adverse effect (e.g., export 
licences, import duties, rules on 
profit repatriation) 
 Subsidies or protection for 
companies 
 Targeted attacks 
 Firm specific sabotage, extortion 
 Theft or abuse of intellectual 
property rights 
 Targeted or selective corruption 
 
Al Khattab et al. (2007) extended the second classification, by dividing the extra-
governmental risks into two parts: host-society risks and interstate risks. The host 
society risks are risks that undermine a constituted authority and might have negative 
effects on domestic and international businesses (e.g. revolution). Interstate risks are 
political conflicts that occur between countries, such as war and economic sanctions 
(Al Khattab et al., 2007).  
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3.4 The nature of risks to international firms 
A wide range of literature (e.g. Miller, 1992; Hashmi and Guvenli, 1992; Howell, 
2001; Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Al Khattab, et al., 2007; Rugman and Collinson, 
2009) reports the different risks experienced by firms making international 
investments. For example, Busse and Hefeker (2007) include 12 political risks in their 
study to examine the relationship between these risks and foreign direct investment 
inflow. These include government instability, ethnic tensions, internal and external 
conflict.  However, these examples are too broad as each of them may include other 
distinct risks. For example, internal conflict can include riots, revolution or civil war 
and each of these risks result in different consequences.  
Previous studies have typically addressed political risk to investors operating from 
developed countries. However, some of these risks are less applicable to the context of 
this thesis such as ‘newly elected government’, listed by Rugman and Collinson 
(2009). During the Arab Spring, there has typically been a revolution followed by the 
establishment of a new government and this is different from the ‘newly elected 
government’ suggested by Rugman and Collinson (2009), where there is usually a 
democratic process that enables the authorised transition from one government to 
another, and clearly presents different kinds of threat.  
 Few studies have been conducted in developing countries, and particularly in the 
Middle East region. To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, only one study was 
conducted in the Middle East region (Al Khattab et al., 2007). This study examines 
the vulnerability of Jordanian international firms to a list of political risks. Table 3.2 
shows the list of political risks suggested by Al Khattab et al. (2007). Interestingly, 
this study omits corruption, yet corruption threatens international businesses in many 
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countries (Oetzel, 2005) and is recognised, for example, by Zahra (2011) and Zgheib 
(2015), as being widespread in the Middle East.  
Table 3.2: list of political risks (adapted from Al Khattab et al., 2007) 
Source of risk Risks 
Host government 
 Currency inconvertibility 
 Taxation restrictions 
 Import and/or export restrictions 
 Contract repudiation 
 Ownership and/or personnel restrictions 
 Expropriation and/or confiscation 
Host society 
 Demonstrations, riots and insurrection 
 Terrorism  
 Revolutions and civil wars 
Interstate 
 Economic sanctions  
 Wars 
 
The following sub-sections describe the political risks to international business in 
more detail, under the headings of host government, host society and interstate risks.  
3.4.1 Host Governmental Risks 
As discussed earlier, host governmental risks are those related to actions of host 
governments acting against the interests of investors but within the relevant legislative 
scheme (Rugman and Collinson, 2009). These risks are taxation restrictions, currency 
inconvertibility, import and/or export restrictions, contract repudiation, ownership 
and/or personnel restrictions, and expropriation and/or confiscation.  
Taxation can be used to either restrict or encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
increasing or decreasing corporate income tax (Waring and Glendon, 2001). Foreign 
investors clearly aim to avoid duplication of taxes in the host country and 
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subsequently when remitting the monies to a home country (Ling and Hoi, 2006; 
Brink, 2004). Glass and Saggi (2014) compared the competition between host 
countries in attracting foreign investments and the implications of tax policy co-
ordination of those countries. Their study established that host countries can attract 
FDI by reducing tax on multinational firms. 
Currency inconvertibility can be a governmental action if the host country suffers 
from lack of hard currency reserves (Al Khattab et al., 2007). Currency 
inconvertibility includes restriction on the repatriation of monies (both capital and 
revenue) and currency exchange. Blocks or delays in profit repatriation, which 
sometimes can reach years after the dividend date, erode the investment rate, 
especially in countries where the currency depreciates in value (Weigel, 1970). 
Empirical research by Hood and Nawaz (2004: 14), found that “currency or trade 
control” is one of the biggest potential risks for international businesses. Moreover, 
Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996) found that profit remittances and exchange 
controls are a serious concern in relation to the political environment.   
Contract repudiation is a breach of contract by the host government. This reflects a 
lack of commitment by the host government (Straub, 2008). Moran (2001) considered 
this a significant risk as it is typically a termination of an existing investment without 
compensation. Firms with large assets are unsurprisingly more concerned about 
contract repudiation by a host government (Al Khattab et al., 2007). Pahud de 
Mortanges and Allers (1996) found that 39% of international firms experienced 
contract problems in relation to host governments in their international business. 
Import and export restrictions are often considered the most important factor in 
foreign market selection (Rugman and Collinson, 2009). Import restrictions imposed 
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by a government typically aim to support domestic production against imported 
substitutes (Keillor et al., 2005). Import restrictions might affect an overseas 
investor’s ability to import materials like drugs, spare parts or chemical substances, 
which will have an immediate adverse effect on profits and sales (Keillor et al., 2005). 
For example, in the mid-1980s, foreign-car manufacturers in Mexico were required to 
use locally produced materials and parts, which amounted to 50% of the value of each 
vehicle (Alon et al., 2006) because of import restrictions. As for exports, a 
government might impose restrictions to protect domestic growth in industries and 
control ‘strategically important’ goods (Rice and Mahmoud, 1990). There is a view, 
however, that international firms may be less concerned about export restrictions as 
these will negatively affect the host country’s balance of trade, making it unlikely that 
a host government will deploy them (Rice and Mahmoud, 1990; Hashmi and Guvenli, 
1992; Subramanian, 1993). 
Ownership restrictions are sometimes used by a host government, when it “demands 
that a government entity, or local nationals, owns part of the affiliate” (Pahud de 
Mortanges and Allers, 1997, p.305). As Root (1998) indicates, uncertain actions of the 
host government that create ownership risk can limit or destroy investors’ control of 
affiliates. In addition, personnel restriction takes place when host governments force 
international firms to employ the domestic workforce regardless of qualifications and 
experience (Brink, 2004). The main objective of government typically is to increase 
local employment and engagement in managing foreign investments (Al Khattab et 
al., 2007).  These kinds of restrictions can clearly affect international firms’ capacity 
to make strategic and competent decisions (Keillor et al., 2005).  
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Expropriation is the power of host governments to deprive foreign investors of the 
legitimate exploitation of their investment (Howell, 2001). Researchers such as 
Burmester (2000), Minor (2003) and Shapiro (2006) regard expropriation as a critical 
and extreme political risk for all international firms. Ramarmurti and Doh (2004) 
argue that expropriation (or nationalisation of foreign assets) is becoming very 
uncommon in developing countries, but does still happen. Examples include the 
effective expropriation of shares by the Bolivian government in 2006 when it 
demanded that foreign companies renegotiate their contracts. The government argued 
that the Bolivian constitution allowed for such expropriation if judged to be in the 
interest of ‘public need’ (Rosado de Sá Ribeiro, 2009). There was also the 
nationalisation of 51% of Spanish company Repsol’s shares in YPF by the 
Argentinean government in April 2012. This happened during a time of high inflation, 
alarming reduction in growth and an increase in capital outflow (Moreno et al., 2013). 
Typically, the level of expropriation risk is inversely proportional to the level of 
technology in the industry, i.e. high-technology industries have a lower expropriation 
risk than low technology industries (Wilkin, 2001). Moran (1998) explains this in 
terms of the host country’s need for new technology and accompanying skills. 
Although expropriation is considered a critical risk, some have found that managerial 
concerns are low in relation to this risk (e.g. Al Khattab et al., 2007). Hood and 
Nawaz (2004) similarly argue that expropriation is diminishing as a concern even in 
politically volatile regions. They suggest that host countries might be reluctant to use 
expropriation against international companies because of the adverse consequences 
for them, such as international economic isolation and the withdrawal of support from 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Hood and Nawaz, 2004).  
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Host governments attract foreign investments through promoting liberal and stable 
policies (Baek and Qian, 2011) and offering financial (Li, 2006) and tax incentives to 
foreign investors (Al Khataab et al., 2007; Baek and Qian, 2011). And their reputation 
is essential to attracting foreign investors while minimising their uncertainty. 
Consequently, host governments’ attempts to regulate businesses are decreasing 
(Hood and Nawaz, 2005) and this explains the findings of Al Khattab et al. (2007) 
who show that managers, overall, are becoming less concerned about the host 
governmental risk. 
3.4.2 Host society risks 
Risks such as demonstrations, riots, turmoil, revolutions, civil wars and terrorism 
relate to political actions coming from non-governmental sources (Ting, 1988). Host 
society risks are ones that interrupt governmental services, affect the supplies 
necessary for manufacturing, cause personnel loss, result in damage to physical 
properties and, in some cases, necessitate abandoning the business operation (Minor, 
2003; Brink, 2004). Dunn (1983) suggests that these types of risk originate from the 
values, attitudes and beliefs of the people rather than government. Host society risks 
include demonstrations, riots and insurrection, terrorism, revolutions, civil wars and 
corruption. 
Demonstrations are public gatherings to protest against something and to express 
certain views and opinions on political issues (Stevenson, 2010). When such 
demonstrations lead to a violent disturbance of the peace they become riots, while 
insurrection is a violent uprising against governments (Stevenson, 2010). These risks 
are obviously interrelated as demonstrations can turn into riots and riots into 
insurrection (Tareq, 2004).  
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Terrorism can cause direct or indirect risks to firms’ operations as it might create 
barriers to the free flow of goods and increase transaction costs (Czinkota et al., 
2005). As pointed out by Subramanian et al. (1993), Rice and Mahmoud (1990) and 
Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996), these risks can be of substantial concern to 
companies operating in developing countries in particular.  
Revolution is a radical restructuring of economic and social relations due to the 
overthrow of an established order and the transfer of state power from one leadership 
to another (Mclean and McMillan, 2009). Similarly, civil war is a military conflict, 
involving both government and civilian forces, which centres on territory within a 
country, involves combatants from that country and is about the right to govern the 
disputed territory (Mclean and McMillan, 2009). The disintegration of the local 
economy because of civil war generally forces international firms to leave the host 
country (Tayeb, 2000).  
Corruption is a host society risk existing at least partly outside the governmental 
system and violating the existing law. It affects the whole business environment 
(Brink, 2004; Oetzel, 2005), reduces government efficiency, disturbs the financial and 
economic environment, causes political instability (Merna and Al-Thani, 2007), and 
generally raises the cost of investment (Johnston, 2001). Based on empirical research 
conducted by Busse and Hefeker (2007) in 83 developing countries (1984-2003), 
government stability and corruption are important determinants of FDI inflows. Wei 
(2000) conducted research into inflow investment from twelve countries to 45 host 
countries, finding an inverse relationship between corruption and FDI inflow, as 
would be expected. But, more surprisingly, Egger and Winner (2005, p.949) found 
that there was a positive relationship between corruption and FDI inflows in 73 
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countries over the period 1995-1999. The authors argued that corruption could be a 
“helping hand” by “circumventing regulatory and administrative restrictions” and 
thereby encouraging foreign investors. This shows that it is reasonable to regard 
phenomena like corruption as being the source of risks but this does not mean that 
they are risks in all cases and it does not mean that, at an aggregate level, they deter 
investment activity.  
Overall, host society risks have been found to be more important than governmental 
risk for firms operating in developing rather than developed economies (Pahud de 
Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Rice and Mahmoud, 1990; Kobrin 1980). On this theme, 
Al Khattab et al. (2007) found that Jordanian managers are more concerned about the 
host society risks, as these risks are common events in the Arab countries and their 
consequences are expected to be more severe.  
3.4.3 Interstate risks 
As described in Section 3.3, interstate risks are political conflicts that occur between 
countries and of which the most important are regarded as economic sanctions and 
wars (Al Khattab et al., 2007). International economic sanctions are the most frequent 
feature of political interactions (Caruso, 2003). According to Black et al. (2009, 
p.412), an economic sanction is “a restriction or prohibition by one country of trade 
contracts with another country of whose actions or policies it disapproves. Sanctions 
may be general, or applied to particular goods, especially armaments and oil”. 
Burmester (2000) defined economic sanctions as governmental restrictions on 
financial transactions or exports and imports, which could harm the target country by 




According to Al Khattab et al. (2007), wars have multiple negative consequences, 
such as interrupting businesses in conducting their normal activities, causing loss of 
income and equity investments, and causing probable damage to physical assets. 
Suliman and Mollick (2009, p.47) supported Al Khattab et al. (2007) in arguing that 
“war events... exert strong negative effects on FDI”.  
3.5 Political risk in developing and developed countries  
Several references have already been made to the importance of a country’s economic 
status, whether developed or developing, in terms of the political risks it creates 
(Kobrin, 1980; Hood and Nawaz, 2004; Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996). 
Although host governments in both developing and developed nations can exercise 
higher managerial control and manipulate regulatory structures (Cantwell, 2014), 
government regulations and priorities in developing countries can change fairly 
rapidly whereas, in developed countries, firms are likely to have an advance notice of 
any changes and be capable of taking action to protect their investment (Hood and 
Nawaz, 2004). Shen et al. (2001) suggested that international firms need to reduce the 
less favourable changes in policy by maintaining a good relationship with the host 
government in developing countries.  
More generally, companies have different concerns toward political risk in developed 
and developing countries. For example, exchange control, profit repatriation and 
contract problems were found to be the risks which raised the most concern in 
developed countries, whereas, in developing countries, social unrest was the most 
important risk (Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996). This result is in line with 
Kobrin’s (1980) finding in which American senior international managers were more 
concerned about the expropriation and civil disorder in developing countries whereas 
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labour interference and price controls were found the most important in developed 
nations. Similarly, Rice and Mahmoud (1990) found that Canadian firms judged 
‘political and social unrest’ as the most important risk while operating in developing 
economies, whereas ‘import restriction’ was the most important risk while operating 
in developed economies.  
As explained later in this thesis, the distinction between developed and developing 
countries becomes relevant to the exploration of risk perception. It is also potentially 
relevant to this study as the levels of development of the host countries potentially 
informs the way in which political risks are assessed by the international investors.  
3.6 Political Risk Assessment 
A growing body of literature indicates the importance of political risk assessment in 
making investment decisions (Rice and Mahmoud, 1990; Alon and Martin, 1998; 
Minor, 2003; Fitzpatrick, 2005) in order to avoid or minimise the probability of losing 
assets and income in host countries (Wilkin, 2001; Shapiro, 2006). Assessing political 
risks is claimed to help firms cope and survive and prosper in whatever political 
environment they encounter (Brink, 2004). According to Nawaz and Hood (2004), 
some firms completely avoid areas in which there are political conflicts, but obviously 
this has to be balanced against losing opportunities for profit.  
Political risk assessment has been defined as “the process of analysing and evaluating 
political risk while undertaking international business activities” (Al Khattab et al., 
2008, p.688). Despite its importance, the low standard in the practice of political risk 
assessment has been portrayed by many researchers as unsystematic, informal and 
subjective (Kobrin et al., 1980; Hashmi and Guvenli, 1992; Pahud de Mortanges and 
Allers, 1996; Hood and Nawaz, 2004). Little research has been conducted to explain 
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this phenomenon, but Burmester (2000) has attempted to explain it as either lack of 
awareness of political risks, or as firms resisting the idea that political risk is open to 
analysis.  
The literature uses the term ‘institutionalisation’ to explain the process by which the 
assessment  of political risk becomes “more explicit and systematic” within a firm 
(Blank et al., 1980; p.7). A low standard of political risk assessment practice in a firm 
is associated with a low level of institutionalisation. The following sub-sections 
therefore explain institutionalisation and its indicators in political risk assessment.  
3.6.1 Institutionalisation of political risk assessment 
Most empirical researchers deal with “institutionalisation” as a twofold classification: 
either institutionalised or non-institutionalised, depending on certain indicators. For 
example, Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996) investigated several firms’  levels of 
institutionalisation with reference to whether a political risk assessment department 
had been established or not. Burmester (2000) differentiated between institutionalised 
firms and non-institutionalised firms based on the firms’ propensity to commence 
political risk assessment and the frequency with which they undertook it.  
Blank et al. (1980, p.7) argued that institutionalisation of political risk assessment is a 
gradual process and that the degree of institutionalisation at any one time lies on a 
continuum. There is a “grey area” in which firms may have institutionalised the 
function from one perspective but not from another. They suggest that there are three 
indicators of institutionalisation: (a) assigning responsibility to employees and 
managers; (b) regularity of performing the assessment and (c) the existence of 




As explained later in Chapter Six, these three indicators are used in this study; they are 
therefore discussed in more detail in the next section.  
3.6.2 Institutionalisation indicators 
 Assigning responsibility 
According to the literature, there are basically two ways of assigning responsibility: 
internal (in-house) responsibility, to individuals or groups within the firm; or external, 
using other institutions to assess political risk. The literature points to the various 
deficiencies of relying on external bodies: (a) the differences in how various external 
assessors define political risk, leading to different assessment results (Alon and 
Martin, 1998); (b) the reliance of risk assessment models used by external assessors 
on historical data when there are good reasons to think such data will not predict 
future risk (De La Torre and Neckar, 1988); (c) the  particular, specialised focus of 
external institutions; for example, a concentration on creditworthiness, while ignoring 
other risks (Alon and Martin, 1998); and lastly (d), the external assessors provide 
general assessment that does not necessarily take account of the specific 
characteristics of the investor and the situations they encounter (Pahud de Mortanges 
and Allers, 1996).  
As a result of these deficiencies, coupled with increased investment abroad (Alon and 
Martin, 1998), many firms are said to be carrying out in-house assessment of political 
risk. According to Blank et al. (1980), in order for the international firms to be 
classified as institutionalised, they should at least have dedicated employees for this 
work. Similarly, Kobrin (1982, p.89) suggested that institutionalised firms should 
have an internal “function, role and position differentiated” for the responsibility of 
assessing political risk. However, Kobrin (1982) admitted that firms may implicitly 
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conduct political risk assessment without assigning such responsibilities, and Al 
Khattab et al. (2008) found the majority of Jordanian international firms were 
conducting the assessment through various individuals without assigning formal 
responsibility. 
 Regularity of performing the assessment  
The regularity of political risk assessment is typically taken as the frequency with 
which political risks are assessed (Blank et al., 1980). An increased regularity of 
political risk assessments indicates a higher degree of institutionalisation (Blank et al., 
1980; Al Khattab et al., 2008a) as the regularity allows organisations to cope with 
environmental changes and detect unfavourable events that negatively affect their 
activities (Brink, 2004). Political risk assessment has often been found to be “crisis-
oriented” and “on demand”, that is triggered by external events or internal activities 
rather than being in some way planned or pro-active (Rice and Mahmoud,, 1990; 
Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Oetzel, 2005; Al Khattab et al., 2008b). Such 
external events might include war, taxation restriction and social unrest, whereas 
internal stimuli include the existence of a new investment opportunity or a firm’s 
expansions into different host countries (Al Khattab et al., 2008b).  
 Risk assessment procedures  
According to Brink (2004), there are essentially two different procedures for assessing 
political risk: heuristic (or qualitative) and scientific (or quantitative). The heuristic 
procedure is regarded as involving subjective judgments, whereas the scientific 
procedure is seen as typically using mathematical modelling (Waring and Glendon, 
2001). Heuristic procedures include the opinion of experts (Walker et al., 2003; Rice 
and Mahmoud 1990), the Delphi technique of elicitation specifically (Tsai and Su, 
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2005; Al Khattab et al., 2011), the intuition and judgment of managers (Rice and 
Mahmoud, 1990), and scenario-based methods (Brink, 2004; Al Khattab et al., 2011). 
With reference to expert opinion, firms typically rely on international organisations, 
local government officials, banks, journalists and former politicians (Pahud de 
Mortanges and Allers, 1996).  The main disadvantage of this technique is its 
vulnerability to any bias among such experts (Kobrin, 1981a).  
According to Merna and Al-Thani (2005), Delphi is a way of collecting expert opinion 
in which a panel of experts are requested to make their judgments about the risk, 
independently at first and afterwards by consensus in order to discard any extreme 
opinions. Burmester (2000) argued that the outcome of Delphi method relies on the 
quality and the ability of the experts selected and their enthusiasm to participate. The 
main criticism of this technique is the delay in achieving final results so that the 
assessment might quickly become invalid (Simon, 1985). It has been found that this 
technique was not commonly used for political risk (Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 
1996; Rice and Mahmoud, 1990; Al Khattab et al., 2011).   
With regard to the intuition and judgment of managers, firms may send managers to 
the host country for investigation (Pahud de Mortanges and Allers 1996) and meeting 
with government authorities (Kobrin, 1980). Even then their understanding can be 
limited and selective. It is thus typically recommended to combine this method with 
other less subjective methods (Pahud de Mortanges and Allers 1996). But various 
studies have found that this method was the most common for risk assessment: see, 
for example, Al Khattab et al. (2011) within Jordanian firms, Pahud de Mortanges and 




A scenario-based method is a commonly accepted technique used to identify the 
important risks and opportunities of political risk (Brink, 2004). This method depends 
on visualizing the future rather than inferring from the past (Levinsohn, 2002).  
In order to decrease the subjectivity and the bias of the qualitative procedures, 
quantitative assessment of political risk is also used (Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 
1996). The quantitative procedures include techniques that depend on mathematical or 
statistical processes (Ting, 1988) such as the use of regression procedure to predict the 
political risk (Rice and Mahmoud, 1990). The quantitative techniques could provide a 
sensible and systematic structure in the assessment of political risk (Tsai and Su, 
2005).  
A number of quantitative risk assessment techniques exist that have been applied 
specifically to country risks including political risks. Some of the commonly applied 
ones include Discriminant Analysis (DA), Logit and Probit models, and Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANN) (Bouchet et al., 2003). Discriminant Analysis, for instance, 
has used data such as that on price inflation as independent variables to predict 
categorical dependent variances such as expropriation (Yim and Mitchell, 2005, 
Lindeberg and Mörndal, 2002). Discriminant Analysis is used when dependent 
variables (also known as grouping variables) are known a priori (Bouchet et al., 2003). 
Accordingly, this technique allows prediction of the extent to which a country is likely 
to take an action that is unfavourable for foreign investment (Bouchet et al., 2003). 
Logit and Probit models look into dichotomous or binary variables, thus making them 
suitable for political risks that normally have either/or results, e.g. either a country 
goes into war or not.  All such approaches have limitations – for example Bouchet et 
al. (2003) describe the problem that independent variables vary across countries and 
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times, citing the way in which debt service ratio can have a negative sign in some 
models but a positive sign in others. In these cases, where data do not fulfil the 
assumptions, techniques such as Artificial Neural Networks are used (Yim and 
Mitchell, 2005). Artificial Neural Networks do not follow traditional statistical 
techniques as they do not assume dependence of the predictors, i.e. the relationship 
between outputs and inputs is non-linear (Yim and Mitchell, 2005). Several studies 
(e.g. Cosset and Roy, 1990) have established Artificial Neural Networks as superior to 
statistical models in terms of providing more accurate predictions of risk in the case of 
political risks. Yim and Mitchell (2005), studying country risk of Belize, Uruguay, 
Croatia, Kazakhstan and Panama, combined several of the above mentioned 
techniques and found that hybrid neural networks produced the best results in 
predicting country risk.  
According to Hood and Nawaz (2004, p.10), the measurement and management of 
political risk “tend to be more subjective than objective” in practice. Al Khattab et al. 
(2011) found that managers justified their substantial use of qualitative rather than 
quantitative procedures with three reasons: firstly, qualitative procedures are quicker 
to use, especially in rapidly changing environments; secondly, qualitative procedures 
are less expensive as there is no need to gather historical information; thirdly, 
quantitative procedures need data that are vulnerable to statistical manipulation and so 
are unreliable.  
In addition to effective risk assessment techniques, firms also employ risk mitigation 
strategies to reduce the consequences of political risks. Ling and Hoi (2006) 
summarised several mitigation strategies, including the avoidance of “political 
hotspots” in countries or regions. Hood and Nawaz (2004) made similar arguments, 
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but also added that avoidance should be balanced against available opportunities. Ling 
and Hoi (2006) also supported selecting short-duration projects, and avoiding the 
participation in government projects whilst working towards keeping good 
relationships with host governments. Diversification of international activities across 
different regions can equally be an effective strategy to mitigate political risks (Hood 
and Nawaz, 2004). In addition to these strategies, insurance is mentioned as a strategy 
to mitigate political risks (Jensen, 2008) and political risk insurance facilities are 
provided by a number of firms; e.g. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 
AON Hewitt, and the Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee.  
3.7 Political risk, institutionalisation and firm characteristics 
This section briefly summarises how both risk and the assessment of political risk are 
influenced by the specific characteristics of the risk bearer – the firm making 
international investments. The impacts of political risk on firms can clearly vary, even 
on those in the same political environment (Robock, 1971; Kobrin, 1982; Alon et al ., 
2006; Al Khattab et al., 2007; Alon and Herbert, 2009). These variations in impact can 
be related to specific characteristics including: the number of countries in which the 
firm is operating (Kobrin, 1982; Keillor et al., 1997; Howell, 2001; Al Khattab et al., 
2007); type of industry (Kobrin, 1982; Burmester, 2000; Howell, 2001; Zarkada-
Fraser and Fraser, 2002; Al Khattab et al., 2007); years of experience in the 
international businesses (Kobrin, 1982; Al Khattab et al., 2008a; Oetzel, 2005; Green, 
2005); and the size of the firm (Kobrin, 1982; Jenney, 2001; Oetzel, 2005 Stosberg, 
2005; Al Khattab et al., 2007). Further studies have demonstrated the relationship 
between firm characteristics and the institutionalisation of political risk assessment 
such as: Blank et al. (1980), Kobrin (1982), Hashmi and Baker (1988), Stapenhurst 
(1992b), Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996 and Al Khattab et al. (2008a). This 
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section will scrutinize the relationship between political risk, institutionalisation and 
firm characteristics.  
Number of countries in which the firm is operating 
The relationship between the impact of political risk and international expansion was 
found to be positive (Howell, 2001; Al Khattab et al., 2007). Moreover, through 
international expansion and venturing into less familiar environments in different host 
countries, firms become more conscious that political risk may be a problem (Keillor 
et al., 1997). Al Khattab et al. (2007) also indicated that the increase in the number of 
host countries that firms operate in will increase the transactions between the home 
country of the investing firm and  the host countries, and consequently managers show 
more concern with currency inconvertibility. Similarly, Kobrin (1982, p.71) indicated 
that firms operating in larger number of countries become more vulnerable to political 
risks with a greater tendency to “institutionalise the function”. Hashmi and Baker 
(1988) explained that an increase in the number of operating countries means that the 
firm is more likely to encounter constraints as a result of political variables, and 
managers might spend more time on the assessment of political risk. This matches Al 
Khattab et al. (2008a) who suggested a positive correlation between the level of 
institutionalisation of political risk assessment and the number of operating countries.  
Type of industry 
Different industries have been found to receive different levels of exposure to and 
concern about political risk, even in the same country (Burmester, 2000; Howell, 
2001; Zarkada-Fraser and Fraser, 2002; Minor, 2003; Al Khattab et al., 2007). For 
example, Al Khattab et al. (2007) found that manufacturing firms are more concerned 
about restrictions on exporting and importing activities when compared to banks and 
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service sectors. Similarly Zarkada-Fraser and Fraser (2002) argued that sectors that 
rely highly on the economy and the political environment of the host country, such as 
the construction industry, are more affected by political risk. Kobrin (1980) suggested 
that the differences in industrial sectors can determine the exposure to expropriation. 
By way of illustration, natural resources extractors (such as oil firms), banking and 
insurance industries are more likely to be expropriated when compared to 
manufacturing industry because the latter is considered to have less influence over the 
economy of the host country (Kobrin, 1980). Minor (2003) confirmed Kobrin’s (1980) 
point and argued that oil firms are often subject to expropriation as host governments 
believe that resources such as oil reserves are endowments to the local people rather 
than assets exploitable for the benefit of ‘foreign’ profits. Similarly, Shapiro (2006) 
argued that the risk of expropriation could be higher in the financial services and 
utility industries when compared to manufacturing industries.  
The level of technology within an industry is another factor that determines the 
vulnerability to political risk as “technologically intensive industries are significantly 
less vulnerable to political risk than firms whose technology is widely available” 
(Kobrin, 1982, p.39). High technology offers a source of bargaining power to the 
foreign firms (Kobrin, 1982) due to the substantial needs for these technologies in host 
countries.  
The type of industry was also found to influence the level of assessment of political 
risk. For example, banks and oil firms tend to develop highly sophisticated assessment 
techniques (Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996). Similarly, Blank et al . (1980) 
found that the majority of sampled firms operating in the natural resources sector have 
high institutionalised levels of assessment. In another example, a study by Stapenhurst 
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(1992b) of political risk assessment in North Atlantic countries reported that 
institutionalisation level of the assessment was related to the type of industry. In the 
case of US firms, industrial firms were more likely to be more institutionalised, 
whereas firms in consumer goods industries were less likely to be so. In Canadian 
firms, the banks were more likely to be institutionalised than other firms. In Western 
European firms it tended to be natural resources, banks, and capital-intensive firms. 
Years of experience in the international businesses 
Experience is one of the determinants that affect concern about risk in international 
businesses (Kobrin, 1982). Firms with international experience are less likely to pay 
attention to the assessment of risk as concern about risk decreases according to 
experience (Kobrin, 1982; Oetzel, 2005). Correspondingly, assessment of political 
risk can be important to firms with less international experience (Green, 2005). 
However, Al Khattab et al. (2008a) found that the relationship between international 
experience and the level of institutionalisation within Jordanian firms is not 
significant. 
Size of the firm 
The relationship between political risk and the size of an overseas subsidiary in an 
international business has been debated in the literature (Stephens, 1998; Jenney, 
2001; Oetzel, 2005; Al Khattab et al., 2007). The size of the subsidiary is considered 
to be more crucial in determining a “firm’s susceptibility to political risks” when 
compared to the firm’s overall size (Oetzel, 2005. p. 767). One effect is that the larger 
the scale of the fixed assets in the host country, the more the firms become vulnerable 
to expropriation (Stephens, 1998; Stosberg, 2005) and the more concerned they are 
about contract repudiation or unilateral revision (Jenney, 2001; Al Khattab et al., 
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2007). But some have found the opposite effect. Oetzel (2005, p.782) argued that 
smaller subsidiaries might have higher exposure to political risks as they would be 
less proficient in political lobbying or suffer from “the absence of bargaining power”.   
In terms of assessment, the overall size of the firm is likely to determine its capability 
to conduct formal political risk assessment (Kobrin, 1982). Large firms simply have 
more resources (such as finances and personnel) to complicated assessments. 
Stapenhurst (1992a) found that the high cost is an obstacle to conducting political risk 
assessment by many international firms. Similarly, Calof (1994) reported that the 
small firms might not be able to hire suitable personnel to carry out an assessment. In 
their empirical research, Al Khattab et al. (2008a) found that the size of the firm, 
reflected by the total assets, is positively related to the level of the institutionalisation 
of political assessment of risk.  
 
3.8 Conclusion  
This chapter aimed to discuss the definition of political risk, its classification and the 
nature of risks to international firms. There were two main approaches to political risk 
definition: it could be defined as risk arising solely from government interference, or 
from both governmental and non-governmental actions. The main classifications of 
political risk are based on either the influence, or the source, of political risk. What is 
carried forward into the research design is the principle identified in the literature that 
we can look at risk assessment as being institutionalised to different degrees, and use 
various indicators to measure this: the nature of responsibilities for assessment, the  
regularity of performing it, and the procedures used. The ways in which firm 
characteristics shape political risks and their risk assessment has also been reviewed in 
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this chapter. These ideas have also been used in this thesis to examine two points in 
particular: whether these characteristics can better explain the risk perception when 
compared to the psychometric approach, and whether these characteristics can explain 
the level of institutionalisation observed better than other factors that emerge during 
the empirical work.  
The findings from the risk perception literature reviewed in the previous chapter, and 
from the political risk literature reviewed in the present chapter, informed the design 
of this research more specifically in two main ways. The first was that the nature of 
the psychometric framework adopted in this research from the literature to examine 
managers’ political risk perception required a questionnaire. When using the 
psychometric paradigm, researchers attempt to identify people’s risk perception 
through quantitative methods based on risk attributes. Second, both the gap in the 
literature on the perception-assessment connection, and the gap in explaining the low 
level of formal assessment, point to the need for deeper inquiry. So interviews were 
also needed as this research aimed to not only investigate how people perceived risk 
and what risk attributes influenced their perception, but also to explore why managers 
perceived the risk in the way they did given the nature of the assessments they 
perform. This is something which cannot be investigated by the psychometric 
paradigm or any kind of questionnaire design. Furthermore, the political risk 
literature, although it revealed that the standard of political risk assessment is low, 
does not indicate how this might change when events such as those of the Arab Spring 
occur, and could make a difference to political risk assessment by encouraging 
managers to adopt a more rigorous approach - and if not, why not. Again, this 
question required interviews to be conducted.  
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The next chapter (Chapter Four) will specify the research gap addressed in the thesis, 
explain the methodology used in more detail, and illustrate how the literature informs 




CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to define and explain the research methodology used, but the first 
task is to define the literature gap and the research questions based on reviewing the 
literature. Thereafter, a brief discussion of the philosophical commitments in this 
study will be provided, where critical realism will be presented and justified as being 
suitable for this study. The chapter will then describe the general design and ethical 
concerns. This will be followed by a discussion of the two main parts of the work: an 
interview study and questionnaire study, both of which discuss, in more detail, the 
study population and sample, the pilot study, the process of data collection, the 
detailed design, the data analysis and the trustworthiness of each study. 
4.2 Literature Gap and Research Questions 
The perception of risk has been explored widely in the risk perception literature by 
using the psychometric approach. Previous studies have covered primarily risks to 
human safety and the natural environment (as discussed in Chapter Two); but to the 
best of this researcher’s knowledge, the psychometric paradigm has not been applied 
to political risk. Those studies that have investigated political risk perception have 
done so without drawing from this wider risk perception literature, especially 
approaches such as the psychometric paradigm. For example, political risk perception 
has been investigated by asking managers to rate how concerned they were about 
political risks (Al Khattab et al., 2007), or the  impact of political risk on the market 
entry decision (Zarkada-Fraser and Fraser, 2002), or the impact of political risks on 
business activities (Keillor et al., 2005) as seen in Table 4.1. 
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Furthermore, although the institutionalisation level associated with political risk 
assessment has been explored in the previous literature (e.g. Blank et al., 1980; 
Kobrin, 1982; Hashmi and Baker, 1988; De Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Al Khattab 
et al., 2008a), these studies did not examine on the relationship between this 
institutionalisation and how political risks were perceived, as summarised in Table 
4.1. Yet this relationship seems fundamental to how organizations respond to political 
risk. Any response seems highly likely to be a product of individuals’ instinctive, 
intuitive judgments and some kind of organized procedure. It therefore makes sense 
to: 
1. Investigate how well-established and apparently successful methods of 
analysing risk perception (using the psychometric approach) can be applied to 
political risks. 
2. Investigate how assessment and perception take place together within 
organisations. 
It is these two areas of investigation which form the main contribution of this present 









Table 4.1: Summary of the main political risk literature, including the focus and methodology applied in each study 
Study Focus of study Methodology 
Kobrin (1982) Managerial concern toward political risk 
Mail survey to senior international managers in the U.S asking them to 
select the four most important political risks out of nine risks provided. 
Rich and Mahmoud 
(1990) 
Political risk forecast: what and how to forecast, and 
how to implement the forecast. 
A survey of managers in Canadian international firms, ranking the 
most important political risk in terms of the impact on their business. 
Hashmi and Guvenli 
(1992) 
Perceived importance of political risks in the present 
and the future, and the institutionalisation of the 
political assessment (depending on one indicator - the 
frequency of the assessment) 
A survey of vice presidents in the U.S. international firms, asking them 
to rate the significance of 14 political risks on a five-point scale. The 
frequency of assessment was measured by four options: never; 
occasionally; yearly and quarterly. 
Pahud de Mortanges and 
Allers (1996) 
The importance of political risks in developed and 
developing countries and the institutionalisation of the 
political assessment (depending on one indicator – if 
there is a specialised unit to assess political risk 
A survey of vice presidents and managers in Dutch international firms, 
asking them to rate the importance of various risks in developed and 
developing countries. Also asking about the type of political risk 
assessments in these firms, including location of the assessment to 
identify the institutionalised firms. 
Zarkada-Fraser and 
Fraser (2002) 
Political risk perception by UK firms 
A survey of managing directors in the UK construction firms 
conducting projects in Russia, asking them about the impact of 
political risk on the decision of market entry and the problem 
encounter in Russia 
Hood and Nawaz (2004) 
Perception  and management of political risk in the UK 
international firms 
A survey of risk managers across different sectors to measure the 
extent to which they perceived their exposure to political risk and their 
involvement in political risk management strategy. 
Keillor et al. (2005) 
The political risks that organisations face and the 
political activities that organisations engage in  
response to such risks 
A survey of executive decision makers in multinational firms, asking 
them to rate the political risks that impede their operation. Also asking 
them about the significance of political activities in reducing political 
threats. 
Al Khattab et al. (2007) 
Political risk perception and firms’ specific 
characteristics 
A survey of general managers in Jordanian international firms, asking 
them to rate how concerned were they about political risks 
Al Khattab et al.  
(2008a) 
Institutionalisation of the political assessment (based 
on three indicators: assigning responsibility, frequency 
and procedure and firms’ specific characteristics 
A survey of managers in Jordanian international firms, were asked 
about the degree of institutionalisation of political risk assessment in 




As indicated in the introduction to the thesis (Chapter One), it was thought that the 
context of the Arab Spring would be particular revealing as one in which to explore 
the connection between political risk perception and assessment. The Arab Spring was 
a process in which there was large-scale political change in a relatively small region, 
within a relatively short space of time. Moreover, the researcher, as a Kuwaiti 
national, had good access to Kuwaiti business decision makers. So to address the 
above literature gap, in this context, the study seeks to answer the research questions 
outlined below:  
RQ1: What are managers’ political risk perceptions in Kuwaiti international firms? 
RQ1.1: How well does a framework based on explaining risk perception in 
terms of a risk’s attributes apply to managers’ risk perceptions? 
RQ1.2: What is the influence of firms’ characteristics on managerial 
political risk perception? 
RQ2: What is the relationship between Kuwaiti managers’ risk perception and 
political risk assessment in international Kuwaiti firms? 
RQ 2.1: How institutionalised is political risk assessment and what is the 
influence of firms’ characteristics?  
RQ 2.2: What characterises political risk assessment in these firms and their 
connections with risk perceptions? 
The influence of firms’ characteristics on the institutionalisation of risk assessment in 
research question 2.1 was not originally envisaged, but it became apparent after the 
qualitative analysis of the interviews that it would be useful to understand the 
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connection between the level of institutionalisation and firms’ characteristics 
(demographic variables in the interview study). The demographic explanation of the 
institutionalisation level is relevant because it suggests that something other than 
perception of risk drives the risk assessment.  
4.3 Research philosophy, general design and ethics 
4.3.1 Research philosophy of this study 
Because this study concerns the subjective perceptions and assessments of objective 
phenomena, it lies somewhere in the middle ground between positivism and social 
constructionism. The core tenet of positivism is that a social reality exists externally, 
and it can be measured objectively rather than being dependent on subjective 
inference (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Hence, positivism adopts an epistemological 
stance that suggests the existence of regular and predictable ‘laws’ in the physical and 
social world that enable us to offer explanations and predictions (Easton, 2010).  This 
is the basis of most risk assessment processes, even those of political risk, because the 
assumption is that political risks are sufficiently regular and law-like that we can 
anticipate them, and assign probabilities to them. In general, the positivist research 
design has traditionally attempted to distinguish between the researcher and the 
subject of the research, claiming that, if the researcher becomes involved, it will 
contaminate the research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). 
There are two problems with the above argument in a study of political risk perception 
and assessment. The first is that an objective level of political risk is not knowable.  
Political risk is itself a social phenomenon, and its meaning as a risk to people or 
organisations arises because of the way they look at the world, their interests and their 
motives. We call something political risk because it threatens our interest - if 
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somebody else looks at the same phenomenon, they might not call it a risk. The 
second problem is that the researcher is also involved in constructing risk, to some 
degree, by asking people to respond to questions about ‘risk’, and constraining and 
interpreting their responses (i.e. through close ended questions). In general, positivism 
fails to acknowledge that researchers belong to the world they study (Delanty and 
Strydom, 2003). 
On the contrary, social constructionism rejects the idea that social research can be 
isolated from the society in which it takes place or from the biography of the 
researcher so that its findings can be uninfluenced by social processes and personal 
factors (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995).  Social constructionists argue that it is  
people, and not external, objective factors, that determine reality. The task of the 
researcher should not, therefore, be to gather facts and measure patterns, but to 
understand and value the different meanings and constructions that people make of 
their experiences (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Scholars have realised that social 
science phenomena require an approach that occupies a particular position along the 
positivism-constructionism continuum (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). One such 
approach is critical realism, which is adopted for this research.  
Critical realism is based on a realist ontology, which suggests the world exists 
independent of our knowledge of it (Kwan and Tsang, 2001; Easton, 2010). However, 
it derives its epistemological ideals from relativism and postulates that any knowledge 
we have is theory laden, fallible and based on the available interpretations (Kwan and 
Tsang, 2001). Hence, critical realists believe that any conception of reality is 
potentially biased and can be proven wrong (Kwan and Tsang, 2001). Whereas natural 
science researchers espouse realist ontology, as they are able to make accurate 
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calculations and to carry out studies in controlled and closed systems, this is not 
common with social systems (Easton, 2010). Critical realism advocates the initial use 
of theory to conceptualise what produces particular events (Easton, 2010) and 
proceeds to observe events and understand how they confirm, contradict or amend 
theoretical explanations (Ackroyd, 2004). Critical realism presupposes that reality 
produces signs which researchers can capture using their methodological tools and 
interpret through iterative deduction and induction (Kwan and Tsang, 2001). It 
recognises that there is an actual, external world independent of human consciousness, 
but that there is also our socially determined understanding of reality (Danermark et 
al., 2005; Easton, 2010).  
Recent scholars have argued for the application of critical realism in risk research (e.g. 
Parker and Stanworth, 2006; Ojiako et al., 2012). It is known, for example, that 
entities separately vary their exposure to both objectively real risks, and their 
subjective risk perceptions, which calls for a fit between the two kinds of risk (Ojiako 
et al., 2012). While some risk researchers place emphasis on risk as being something 
‘out there’ that presents a challenge to managers, especially where it is 
‘unanticipated’, others view risk as something that intensifies with a certain action (or 
its absence) and which co-evolves with environmental dynamics (Healy, 2004; 
Ben‐Ari and Or‐Chen,2009; Ojiako et al., 2012). This is particularly true of a 
phenomenon like political risk. A risk is only a risk to some people because they 
choose particular interests or concerns that are then seen to be at risk. Thus, political 
risk perception itself is subjective. However, the aim is to take an objective view of 
how risk is subjectively perceived – via the psychometric paradigm. This approach 
assumes that risk is subjectively defined by individuals, but such risk perceptions can 
be quantified (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000). In the interview study, similarly, the 
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emphasis is on the reasons people give for their perceptions and their ways of 
assessing risk. Their ways of assessing political risk are objectively knowable but their 
reasons are subjective, and the connections with their perceptions are equally 
subjective. Therefore, overall, this study is an intimate combination of the subjective 
and objective. 
4.3.2 General research design 
This section explains whether this research design is 1) inductive or deductive, 2) 
qualitative or quantitative; and 3) explanatory, exploratory or descriptive. The first 
concerns whether research is done to answer questions derived from prior theoretical 
considerations (deductive approach) or whether the researcher collects and analyses 
the data without prior theoretical considerations as a means to build new theory 
(inductive approach) (Saunders et al., 2009). This research is both deductive and 
inductive. It is deductive in a sense that it begins with reviewing existing literature to 
identify research gaps and testing the psychometric framework. Moreover, the three 
indicators that were used in the interview to identify the institutionalisation level of 
the assessment of the firms were extracted from previous literature. This research is  
also inductive in a sense that it explores the connection between the perception and the 
institutionalisation of political risk assessment with no prior theory. This approach 
was deemed conducive to this research as argued by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) 
who agreed that both inductive and deductive approaches can be combined, 
particularly in mixed methods research that employs both quantitative and qualitative 
procedures. They also argued that answering research questions based on critical 
realism philosophical assumptions, such as in this research, requires applying an 
inductive-deductive cycle.  
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Second, this research design applies a combination of both qualitative and quantitative 
strategies in the form of interviews and survey questionnaire. Some scholars refer to 
this combination as mixed methods strategy (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al., 
2009). The psychometric paradigm based questionnaire, used in this study, examines 
risk perception using a structured and quantitative approach. Furthermore, this 
research not only investigates how people perceive risk and what risk attributes 
influence their perception, but also explores why they perceive the risks the way they 
do, which calls for using interviews. Interviews investigated the institutionalisation of 
political risk and how it relates to risk perceptions. This mixed methods approach is 
consistent with the critical realism philosophical underpinning that considers risk as 
both objective and subjective. It is also consistent with the idea of using both 
deductive and inductive approaches in parallel to achieve the research objectives. 
Moreover, researchers like Miles et al. (2014) argued that qualitative data is needed to 
validate, complement or illuminate quantitative data collected from the same context. 
In this study, the interview data was first collected and the findings helped in re-
adjusting the survey questionnaire, explaining the results of the questionnaire survey 
and answering the research questions that would not otherwise be answered by the 
survey e.g. concerning the institutionalisation level of political risk assessment.  
Third, this research design is largely exploratory because there is limited literature on 
political risk in Kuwait, particularly in the context of the Arab Spring. But the use of 
the risk perception framework (the psychometric approach) would suggest a 
confirmatory strategy that would involve stating and testing hypotheses as it also 
involves testing correlations. However, what is tested in this case is a correlation of a 
person judgement with the factor structure in the way that is exploratory because what 
the factor structure is was not defined beforehand. To clarify, the hypothesis of the 
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psychometric framework is that the variation in risk perception is explained by 
variation in risk attributes. These attributes are then grouped into main factors, using 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). In this sense, applying the psychometric 
paradigm in this research design is exploratory as it does not hypothesise a specific 
factor structure beforehand. Moreover, the psychometric framework was never 
designed to test political risk: it does not test whether a particular set of attributes 
predict political risk perception. However, this study assumed that the psychometric 
framework was going to explain people’s risk perception and explored what factor 
structure was explaining manager’s risk judgement. Therefore, there were no formal 
hypotheses that a particular factor structure would predict risk judgement.  
4.3.3 Research ethics 
In research, there are ethical issues that may affect the participants or any other 
relevant stakeholders. Therefore, it is the duty of the researcher to ensure that research 
is conducted morally and responsibly (Saunders et al., 2009). There are multiple 
ethical concerns in research, including obtaining an informed consent of the 
participants which ensures confidentiality of the information obtained during the 
research process, acknowledging signs of physical or mental distress of participants, 
preserving the privacy of participants and preventing any deception (Holloway and 
Brown, 2012, Punch, 2005).  
To ensure adherence to ethical standards, this research was assessed for riskiness in 
accordance with Lancaster University code of practice for ethical research, and 
permitted to proceed since it was found to be less risky. Lancaster University provided 
ethics clearance, including documents like the participant information sheets and 
consent forms (see Appendix 1). These documents were to enable potential 
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participants gain enough information and decide whether or not to participate in the 
research process.  
In accordance with the ethical standards of this research, participants in the qualitative 
research were allowed to choose the place of the interviews in order to reduce physical 
harm; all participants selected their workplaces where they felt most comfortable, 
except one participant who preferred to be interviewed at a cafe. Mental distress was 
reduced in this research by allowing participants to choose their preferred language, 
whether Arabic or English, in both the interviews and questionnaires. Furthermore, 
participation in the research was completely voluntary without imposing any force on 
participants.  
The consent form was introduced to all participants, while ensuring clarity of its 
components (Holloway and Brown, 2012). This form clearly highlighted the purpose 
of the research, and also clearly introduced the terms of confidentiality and anonymity 
in accordance with Berg (2009) who emphasised the need to protect the rights and 
privacy of research participants. Furthermore, prior to introducing the consent form, 
the purpose of the research was also clarified to participants through the emails or 
telephone calls made to arrange the interviews or distribute the questionnaires. 
Additionally, all participants were informed that their participation in the research is 
voluntary, and that they have the right to withdraw from the research without 
providing any explanations. During the interviews, the researchers acknowledged that 
certain signs of distress from participants might arise, due to the commercial 
confidentiality of certain aspects of the topic, where there will be a need to 
discontinue the interviews or change the topic of discussion. Fortunately, there was no 
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need to discontinue any of the interviews; however, there was a need to change the 
topic of discussion at certain points during some of the interviews. 
4.4 Interview Study 
The purpose of the interviews was to conduct an exploratory, qualitative analysis of 
how firms responded to political risks – investigating their formal processes of 
assessment in combination with the perceptions of the firms’ managers. As explained 
earlier, part of this analysis involved assessing the level of institutionalisation 
associated with the assessment.  
4.4.1 Sampling 
As mentioned in Chapter One, this study was motivated by the Arab Spring that 
greatly affected many parts of the Arab world and beyond, including international 
firms in Kuwait. The international government-owned and private-owned companies 
in Kuwait constitute the population of firms for this research. The population of 
government-owned international firms was only eight. The international private-
owned firms were defined to be those listed in the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange. A total of 
130 firms, categorised in seven main sectors – financial services, oil and gas, real 
estate, banking, insurance, telecommunication, and industrial – were listed. This study 
used the entire population instead of choosing a sample due to the small size of the 
population (only 138 firms). Attempts were made to give all the 138 firms equal 
chances of being selected to participate in the study. This was through direct and 
indirect contacts as well as the use of e-mails and telephone contacts requesting all the 
firms to participate. 
A total of 34 firms agreed and participated in the interviews. These firms comprised of 
six out of the eight government-owned international firms and 28 out of the 130 
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international private-owned firms. This means the government owned firms were well 
represented with a response rate of 75% (6/8). But the private-owned firms’ response 
rate was lower i.e. 21.5% (28/130). This low response could be attributed to the 
‘sensitivity’ that surrounds political risk activities (Hood and Nawaz, 2004). There is 
therefore a potential self-selection bias. However, all industry types were fairly 
represented as illustrated in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Number of private-owned and government–owned firms that participated in 
the interviews from each industry sector 
 Industry 


















Oil and Gas 6 2 33.30% 
Bank 9 5 55.60% 
Insurance 6 4 66.70% 
Real Estate 36 2 5.60% 
Financial Service 36 9 25% 
Telecommunication 3 2 66.70% 
Industrial 19 4 21.10% 


















Oil and Gas 5 4 80% 
Financial service 1 1 100% 
Others 2 1 50% 
           Total no. of firms 138 34 24.6% 
 
Table 4.3 provides details about the industry to which the firms belonged, their 
ownership and the countries in which the firms have invested. The latter is provided to 
indicate that firms included in the sample (except for four firms) have international 
businesses in countries involved in the Arab Spring. The four firms (represented by 
RS6, RS9, RS12, RS13) that do not have international businesses in Arab Spring 
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Table 4.3: Firms, their ownership and countries in which they have invested 
ID Industry type 
Ownership 
type 
Countries in which firms have invested 
RS1 Banks Private  Bahrain, Malaysia, Turkey, U.S, Germany 
RS2 Financial Service  Government 
All Arab countries exclude Djibouti (21), Large No. All 
over the world 
RS3 Real Estate Private  Bahrain, Oman, UK, Germany 
RS4 Financial Service  Private   Mena region, Europe, China, Iran, Pakistan 
RS 5 Real Estate Private  Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Dubai & Sharjah 
RS 6 Telecommunication Private  
Saudi Arabia, Spain, Congo, Tanzania, Liberia & Guinea 
 
RS 7 Bank Private  Bahrain, Egypt, Libya,  Iraq,  UK 
RS 8 Insurance  Private  Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt & Iraq. 
RS9 Industrial Private Iraq, Jordan 
RS10 Telecommunication Private  
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon & south 
Sudan 
RS11 Financial Service Private  
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Oman, Jordan, Turkey, 
Greece 
RS12 Oil and Gas  Private  
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kurdistan, North Africa, US 
and India 
RS13 Bank private  Sudan, UK , Indonesia 
RS14 Financial Service Private  G.C.C and MENA Region 
RS15 Industrial Private Egypt & UAE 
RS16 Financial Service Private  Syria 
RS17 Insurance Private  
MENA region, Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe and Sub-
Sahara in Africa 
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RS18 Oil and Gas Government  
Egypt , Tunisia,  Yemen, Sudan, Qatar, Syria, Australia, 
Indonesia Malaysia, china Vietnam,  Norway, UK and 
Pakistan. 
RS19 Industrial Private 
 Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Sudan, Lebanon, 
Jordan and Syria. GCC, all Europe, China 
RS20 Oil and Gas Government 
 18 Arab Countries including e.g. Egypt & Bahrain, 
Europe and Asia 
RS21 Insurance Private  GCC, U.S & Europe 
RS22 Bank Private   Dubai, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, India 
RS23 Financial Service Government  
 Developing countries including Egypt and Syria, Europe & 
US 
RS24 Oil and Gas Government   Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia, Europe, Asia, U.S 
RS25 Oil and Gas Private  
UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria and Egypt, Us, china, 
Korea 
RS 26 Financial Service Private  GCC , Mena region, U.S,  Tokyo 
RS 27 Financial Service Private  Jordan, Egypt, GCC, Hong Kong, china, India, US, Pakistan 
RS 28 Financial Service Private  Egypt, Saudi Arabia  Bahrain, U.K 
RS 29 Insurance Private  
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Qatar, Turkey, London, Germany 
RS 30 Financial Service Private  GCC,  Jordan 
RS 31 Industrial  Private   GCC,  Iraq 
RS 32 Financial Service Private  In almost all the Arab countries and across the world 
RS 33 Oil and Gas Government  Middle East, Canada & Italy 
RS 34  Bank Private  Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain, Europe, US 
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4.4.2 Pilot interview study 
The point of the pilot interviews was to help in refining and validating the final 
interview questions that had been developed based on the gaps in the risk literature. 
An interview pilot study was conducted in September 2013 with five managers 
selected from two government-owned and three private-owned firms. These 
participants were all involved in international business, and were selected from 
different types of industry to ensure variety in the sample as summarised in Table 4.4. 
The pilot interviews were audio recorded, transcribed and analysed by the researcher. 
Findings from this pilot study helped in adjusting some of the interview questions as 
well as adding new questions in order to answer the research questions appropriately. 
Added questions include, for example, how the firms use the outsourced information 
for their political risk assessment. Furthermore, these pilot interviews supported the 
researcher in developing interviewing and probing skills. 
Table 4.4: Summary of the pilot interview firms 
Firm Interviewee’s position Type of industry 
Firm 1 
Head of risk management 
department 
Bank 
Firm 2 Board member Real Estate 
Firm 3 Head of real estate division Financial 
Firm 4 
Deputy manager director and 
vice chairman 
Oil and Gas 
Firm 5 
Executive manager of 
investment and development 
Industrial 
4.4.3 Administration of the interviews 
A total of 34 face-to-face semi-structured interviews, which took place between 
October 2013 and January 2014, were conducted with managers in 34 different firms 
in Kuwait, with each firm being represented by one manager. Each of the managers 
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interviewed was involved in international business at his/her firm. Table 4.5 provides 
details about the survey participants’ job titles and their involvement in political risk 
assessment processes. These interviews were conducted before the questionnaires 
were distributed. As described later, the items in the questionnaire were influenced in 
several cases by these interviews. 13 Interviews were conducted in Arabic, and the 
rest were conducted in English. Some of the participants requested a copy of the 
interview questions prior to the interviews. Where this was the case, a copy of the 
interview questions was sent to them with a cover letter explaining the research aim.  
Before each interview started, interviewees were assured of the confidentiality of the 
information to be obtained in the process. Furthermore, interviewees were first asked 
whether they would be comfortable with being audio-recorded. All but two 
interviewees accepted. Most of the interviews lasted between 20-60 minutes, with the 
exception of only two interviews, which lasted less than 20 minutes. One of the main 
challenges faced during the interview process was the interviewees’ cancellation and 




Table 4.5: Job titles of the interviewees and description of their involvement in risk assessment 
ID Job title Description of the involvement in risk assessment 
RS1 
Deputy general manager and enterprises risk management 
and portfolio 
Linking the analysis that has been conducted by agencies regarding political risk, to 
financial and other exposures, and to building scenarios. 
RS2 Senior investor manager in Arab contribution department 
Reviewing reports provided by International institutions on political and economic 
developments, analysing them to provide reports with recommendation for the top 
management about existing and new investments. 
RS3 Group accounting manager 
Gathering all the information for the new projects and making feasibility studies. 
Making quarterly reports for existing projects and, where there is a loss, reporting it to 




Executive manager of investment and development 
 
Receiving the study from the consultant (including on political risk). Preparing report 
with recommendations based on this study, then raising it with the board of directors. 
Checking the development of the existing projects and making recommendations.  
RS 5 Board member 
Studies and advice is provided by third parties, but decisions are taken by board 
members.  
RS 6 Chairman 
Head of the committee that includes legal department, financial department and 
investment development department. 
RS 7 Head of risk management department 
Assessing potential risks including political risk. Doing a review of the counterparty 
risk before any new opportunity 
RS 8 Head of risk management department 
Reviewing reports from representatives abroad and preparing mitigation plans. 
Preparing a comprehensive study before entering a new market, including on political 
risk.  
RS9 Chairman  
Regular meetings with managers abroad, discussing with them the risks they face and 
how to deal with those risks, including political risks. 
RS10 Risk management director 
Preparing a full study before entering any country, including on political risk. 
Conducting regular risk assessments in which political risks are evaluated. 
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RS11 Head of risk management division 
Assessing potential risks associated with international business before starting the 
business and then on a regular basis. 
RS12 Venture development manager 
Carrying out due diligence before any business involvement including on political 
risk assessment. Preparing business plans based on reviewing reports from 
representatives.   
RS13 Manager – operational Risk 
Reviewing and analysing international reports such as World Bank reports in order to 
prepare summaries for the board, with recommendations.  
RS14 Senior manager of the risk management 
Reviewing reports prepared by the investment department, including on political risk. 
Preparing a summary report with recommendations to the committee.  
RS15 Financial manager 
Reviewing reports from the subsidiaries and preparing  a summary reports with 
recommendations and alternative plans for the top management. 
RS16 Executive manager of investment 
Preparing a comprehensive study to the board before any international business 
involvement, including on political risk.  
RS17 Non-marine manager in Kuwait re-insurance company 
Member of a risk management committee that meet regularly to discuss how to 
manage all kinds of risks including political risks. 
RS18 
Senior analyst of risk management and head of  the Arab 
function in enterprise risk management 
Preparing risk identification analysis before accepting any project and then on 
regular basis. 
RS19 Global channel manager 
In charge of all sales around the world.  Deciding whether to sell directly, go for 
indirect selling or stay away, based on assessing the political situation.  
RS20 Business development group manager 
Generating a risk matrix with external consultants, in order to prepare full reports, 
covering the political risk and the country risk.  preparing mitigation plans. 
RS21 Investment manager. Preparing feasibility study before any business involvement. 
RS22 Head of enterprises risk management department 
Reviewing the country risk, which includes political risk, at the beginning of each 
activity. Preparing reports for the committee. 
RS23 
Legal advisor and head of real estate investment fund 
division 
Together with an engineer and an economist, reviewing investment proposals, 
preparing reports for the committee, with recommendations. 
RS24 Managing director for planning and finance 
Identifying risks that could prevent the investment from achieving its target. 
Assessing the degree of impact, and how much mitigation is required to minimize the 
effect of such risk. 
RS25 Deputy manager director (DMD) and vice chairman 
Member of the  investment committee that meets regularly to discuss how to manage 




Manager of the compliance and risk management 
department 
Assessing all kinds of risk before starting any business activity. Conducting regular 
risk assessments for existing activities. Preparing summary reports with 
recommendations for the board.   
RS 27 
Head of internal audit department and supervising the risk 
management department 
Preparing management international reports with external consultant, highlighting the 
potential impact, the exposure on the investment and how to mitigate the risks. 
Presenting the reports to the risk management committee.  
RS 28 leading risk management department 
Conducting a final risk assessment based on a due diligence report prepared by the 
investment department. 
RS 29 Assistant general manager and financial manager 
Conducting feasibility studies. Preparing quarterly reports for existing projects with 
recommendations. 
RS 30 Internal audit manager 
Working with the investment department in assessing and monitoring all types of risk 
before, during and after investment.  
RS 31 Risk management director Reviewing all types of risk before starting any business, including political risk.  
RS 32 Vice president of risk management and compliance 
Analysing the reports provided by consultants in host countries to prepare a study 
with recommendations before any engagements. Assessing how the potential risk 
might affect ongoing businesses. 
RS 33 Team leader of enterprise risk management Assessing potential risks associated with business activities on a regular basis. 
RS 34  Advisor risk management 
Providing reports, with recommendations, for the top management about potential 
risk, including political risk. 
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4.4.4 The interview guide 
The interviews followed a semi-structured guide (Appendix 2), where the researcher 
ensured that all the relevant questions were covered in the interviews starting with 
more general questions before moving on to more in-depth questions that uncover 
thoughts, reasons and processes. These interview guides are essential to improve the 
reliability of qualitative research (Holloway and Brown, 2012; Patton, 2002) as they 
offer a guiding framework that can be adapted depending on participants’ responses 
(Holloway and Brown, 2012; Saunders et al., 2009). Initially, the researcher started 
with general questions about the demographics of the participants and their firms (e.g. 
position of participants and type of industry). This was followed by descriptive 
questions asking participants what the most important risks they are concerned about 
are. More clarifying questions were asked next to uncover the reasons behind the 
participants’ concerns and thoughts. Then, the researcher moved to more in-depth 
questions, in line with the aim of these interviews, where questions regarding the 
assessment of political risk at firms were asked, including whether the assessments 
involved assigned responsibilities to individuals within the firms, the frequency of 
conducting the assessments and whether subjective or objectives techniques are 
applied. 
4.4.5 Interview data analysis 
As described in the interview administration section, all but two interviews were audio 
recorded. Interview notes were taken by the researcher during the two unrecorded 
interviews. Following these interviews, transcripts were prepared by the researcher. 
The 13 interviews that were conducted in Arabic were transcribed into Arabic before 
having translated into English. The interview data was analysed using two approaches. 
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The first approach involved a more structured one, while the second was purely 
qualitative and inductive as described next.  
The first approach followed a structured way of categorising the data based on the 
literature. This aimed to investigate the institutionalisation level of political 
assessment, and the relationship between this level of institutionalisation and firm 
characteristics. Three indicators for the degree of institutionalisation of political risk 
assessment were extracted from the literature described in Chapter 3 (e.g. Blank et al., 
1980). These indicators were:  
1. Assignment of responsibility – assigning a responsibility to a specific individual 
or group is the ‘minimum’ indicator of institutionalised risk assessment (Blank et 
al., 1980). This was done by assigning scores representing different levels. Where 
the interviewees indicated that there was completely no assignment of 
responsibility, this was scored as 0. Where interviewees indicated that they had at 
least a sense of responsibility (an informal understanding of responsibility), this 
was given a score of 1. Lastly, when the interviewees described that they had a 
formal responsibility for assessing political risk, they were scored as 2.  
2. Regularity of assessment – This indicator was divided into three categories 
including: 1) never 2) on demand and 3) on a regular basis, where the latter is 
seen to represent a higher level of institutionalisation. Therefore, firms that never 
conducted assessment were scored 0, firms that conducted assessment only on 
demand were scored 1, while firms that conducted assessments on a regular basis 
were scored 2.  
3. Method of assessment (qualitative and quantitative) – From the literature, it was 
asserted that firms that use mixed methods of risk assessment are more 
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institutionalised than those that use qualitative method only. Thus, the “no 
discernible method at all” was scored 0, “qualitative method” was scored 1, while 
the classification “mixed assessment” was scored 2. The highest score for this 
indicator is 2 as no firms had a purely quantitative procedure, and it is not clear 
whether we would normally think a purely quantitative procedure more 
institutionalised than a mixed one.  
In order to answer one of the research questions of this study, which aims to 
investigate the relationship between the level of institutionalisation of firms and firm 
characteristics (i.e. firm size, years of experience, number of Arab countries in which 
firms were operating, type of industry and ownership), this research calculated the 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients. In order to calculate this coefficient, it 
was necessary to have an overall rating of the institutionalisation level of firms. 
Consequently, this overall rating was calculated by adding the scores on the three 
indicators of institutionalisation (responsibility assignment, frequency and technique), 
where the resulting overall rating was included in the analysis of the correlation with 
firm characteristics.  
The second approach to interview data analysis was purely qualitative and inductive, 
and involved selecting insights from each interview and categorising these insights 
thematically to arrive at explanations of the organized and judgmental responses they 
made to political risks. This was in accordance with grounded analysis principles, 
where an effort was made to avoid being limited by prior theoretical knowledge in 
order to allow new ideas to emerge from the data rather than fitting the data in 
predetermined structures, as suggested by Ketokivi and Choi (2014). Two levels of 
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theme were identified, and these are described in Chapter Six – together with data that 
support and explain them. 
4.4.6 Trustworthiness and rigor of the interview study  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested four criteria to determine the trustworthiness of 
qualitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, 
which correspond to the criteria of external validity, internal validity, objectivity and 
reliability, which are normally applied in quantitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). Lincoln and Guba (1985) referred to credibility as the extent to which the 
findings are true and reflect actual situations, and regarded it as the most important 
aspect for establishing trustworthiness in qualitative research. In this research, 
credibility was enhanced by audio recording the interviews (except two) to support 
detailed data analysis and interpretation. These recordings allowed the researcher to 
listen many times and accurately remember not just the words but the tone of voice in 
which claims and observations were made. Furthermore, the research participants 
were allowed to select their preferred language of choice, whether Arabic or English, 
which also supported more accurate reflections of actual situations. This created an 
extra burden of translation in 13 cases but this seemed important in a study looking at 
managers’ perception as well as their firms’ formal processes of assessment. Ethical 
considerations of this research also support its credibility as no participant was forced 
to take part in the study and participants were also given undertakings of 
confidentiality as explained earlier in Section 4.3.3. The fact that the researcher was 
known to all participants as a Kuwaiti, and an academic teacher of insurance and risk 
management, gives some reassurance that participants were not simplifying their 
insights.   
 93 
 
Transferability in qualitative research is equivalent to generalisability (Punch, 2005), 
and refers to the applicability of findings in other contexts. This is very difficult in 
qualitative research due to the limited context and sample size. Yet, researchers in 
qualitative research should act to support the transferability of findings (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985). For example, Morrow (2005) highlighted the importance of the sample 
size and characteristics. In this study, 34 respondents from eight different sectors were 
interviewed; all these respondents were involved in international business and aware 
of different risk aspects of their businesses. 
Dependability refers to the extent to which qualitative research produces findings that 
would be replicated if the study was repeated in similar conditions (Knight, 2002). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) agreed that strong credibility supports the dependability of 
research to some extent, and the former has been established in relation to this 
research, as described earlier in this section. 
Confirmability refers to establishing how the researchers’ biases, motivations and 
viewpoints are minimised (Lincoln and Guba, 2003). Accordingly, confirmability of 
qualitative research is reflected in its objectivity, taking into consideration that 
complete objectivity is not possible in qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 2003). 
This aspect is supported in this research through the audio recording of interviews 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). After preparation of the interview transcripts in the 
participants’ native language, they were sent back to the interviewees for a final check 
and approval before using them in this research. 
4.5 Questionnaire study 
As mentioned earlier the questionnaire survey aimed to study managerial political risk 




The original intention was to distribute five questionnaires to each of the 34 
companies that had participated in the interviews. But some of the 34 companies were 
hesitant to accept participation in the questionnaire survey. The reasons for this 
included the length of the survey questionnaire (i.e. 20 pages) and the managers’ busy 
schedules – there were only two months left for the financial year-end for many of 
these firms. Consequently, all the other international firms listed in the Kuwaiti Stock 
Exchange were further requested to participate in the survey. To improve the response 
rate, a recommendation letter was obtained from the sponsor of the researcher (Public 
Authority for Applied Education and Training in Kuwait) (see Appendix 3), which 
was sent to potential participants alongside the request to participate. A total of 400 
self-administered questionnaires were hand delivered to managers who were involved 
in international business and knowledgeable about risks in the 138 firms. A total of 
122 questionnaires were returned, but 2 of these were not completely answered and 
therefore not considered usable. Thus, the number of usable questionnaires was 120 
pointing to a response rate of 30% (120/400). All the government-owned firms that 
participated in the interviews also participated in the questionnaire survey but only 16 
out of the 28 private-owned firms that participated in the interviews also participated 
in the questionnaire survey. Of the usable questionnaires, 70 were collected from 
firms which had also participated in the interviews, with 20 questionnaires returned 
from the government-owned firms and 50 questionnaires from private-owned firms. 
The number of firms that participated in the survey was 44, constituting 32% 
(44÷138) and this could be a limitation in a sense that it may not be completely 
representative, as it is only 1/3 of the whole population. However, this sample was not 
seen biased as the returned usable questionnaires offered a fair representation of all 
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the industrial sectors in both government-owned and private-owned firms in Kuwait 
as illustrated in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Number of private-owned and government–owned firms that participated in 






























Oil and Gas 6 3 7 50% 2.3 
Bank 9 3 5 33% 1.7 
Insurance 6 3 8 50% 2.7 
Real Estate 36 7 25 19% 3.6 
Financial Service 36 8 17 22% 2.1 
Telecommunication 3 2 7 67% 3.5 
Industrial 19 4 16 21% 4 
Others 15 8 15 53% 1.9 


















Oil and Gas 5 4 15 80% 3.8 
Financial service 1 1 3 100% 3 
Others 2 1 2 50% 2 
 Total 8 6 20 75% 3.4 
  
4.5.2 Pilot questionnaire study 
Conducting a pilot study before the main empirical work is generally recommended in 
the research methods literature (e.g. Yin, 2009). In this research, a pilot study of the 
questionnaire was conducted with 12 managers; i.e. CEOs and risk managers in 6 
different firms, 2 of which were government owned. These firms represented three 
distinct industries i.e. Oil and Gas, Financial service and Bank to ensure variety in the 
sample. During the process of conducting this pilot survey and after pilot data 
analysis, two main issues emerged that helped in re-adjusting the questionnaire. First, 
 96 
 
the questionnaire was originally drafted in English but 7 out of the 12 managers who 
participated in the pilot study were Arabs. Three Arab managers clearly did not 
understand some of the contents of the questionnaire. This signalled a need to re-write 
the questionnaire in both Arabic and English. As shown in Appendix 4, the final 
version of the questionnaire was split into two halves – the left half being in English 
and the right half being in Arabic. The translation of this questionnaire from English 
to Arabic was approved by the Translation Centre in Kuwait.  
Second, this pilot study resulted in adjusting some of the items in the questionnaire. 
For example, a risk variable labelled ‘currency inconvertibility’ based on the 
literature, was originally meant to incorporate three issues i.e. currency exchange 
restriction, capital repatriation restriction, and profit repatriation restriction. However, 
some of the participants in the pilot study like the CEOs of oil companies interpreted 
‘currency inconvertibility’ as referring to only currency exchange restriction. This was 
apparent from their comments that the questionnaire lacked two risk issues (capital 
repatriation restriction and profit repatriation restriction). Therefore the risk ‘currency 
inconvertibility’ was replaced with two independent risks i.e. currency exchange 
restriction, and restriction on capital/profit repatriation. 
Furthermore, there was a risk type labelled ‘revolution/civil war’ in the original draft 
questionnaire. But, during the pilot study, one of the managers whose firm operates 
both in Egypt and Syria indicated that the duration of effect of a revolution (which 
took place in Egypt) is usually different from the duration of effect of a civil war 
(which was and continues to take place in Syria). This resulted in considering 
‘revolution’ and ‘civil war’ as two independent types of risk in the final questionnaire.   
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4.5.3 Questionnaire study administration 
The survey data collection process commenced in February 2014 and was completed 
in May 2014. As mentioned earlier, a total of 400 self-administered questionnaires 
were hand delivered to managers who were involved in international business and 
knowledgeable about risks in the 138 firms. Each firm received a minimum of 3 
questionnaires. The approach was to distribute the questionnaires and go back in one 
or two weeks to collect them. However, although telephone calls, emails, or made 
personal visits were used to remind respondents to complete the questionnaires, most 
of the questionnaires had not been completed by the time of collection. Many of the 
respondents commented that the questionnaire was tedious to complete at once. This 
is in line with Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991 who argued that one of the commonly 
acknowledged limitations of the survey questionnaire based on psychometric 
paradigm is its being tedious and demanding, making it susceptible to fatigue 
(Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991). This perhaps explains why some previous 
researchers adopting the psychometric based risk questionnaire targeted students and 
used convenience sampling (e.g. Teigen and Brun, 1988; Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 
1991; Bronfman et al., 2007; Rawad and Khattab, 2015); however, there are 
exceptions, for example Siegrist et al. (2005).  
4.5.4 Detailed design of the questionnaire study 
The content of the questionnaire was based on the review of the literature on risk 
perception and political risk. Further adjustments and validation were obtained from 
the findings of the interview study as well as the pilot questionnaire survey.   
The survey questionnaire had four main components:  
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 The list of political risks (shown in Table 4.7). This list was developed from the 
review of risks in the political risk literature, which were adjusted to fit the study 
context, as not all political risk cited in political risk literature would be 
applicable to the context of this research (e.g. newly elected government) as 
explained in Chapter Three. Moreover, as this research focuses on managerial 
perception, it should include clear and specific risks that have a direct meaning to 
managers, but disregard general risks that may be interpreted by managers in 
different ways. Therefore, this study includes risks such as ‘taxation restriction’, 
but did not cover risks such as “changing government regulation”, as specified by 
Miller (1992). Literature supporting the selection of political risks in this study is 
highlighted in Table 4.7.  
The interviews conducted in this study further helped to confirm the 
appropriateness of these political risks to the context of this research as shown in 
Table 4.6. The table includes quotes from different respondents that support the 
different political risks addressed in the questionnaire. Each quotation in the table 
is selected based on codes that are highlighted in Table 4.7. Additionally, the list 










Table 4.7: list of political risks used in the questionnaire and their link to literature and interviews conducted in this study 
Risk issue References Respondents’ Quotations 
Taxation restrictions  
Subramanian (1993), Hashmi and Guvenli ( 
1992), Kobrin (1981), Al Khattab et al. 
(2007), Hood and Nawaz (2004), Alon et al. 
(2006), Pahud de Mortanges and Allers 
(1996) 
“There are political risks that we can control somehow and there are some can’t be controlled i.e. 
the increase of taxation can be controlled by increasing the premium that we get for the cover of the 
insurance.” RS8 
“Jordan imposed suddenly 30% extra taxes on the services we’re giving to our customers suddenly. 
Taxes were 14% and became 44% which is one of the highest in the world.” RS10 
Currency exchange 
restrictions 
 Hood and Nawaz (2004), Pahud de 
Mortanges and Allers (1996)   
“Before the Arab spring happens we looked into many political risks such as taxation restrictions 
and currency exchange control. This is a common practice that we used to do.” RS14 
“In Egypt, the Egyptian clients are wealthy, yet they cannot withdraw their money outside. The law 
after the revolution does not allow taking large amount of hard currency outside .”RS19 
Breach of contract by a 
host government  
Al Khattab et al. (2007), Moran (2001), 
Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996) 
“sometimes we face risks related to changing the regulations which lead for example to repudiation 
of contract, or more ownership constraint as its very normal to face these kind of risks in the Arab   
or emerging market countries” RS16 
Capital and/or Profit 
repatriation restrictions 
Desta (1985), Busse and Hefeker (2007), 
Hood and Nawaz(2004), Alon et al. (2006) 
“Sudan has sanctions from the United Nations and the United States. So, we had a problem which is 
a risk for us which is repatriation of our revenue which is sitting in the bank of Sudan in their local 
currency” RS10 
Import and/or export 
restrictions 
Keillor et al. (2005), Alon (2006), Alkhattab 
(2007), Busse & Hefeker (2007)), Pahud de 
Mortanges and Allers (1996) 
“I produce Polystyrene in Kuwait cheaper than a factory in Turkey, and we sell it cheaper than the 
factory in turkey. So the governments set some regulations against that foreign producer ... order to 
reduce the imports to their country.” RS19 
Ownership and/or 
personnel restrictions  
Brink (2004), Keillor et al (2005), Pahud de 
Mortanges and Allers (1996) 
“sometimes we face risks related to changing the regulations which lead for example to repudiation 
of contract, or more ownership constraint as its very normal to face these kind of risks in the Arab   
or emerging market countries” RS16 
Expropriation and/or 
confiscation  
 Howell (2001), Hood and Nawaz (2004), 
Burmester (2000), Minor (2003) and Shapiro 
(2006) ,(Wilkin, 2001), Desta (1985), Busse 
and Hefeker (2007) 
“With what is happening now in the Arab Spring countries I don’t expect people to be honest and the 
governments actually applying the law; there is no guarantee of the stability of the regulation which 




Merna and Al-Thani (2007 ),Busse and 
Hefeker (2007), Wade (2005), Rio-Morales 
et al. (2009) 
“The corruption happens everywhere before the political unrest. And I’m assuming it will be more 
because the more poverty, the greater the chance for what we call it in insurance moral hazard”. 
RS8 
“We are unable to accomplish our procedures in the south because ... and it is not easy to get a 
license because of the routine and corruption.” RS12 
Demonstrations  and 
riots     
Wade (2005), Al Khattab et al. (2007) 
 “The major political risks at the moment, such as uprising, public kind of riots such as what is 
happening in Egypt.” RS11 
Revolutions  Kobrin(1981), Al Khattab et al. (2007) 
“The most important political risks are Civil war and revolution.” RS13 
“Some Risks cannot be controlled such as the revolution and the civil wars beyond control.” RS16 
civil wars 
Wade (2005), Busse and Hefeker (2007), Al 
Khattab et al. (2007)  
“Civil wars are badly affected the infrastructure and the economy in these countries”. RS6 
“once there is a crisis such as civil wars , the whole business might collapse; unlike the investment in 
real-estates which is safer”  RS16 
Terrorism 
Alon et al. (2006), Al Khattab et al. (2007), 
Hood and Nawaz (2004) 
“It was the terrorism part which was the main concern for us” RS17 
Economic sanctions Burmester (2000), Al Khattab et al. (2007)   
“Sudan has sanctions from the United Nations and the United States. So, we had a problem which is 
a risk for us which is repatriation of our revenue.” RS10 
“once the sanction carried out, people started to fear that Syria will confront many financial 
difficulties” RS16 
“The economic sanction as that affects the flow of premium ...the premium of that business cannot be 
transferred to Kuwait because of the sanction issue.”RS17 
Wars Al Khattab et al. (2007), Alon et al. (2006) 
“if any war happened with them, our business will be impacted....If Humors Strait shut down, the sea 




 The risk attributes. These were adopted from the instruments normally used in the 
psychometric research that has been discussed in the literature review (see 
Chapter Two). Because this study explores whether the psychometric approach 
fits political risk, it became important to minimise significant deviations from the 
attributes already used in the literature. Since the psychometric paradigm had not 
been used in the context of political risk, the interviews conducted in this research 
supported the identification and confirmation of risk attributes that were used in 
the questionnaire. Table 4.8 shows the different attributes included in the 
questionnaire; these included risk attributes that are supported by literature and 
relevant interviewee quotations. As shown in Table 4.8, most of the attributes 
have been used multiple times in previous studies. However, some attributes - 
unanticipated consequences, preventability, increasing-ness and duration of effect 
- have been used only once. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, these 
attributes were found to be appropriate because they seemed to fit the nature of 
political risk that firms experienced during the Arab Spring and they emerged 
from some of the interviews, as shown in Table 4.8. Furthermore, no supporting 
quotations were identified from the interviews for three of the attributes - 
voluntariness of risk, knowledge about risk and dread. However; these attributes 
were included in the questionnaire because they are major attributes and widely 
used in the psychometric paradigm as mentioned earlier in Chapter Three Section 




Table 4.8:Linking the risk attributes to the literature and interviews conducted in this study 
Risk Attribute References Interviewees’ Quotations 
Voluntariness of risk  Sjoberg (1996), Siegrist et al. (2005), 
Fischhoff et al. (1978), Bronfman et al. 
( 2007), Marris et al. (1997), 
Kleinhesselink and Rosa(1991), 
Siegrist et al. (2007), Bronfman et al. 
(2008), Bronfman et al. (2003), 
Langford (1999), Jenkin (2006). 
  
Immediacy of effect  Sjoberg (1996), Siegrist et al. (2005), 
Fischhoff et al. (1978), Bronfman et al. 
( 2007), Marris et al. (1997), Bronfman 
et al. (2008), Bronfman et al. (2003), 
Langford (1999), Jenkin (2006), Willis 
et al. (2005). 
“Because when you have a social uprising and it is not controlled properly, the safety and security decreases, 
so what happens people will invest less and travel there less and it becomes like dominant effect. So if, an 
entity or an institution that does business in a country such as this, you will stop doing business there 
immediately.”  RS11 
“The most important political risks are Civil war and revolution. Because if people don’t feel confident they 
will not spend money. That will affect our business straight away as a bank. People for example will not take 
loans. Today these risks are increasing” RS13    
Knowledge about risk Sjoberg (1996), Siegrist et al. (2005), 
Fischhoff et al. (1978), Bronfman et al. 
(2007),  Marris et al. (1997), 
Kleinhesselink and Rosa(1991), 
Siegrist et al (2007), Bronfman et al 
(2008), Bronfman et al. 
(2003),Langford (1999), Jenkin (2006). 
 
Control over risk  Sjoberg (1996), Siegrist et al. (2005), 
Fischhoff et al (1978), Bronfman et al ( 
2007), Bronfman et al. (2008), 
Bronfman et al. (2003), Kleinhesselink 
and Rosa (1991), Siegrist et al. (2007), 
Jenkin (2006). 
“We have hedging strategies to ensure that if something like this happened how we can respond...but will not 
stop us from taking the decision to enter the country , but if the security threat is very high, it can stop us, as 
we can’t control  this” RS1 
“There are political risks that we can control somehow and there are some can’t be controlled i.e. the 
increase of taxation can be controlled by increasing the premium that we get for the cover of the insurance” 
RS8 
The political unrest and the government instability are ones of the risks that uncontrollable. “The political 
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unrest and the government instability means that everything is delayed in terms of the government spending, 
changing in rules and regulations and these risks are out of control” RS8 
“I want to say that the political risk or the force majeure is beyond control by either the investor or the 
country; the environment itself may change. Any investor must know that everything might go positive or 
negative”. RS16 
Newness  Sjoberg (1996), Siegrist et al. (2005), 
Fischhoff et al. (1978), Bronfman et al. 
(2007), Kleinhesselink and Rosa 
(1991), Bronfman et al.  (2003), Jenkin 
(2006), Willis et al. (2005). 
“In Iraq the risk is happening every day. They live with it. They are used to it. they don’t complain about it” 
RS9 
“There have been issues of political related issues outside of the Middle East for many many years, so it's a 
big history for example Turkey.” RS11 
Catastrophic potential  Sjoberg (1996), Fischhoff et al. (1978), 
Bronfman et al. (2007), Marris et al. 
(1997), Kleinhesselink and 
Rosa(1991), Bronfman et al. (2008), 
Bronfman et al. (2003), Langford 
(1999), Jenkin (2006), Willis et al. 
(2005). 
“Arab Spring is big political issue all over around the Arabic and Islamic areas and that affected a lot of 
business” RS5 
Dread Sjoberg (1996), Siegrist et al. (2005), 
Fischhoff et al. (1978), Bronfman et al. 
( 2007), Marris et al. (1997), 
Kleinhesselink and Rosa(1991), 
Bronfman et al.  (2008), Bronfman et 





Willis et al.(2005) 
 
“The expectation is difficult as you cannot follow the political events, and you cannot determine the recovery 
time”. RS15 




Jenkin (2006).  “we just protect our business from these kind of risk by insurance” RS16 
“insurance is a recovery solution not protective....the impact will be very high” RS1 
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“Because we already exist there and already have a system that can prevent the K.P.C. from 
corruption”.RS24  
 
Increasingness  Jenkin (2006).  “The political instability has increased substantially since the beginning of the A.S” RS7 
“The security and safety risks have increased since the beginning of the A.S. The extremists are occupying the 
border areas. That  is where they grow and expand. their main areas are borders between Syria, Iraq and 
Jordan” RS9 
“Because when you have a social uprising and it is not controlled properly, the safety and security decreases, 
so what happens people will invest less and travel there less and it becomes like dominant effect..”  RS11 
“The most important political risks are civil war and revolution. Because if people don’t feel confident they 
will not spend money. That will affect our business as a bank. People for example will not take loans. Today 
these risks are increasing”. RS13    
Duration of effect  Willis et al.(2005) “These events affect the investments in these countries. But it’s temporary decline. It will not last.” RS16  
“always officials whom we have close relation with them regarding waves and vibrations issues escape for 
survival and consequently our investment is affected by such absence, but it’s a temporary issue” RS6 
“The political unrest in Syria has been remaining for long time, there is no operation and we had to shut down 
these branches.” RS8 
Severity  Siegrist et al. (2005), Fischhoff et al.  
(1978), Bronfman et al. ( 2007), Marris 
et al (1997), Bronfman et al. (2008), 
Bronfman et al. (2003), Langford 
(1999), Jenkin (2006),Willis et al. 
(2005). 
 
“the political unrest did not affect the insurance industry as much as it affect the investment industry and so it 
affect some companies more than the others” RS8 
“We just have been affected a little bit from the political violence in Bahrain” RS10  
“Corruption doesn’t have severe impact on us as financial service. If we were in the retail business or a 
service related entity, maybe it would impact.” RS11 
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 The demographic variables. These were in six items: a) total size of the firm and 
its subsidiaries; b) years of experience in international business; c) type of 
industry; d) number of countries which firms operate in; E) managerial position of 
the individual completing the questionnaire and F) ownership.  
As regards the total size of the firm, there is a lack of financial data in the GCC, 
with most private and public organisations basing their definitions of firm size 
only on the number of employees rather than sales turnover (Hertog, 2010). 
Moreover, in Kuwait, the total size of the firm is normally defined in terms of 
capitalization (Al-Najem et al., 2013; Hertog, 2010). Previous studies in the area 
of political risk (e.g. Al Khattab et al., 2008a) used total assets as a reflection of 
the total firm size. Therefore, total firm size in the questionnaire included the total 
assets, capitalization and total number of employees. However, the size of the 
subsidiary is considered to be more crucial in determining a “firm’s susceptibility 
to political risks” when compared to the firm’s overall size (Oetzel, 2005. p. 767) 
therefore, percentage of assets and number of employees in host countries was 
included in the questionnaire to indicate the size of subsidiaries.  
As mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, the firms’ length of experience in 
international business and type of industry affect the concerns about risk in 
international businesses (Kobrin, 1982; Al Khattab et al., 2007), and, therefore, 
this length of experience was included in the questionnaire. Other demographics 
including number of countries in which firms operate was included in the 
questionnaire considering the positive relationship between concerns about 
political risks and international expansion as highlighted by Howell (2001) and Al 
Khattab et al. (2007). 
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The ownership (as a demographic variable) was not discussed previously in 
political risk studies but, in Kuwait, governmental firms are heavily involved in 
international business. Ownership – governmental or non-governmental – is 
therefore examined in the present research. Similarly, the position of managers 
was not tested in previous political risk studies, but it is plausible that an 
individual’s managerial position will influence their risk perceptions as different 
positions involve different levels of responsibility. This research does not claim 
that the position of managers is the only characteristic that potentially affects risk 
perception; nationality, gender and education are among the characteristics that 
are also known to affect risk perception. However, the focus of this research study 
is on political risk perception within organisations, which makes the characteristic 
of managerial position the most relevant.  
 The dependent variables (the perceived level of risk and the perceived 
acceptability). These variables are regressed against condensed risk attributes in 
the psychometric paradigm (Slovic et al., 1987; Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; 
Maris et al., 1997; Siegrist et al., 2007; Bronfman et al., 2007). 
As explained earlier, the questionnaire was provided in both English and Arabic by 
splitting it in halves – the left half being in English and the right half being in Arabic.  
The questionnaire was composed of three sections. In Section One, participants were 
asked about his/her position and information about the firm (the demographic 
variables). Participants were also asked an open question about their understanding of 
the influence of the Arab Spring; the aim in asking this question was to ascertain the 
seriousness of the participants in answering the questionnaire. In Section Two, each of 
the 12 risk attributes was presented on a separate page, with a short description for 
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each of them. On each of these pages, participants were asked to rate the 14 political 
risks as they related to each given risk attribute; they rated them using a scale of 5, 
following previous studies which adopted the psychometric approach (e.g. Marries et 
al., 1997; Marries et al., 1998, Siegrist et al., 2005; Siegrist et al., 2007).  In Section 
Three, each of the two dependent variables were presented on separate pages with a 
short description for each of them. Participants were asked to rate the 14 political risks 
on each of the two dependent variables, using a scale of 5. The detailed questionnaire 
is attached in Appendix 4. 
4.5.5 Questionnaire data analysis 
 In response to research question one, this analysis sought to investigate the managers’ 
political risk perceptions by ascertaining the variations in perceptions explained by 
three dimensions: participants, risk attributes and political risks. To clarify, for each of 
the 120 participants the data consist of ratings of each of the 12 risk attributes (for 
example voluntariness) for each of the 14 different political risks (for example civil 
war). This data provides potentially three different two-dimensional views as 
summarised in the Figure 4.1. 
 





View 1 and view 2 are from a psychometric paradigm approach and view 3 is to show 
the usefulness of risk attributes in risk perception when compared to the two views of 
the psychometric paradigm approach. These views are: 
 View 1 – analyses risk attributes against political risks and aggregating across 
participants (this represents the traditional psychometric paradigm) 
 View 2 – analyses risk attributes against participants and aggregating across 
political risks  
 View 3 – analyses participants against political risks and aggregating across 
the risk attributes   
Managers were firstly asked to rate the list of political risks on each of the risk 
attributes outlined in the questionnaire. For view 1 and view 2, the correlations 
between each pair of attributes were calculated; and in view 3, the correlations 
between each pair of political risks were calculated. Then Principle Component 
Analysis was performed for the three views to group the risk attributes/political risks 
into factors. These factors were used to produce a cognitive map.  In order to assess 
the predictive power of the factors that emerged from the three views, the two 
dependent variables commonly used in the risk literature (scale of risk and 
acceptability) were regressed onto the factors.  
In order to examine the influence of firms’ and participants’ characteristics on 
managerial political risk perception, inferential analysis was conducted by linking the 
19 demographic variables with the two dependent variables: riskiness and 
acceptability. Three demographic variables: type of industry, job title and ownership 
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(which are all nominal variables) were analysed using non-parametric methods, while 
the rest of the variables were analysed using parametric methods.  
Two non-parametric methods were used, namely: Kruskal-Wallis Test (for more than 
two categories, e.g. type of industry) and Mann-Whitney U Test (for the differences 
between two categories only e.g. ownership). Furthermore, a parametric data analysis 
was used for the 16 remaining demographic variables. Correlation analysis for these 
variables was first conducted followed by factor analysis to condense the inter-
correlated variables. Finally, two regression models were developed to assess the 
usefulness of the factors in predicting riskiness and acceptability.    
4.5.6 Trustworthiness and rigor of the questionnaire study  
There are four criteria to verify trustworthiness of quantitative research: internal 
validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Internal validity reflects confidence in the ‘truth’ of the findings (Lincoln and Guba, 
2003). External validity demonstrates the extent to which findings of one research 
study are applicable to other situations. This is commonly shown by demonstrating 
that the findings are applicable to the larger population (Merriam, 1998). Reliability 
reflects the extent to which the tool used in the research will produce similar results in 
different circumstances provided everything else remains the same (Roberts et al., 
2006), while objectivity is a characteristic of quantitative approaches as they apply 
precise statistical measurements that keep the researcher detached from the subjects 
(Lincoln and Guba, 2003).  
In this research study, the psychometric paradigm is applied in the questionnaire. This 
paradigm has proven validity as it has been thoroughly tested with various risks, 
various types of respondents and sampling approaches as well as in different countries 
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and contexts (Dohle et al., 2010). This is highlighted in more detail in Chapter Two 
Section 2.3.1. However, it has not been previously tested with political risks. 
Therefore, a pilot study was conducted in this research (see Section 4.5.2) and the 
interview findings were also used (see Section 4.5.4) to support the development of 
the questionnaire, which all supported the validity and reliability of the research study. 
Moreover, to prevent any misunderstanding by any of the participants, the 
questionnaire was provided in both English and Arabic by splitting the same 
questionnaire into halves. The translation into Arabic was carried out by a certified 
translator in Kuwait.  
A conventional reliability analysis is inapplicable because there is only one 
questionnaire item for each ‘scale’ i.e. each attribute. When these are combined in the 
principal components analysis, this analysis itself indicates how strongly the attributes 
loading on each component are inter-correlated. 
This study employed two important measures; these are the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) and Bartlett test. KMO measures the sampling adequacy and its statistic value 
ranges between 0 and 1. According to Field (2005), a KMO value close to 0 indicates 
that factor analysis is inappropriate while a value close to 1 indicates the obtaining of 
reliable factors. Kaiser (1974) shows that a value of more than 0.5 is acceptable, 
whereas KMO values less than 0.5 may require collecting more data or a review of the 
variables to consider in the analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is testing whether our 
observed correlation matrix is equal to the identity matrix. For factor analysis to 
produce good factors, the observed correlation matrix should not be equal to zero (the 
identity matrix); i.e. Bartlett’s test statistic value should be significant at 0.05 level 
(Leech et al., 2005). 
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KMO coefficient results are presented and supported by the Bartlett test whenever 
applicable in each section as shown in the next chapter. In this study KMO measures 
of sampling adequacy were more than 0.5 (as shown in Chapter Five), which indicates 
that the data is likely to factor well. This was also supported by Bartlett's test of 
sphericity, where the significance value = 0.000 < 0.001.   
4.6 Methodological limitations 
In this section, several methodological limitations related to this study are discussed. 
The study investigates the potential effect of the characteristic of managerial position 
on political risk perception. This is acknowledged as a methodological limitation as 
other characteristics, for example age, gender and education, can potentially affect risk 
perception also. However, managerial position is considered in this study due to its 
relevance as explained earlier. 
Other limitations of this study include the generalisability of findings. This study was 
conducted in Kuwait where there are only 138 firms participating in international 
business; and only 44 of these firms responded to the survey. This is a limitation in a 
sense that the firms may not be completely representative, as they are only 1/3 of the 
relevant population. And since the study was done only in Kuwaiti firms, there are 
questions of external validity – it is possible that the findings may not be generally 
applicable in other different contexts.  
Also, possible sampling bias is another limitation to this study due to the self-selection 
process, whereby the potential respondents had first to be contacted to confirm their 
willingness to participate due to the size of the questionnaire (20 pages). However, 
this was important to enhance the response rate as the previous studies have indicated 
that respondents were reluctant to participate because of the length of the 
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psychometric questionnaire. Related to this is the use of a single respondent manager 
per firm in the interview study. This in itself is a potential limitation, as it means the 
study relies in most cases on using one informant to determine what happens in a 
particular organisation. Two or more respondents per firm would allow for the 
triangulation of data across respondents to ascertain consistency of the data in every 
firm. However, this study used managers who had busy schedules and it was therefore 
difficult to get more than one manager from every company. Nonetheless, the study 
used multiple firms and two sources of data (i.e. questionnaire survey and interviews) 
and their complementarity improved the validity of findings.  
Another limitation pertains to the cross-sectional nature of this study. As this study 
investigates managers’ perceptions and its relation to risk assessment, it would be 
expected that processes would evolve over time, and the cross-sectional study does 
not capture such processes.  
4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter provided an overview of the gaps in the literature, laid out the research 
questions, the philosophy of the research and the methods used. The first gap in the 
literature was the absence of a prior attempt to apply the psychometric paradigm to the 
perception of political risk. This was addressed by a questionnaire study, in which 14 
political risks and 12 risk attributes were tested. The second gap was the absence of a 
connection between risk perception and formal risk assessment. This was addressed 
by the interview study that investigated how Kuwaiti managers responded to political 
risks, and how they explained both their assessment processes and their judgments of 
risks. This was analysed in both an open-ended thematic approach, and a more 
constrained approach that specifically looked at the degree of institutionalisation of 
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the assessment found in each firm. The basic philosophical commitment in this study 














Figure 4.2: Summary of the methods and variables in the current research 
 
This research applies a combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches in 
the form of interviews and a survey questionnaire as summarised in Figure 4.2. 
Although the interviews chronologically come first as they informed the design of the 
questionnaire, the next section presents the data analysis of the questionnaire first. The 
reason for this is that the findings of the interviews confirm and explain the results of 
the questionnaire. Therefore, it was deemed sensible to have the results of the 
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CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the quantitative analysis of the psychometric 
questionnaire study. As described in Chapter 4, there are three views of the data 
obtained from this analysis. The aim is to compare the first view (the traditional 
psychometric paradigm) with the other two views in order to assess which offers the 
best explanation of differences in risk perception, and to compare it with an 
explanation based on demographic variables (firms’ and participants’ characteristics) . 
In the risk perception literature, “hazard” is the word normally used to denote discrete, 
uncertain threats or types of threat. However, the word “risk” is normally used in the 
political risk literature, and in order to reduce confusion, the word ‘risk’ will be used 
here.  
The main finding of this chapter is that risk perceptions are most strongly predicted by 
aggregating across participants, using the attributes (the traditional psychometric 
approach). Aggregating across risks, again using the attributes, produces a less 
predictive value. Ignoring the attributes by aggregating across them produces the least 
predictive model. The demographic variables provide a very weak explanation of risk 
perceptions. A descriptive analysis is presented in section 5.2, followed by section 5.3, 
which deals with the analysis of risks, attributes and subjects (the three views). 
Section 5.4 deals with the analysis of demographic influences on risk perception. 
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5.2 Descriptive analysis 
a) Distribution of respondents by type of industry 
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to choose from one of the following 
types of industry: Banking, Oil and Gas, Real Estate, Insurance, Financial Service, 
Industrial, Telecommunications and Others. Due to low frequencies for some types of 
industries, such as Bank (frequency = 5), Insurance (frequency = 8), 
Telecommunication (frequency = 7) and Others (frequency = 7), and in order to 
facilitate comparisons between types of industries, Banking, Insurance and Financial 
Service are classified under Financial Services, and Industrial, Telecommunications, 
and Others are classified under Others. Table 5.1 gives insight on the distribution of 
respondents according to these broader categories of type of industry. 
Table 5.1: Distribution of respondents by type of industry 
Type of industry Frequency Percent 
Financial Service 41 34.2 
Real Estate 26 21.7 
Oil & Gas 22 18.3 
Others 31 25.8 
Total 120 100.0 
 
b) Distribution of respondents by their job title 
Two classifications have been used for managerial positions, firstly, according to 
seniority, and secondly, according to speciality. Two classes were used for each: the 
seniority classification included ‘top managers’ and ‘middle managers’; the speciality 
classification included ‘risk managers’ and ‘other managers’. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show 
the proportions of managers in each classification.  
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Table 5.2: Job Title according to seniority 
Job Title Frequency percent 
Top Management 31 25.8 
Middle management 89 74.2 
Total 120 100.0 
 
 
Table 5.3: Job Title according to speciality 
Job Title Frequency Percent 
Risk Manager 20 16.7 
Other manager 100 83.3 
Total 120 100.0 
 
c) Distribution of respondents by type of ownership 
Table 5.4 shows the distribution by type of ownership respondents. Most respondents 
were from private companies. As mentioned earlier in the Methodology Chapter (see 
Section 4.4.1), the population of Kuwaiti international firms is 138 and the proportion 
of international government-owned firms is only 6% (8/138), whereas the proportion 
of the international private-owned firms listed in the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange is 94% 
(130/138).  
Table 5.4: Distribution of respondents by type of ownership 
Ownership Frequency Percent 
Private 100 83.3 
Government 20 16.7 
Total 120 100.0 
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5.3 Analysis of risks, attributes and subjects  
As explained in Chapter Four, three types of analysis of the main data set were 
conducted: 
1. Attributes against risks and aggregated across participants (which means 
ignoring the differences between participants) – the traditional ‘psychometric’ 
approach. 
2. Attributes against participants and aggregated across risks (which means 
ignoring the differences between risks). 
3.  Participants against risks and aggregated across the attributes (which means 
ignoring the differences between attributes). 
5.3.1 Analysing attributes against risks aggregating across participants 
In this analysis, each case is a risk (for example civil war). The participants’ ratings 
for each attribute are aggregated as a mean value within each risk. Then the aim is to 
condense the attributes with principal component analysis. First, Table 5.5 shows the 
correlation matrix for the attributes. Most correlation coefficients are strongly 
correlated and significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), except that all the correlations 
with ‘increasing-ness’ are not significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). The correlations 
are in the direction- that would be expected. For example, the correlation between 
‘voluntariness of risk’ and ‘control over risk’ (r= -0.953) is a negative strong 
correlation because of the scales chosen: ‘voluntariness of risk’ values range from 
(1=voluntary) to (5=involuntary), while ‘control over risk’ values range from 
(1=uncontrollable) to (5=completely controllable). This means that, on average, risks 
which are felt to be voluntary were also felt to be controllable. The formulation of 
these scales was developed to stimulate participants’ thinking.  
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  N = 14 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin coefficient and Barttett’s test were calculated. As shown in Table 
5.6 KMO coefficient measure of sampling adequacy = 0.664, which is more than 0.5. 
This indicates that the data are likely to factor well. This is also supported by Bartlett's 
test of sphericity sig value = 0.000 < 0.001.  Therefore, it is possible to proceed with 






Table 5.6: KMO and Bartlett's Test of attributes against risks aggregated across 
participants 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .664 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 343.240 
Df 66 
Sig. .000 
Next, the principal component analysis was performed on the Risk × Attribute matrix. 
The resulting two factors explained 94% of the total variance in attribute ratings. 
Table 5.7 shows the rotated component matrix.  
Table 5.7: Rotated component matrix for attributes against risks aggregated across 
participants 
 Component 
 1 2 
Voluntariness of risk .880 .356 
Immediacy of effect -.932 .130 
Knowledge about risk .944 .163 
Control over risk -.933 -.327 
Newness -.886 -.317 
Catastrophic potential .884 .421 
Dread .959 .242 
Unanticipated consequences -.968 -.195 
Preventability -.915 -.392 
Increasing-ness .124 .982 
Duration of Effect .924 .117 
Severity of consequences .981 .119 




As shown in Table 5.7, severity of consequences loads most highly on factor 1, but 10 
out of the remaining 11 attributes also load highly on factor 1, and factor 1 accounts 
for 79% of the variance. Factor 1 is termed severity of consequences. Factor 2 only 
incorporates a single attribute, increasing-ness, and accounts for 15% of the variance. 
It is reasonable to term this increasing-ness.  
This factor structure, with all but one attribute loading heavily on one factor, is very 
different from all previous traditional studies about perception of environmental risks 
and activities such as Fischhoff et al. (1978), Marris et al. (1997), Bronfman and 
Cifuentes (2003) and Siegrist et al. (2005), in which the results contained a much 
more balanced factor structure. This could be due to the difference in the nature of the 
risks being studied, as this research focuses on political risk; it could also be due to the 
difference in the context of this study and type of participant, i.e. managers in 
international business, rather than the general public. It might be considered that the 
layout of the questionnaire contributed to this anomaly but this is unlikely as these 
results, as will be shown later, are in line with previous literature about political risk 
and with the results of the interviews. With the attributes condensed into two principal 
components, the different risks can be plotted in factor space. This is often done in 
psychometric studies (where it is referred to as a ‘cognitive map’) to show how risks 
appear to be differentiated. Figure 5.1 represents the location of the 14 political risks 













Figure 5.1: Factor space for attributes against risks 
As shown in Figure 5.1, risks in the first quadrant (high in both factors) are risks that 
are not imposed by the government, such as demonstrations and riots, revolutions, 
terrorism, civil wars, economic sanctions, and wars. It is also notable that corruption is 
very high in increasing-ness, although not in severity of consequences. Breach of 
contract by a host government, and expropriation and/or confiscation, were both high 
in severity, and very low in incerasing-ness. This supports the findings of Hood and 
Nawaz (2004) which indicate that these two risks have been decreasing in the recent 
years as governments have come to realise that they affect their credibility and make it 
hard to get World Bank support.   
In order to assess the predictive power of the two factors, the mean ratings across 
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regressed against the two factor scores for the 14 risks.  Table 5.8 shows the results for 
the two regression models. Both factors have high values of adjusted R2. Coefficients 
for both factors are highly significant in the model of riskiness, but only the severity 
factor has a significant coefficient in the model of acceptability. This coefficient is 
negative as should be expected, since acceptability would normally be high when 
riskiness is low. 
Table 5.8: Regression model of riskiness and acceptability onto two attributes factors 
Dependent Variable             Predictors B Std. Error Beta t-value 




(Constant) 3.660 .026 
 
141.320* 
Factor 1 .499 .027 .955 18.566* 





(Constant) 2.063 .053  38.890* 
Factor 1 -.607 .055 -.954 -11.034* 
*P-value<.0001 
    
It has been claimed in the literature of risk perception (Chapter Two) that the 
traditional psychometric analysis seems to obscure differences among participants and 
inflates how the model predicts the risk perception (Gardner et al., 1982). This is 
because the regression produces a higher R2 when ratings are aggregated across 
participants. Aggregation is said to ‘wash away’ the effect of participant differences 
(Bronfman et al., 2007). Therefore, several studies attempted to apply the 
psychometric paradigm by using different types of analysis (Gardner and Gould, 
1989; Savadori et al., 2004; Bronfman et al., 2008). 
Nonetheless, it can be said that the attributes explain variation in risk perception very 
well. This is interesting because those attributes are very similar to the ones in the 
traditional psychometric model, indicating that such attributes have great generality. 
They are equally useful for explaining the perception of safety risks among the 
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general public and the perception of political risk among managers in organisations. 
But they work in a way that differs between these two situations because they 
combine into factors in a different way. Somehow people use this very general set of 
attributes when making judgments about risks, but have a different way of combining 
them in different contexts.  
5.3.2 Analysing attributes versus participants aggregating across risks 
This analysis ignores the differences between risks and concentrates on differences 
among participants. But it retains the idea that the attributes are what explain variation 
in risk perceptions. To clarify, in this analysis each participant is a case, with ratings 
averaged over the risks. Then the aim is to condense the attributes with principal 
components analysis. Table 5.9 shows the correlation matrix for the risk attributes. 
Many correlation coefficients between attributes are found to be significant at the 0.01 
or 0.05 levels (2-tailed) except those involving the knowledge attribute, which appears 
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Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin coefficient and Bartlett’s test were calculated as shown in Table 
5.10. KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.810, which is more than 0.5 and closer 
to 1; this predicts that the data are likely to factor well. This is also supported by 
Bartlett's test of sphericity sig value = 0.000< 0.001. Therefore, it is possible to 
proceed with performing factor analysis. 
 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
    N =120 
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Table 5.10: KMO and Bartlett's Test of attributes versus participants aggregating across 
risks 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .810 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 467.899 
Df 66 
Sig. .000 
Next, principal component analysis was applied to the participant × attributes matrix. 
The resulting four factors explained 67% of the total variance in attribute ratings. 
Table 5.11 shows the rotated component matrix.  
 
Table 5.11: Rotated component matrix for attributes against participants aggregated 
across risks 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 
Voluntariness .215 .686 .116 .281 
Immediacy of effect -.444 -.106 .418 .442 
Knowledge about risk  .066 .043 -.133 .902 
Control over risk -.679 -.155 .283 -.064 
Newness -.157 .265 .800 -.088 
Catastrophic potential .796 .117 .130 -.055 
Common-Dread .803 -.112 -.076 -.044 
Unanticipated consequences .077 -.463 .699 -.037 
Preventability -.714 -.177 .210 -.142 
Increasing -ness .242 .708 -.115 -.249 
Duration of effect .731 .394 .063 .063 
Severity of  consequences .799 .250 -.046 -.142 
Percentage  of Variance Explained 




As shown in Table 5.11, factor 1 includes the following attributes: control over risk, 
catastrophic potential, common-dread, preventability, duration of effect and severity 
of consequences. Factor 1 is highly correlated with dread so is termed ‘dread’. It 
accounts for 31.3% of the total variance explained. The attributes control over risk and 
preventability load negatively on factor 1 given the scales used in the questionnaire.  
Factor 2 includes increasing-ness and voluntariness attributes. Factor 2 is highly 
correlated with increasing-ness so is termed ‘increasing-ness’ and accounts for 13.1% 
of the total variance explained. Factor 3 includes newness and unanticipated 
consequences and accounts for 12.5% of the total variance explained, and is termed 
newness.  
Factor 4 includes only one attribute: knowledge about risk so is termed ‘knowledge 
about risk’ and it accounts for 10.1% of the total variance explained. As far as the 
immediacy of effect attribute is concerned, there is no strong factor loading observed 
on any of the four factors (factor loading < 0.45). Therefore, immediacy of effect 
attribute has been removed from the analysis. 
Figure 5.2 represents the location of participants in the factor space defined by the 
first two of these principal components: dread and increasing-ness. It shows no visual 




Figure 5.2: Factor space for attributes against participants 
 
In order to assess the predictive power of the four factors, the mean rating for the two 
dependent variables (riskiness and acceptability) across the 14 risks for each 
participant were regressed onto the factor scores. Table 5.12 shows the results, first for 
the stepwise regression linking riskiness with the factors, second for the stepwise 
regression linking acceptability with the factors. For the first, the adjusted R2 = 0.346, 
indicating a moderate fit. The first two factors only (dread and increasing-ness) have 
significant coefficients.  In the second model, the adjusted R2 = 0.316 and factors 1 
and 3 (dread and newness) have significant coefficients. None of the other factors had 






Table 5.12: Regression model of riskiness and acceptability onto four attributes factors 
Dependent Variable             Predictors B Std. Error Beta t-value 




(Constant)       3.660 .055  65.950** 
Factor 1   .398 .056 .529 7.138** 





(Constant) 2.063 .057  36.0728** 
Factor 1 -.398 .057 -.526 -6.938** 
 
Factor 3 .172 .057 .227 2.993* 
*P-value<.01;  **P-value<.001 
 
    
The results of the Acceptability regression model agree with common sense that as 
Dread increases, Acceptability decreases. Also, as the risk becomes old, it will 
become more acceptable to managers, and vice versa. Voluntariness and knowledge 
about risk are excluded from the acceptability regression model as these factors are 
found to be not significant predictors to the aggregated acceptability. 
The R-squared for both models in this view is substantially lower than view 1 (the 
traditional approach). This indicates that aggregating across risks produces less 
predictive value. This finding is in line with Bronfman et al. (2007), Willis et al. 
(2005), Savadori et al. (2004) and Barnett and Breakwell (2001). Bronfman et al. 
(2007, p.530) concluded that “psychometric dimensions are less useful for explaining 
differences among participants than explaining differences among hazards”.  
5.3.3 Analysing participants against risks aggregating across attributes 
The aim here was to assess the effect of risks against participants and aggregated 
across attributes, thereby ignoring the differences between attributes. So the 
assumption here was that attributes have no particular significance, and that all 
predictive value, in terms of anticipating risk perceptions, lay with the participants and 
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the risks. This is contrary to the thinking behind the psychometric approach, and was 
examined to determine whether the psychometric approach is substantially better. 
Table 5.13 shows the correlation matrix for political risks. Almost all correlation 
coefficients between risks are found to be significant at the 0.01 level or 0.05 level (2-
tailed), except that between Import/Export restrictions and Wars.  
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**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
N = 120 
 
First step in principal component analysis is to calculate the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
coefficient measure and Bartlett’s test as shown in Table 5.14. KMO measure of 
sampling adequacy = 0.903, which is very close to 1; this predicts that the data is 
likely to factor well. This is also supported by Bartlett's test of sphericity sig value = 
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0.000< 0.001. Therefore, it is possible to proceed with performing principal 
component analysis. 
Table 5.14: KMO and Bartlett's Test of participants against risks aggregating across 
attributes 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .903 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1.468E3 
Df 91 
Sig. .000 
The principal component analysis was performed on the Risk × Participant matrix 
retaining components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and rotating the solution using 
the orthogonal varimax method.  The resulting two factors explained 70.5% of the 
total variance in attribute ratings. Table 5.15 shows the rotated component matrix for 
the aggregate-level risk-focused analysis, and highlights risks assigned to each 

















Table 5.15: Rotated component matrix for risks against participants aggregated across 
attributes 
 Component 
 1 2 
Taxation restrictions .063 .755 
Currency exchange restrictions .217 .812 
Breach of contract by host government .348 .707 
Capital/Profit repatriation .205 .835 
Import/Export restriction .122 .789 
Ownership/Personnel restriction  .103 .706 
Expropriation .272 .574 
Corruption .654 .412 
Demonstration and Riot .887 .213 
Revolution .919 .185 
Civil War .936 .166 
Terrorism .919 .155 
Economic sanction .849 .249 
Wars .890 .151 
Percentage  of Variance Explained 40.048 30.453 
 
As shown in Table 5.15 the risks corruption, demonstration/riots, revolution, civil war, 
terrorism, economic sanctions and wars had very high positive loading on factor 1, 
which account for 40% of the variance. As the source of these risks is not directly the 
host government, factor 1 can be called non-governmental risk. Factor 2 includes 
taxation restriction, currency exchange restrictions, breach of contract, capital 
repatriation, import and export restrictions, personnel restriction and expropriation. It 
accounted for 30.5% of the variance. Since the source of these risks is related to 
governmental policy, factor 2 can be termed governmental risk. Figure 5.3 represents 
the location of 120 participants in the factor space as defined by the two factors. It 




Figure 5.3: Factor Space for risks against participants 
 
As before, riskiness and acceptability are regressed against these factors to determine 
how well they explain variation in the two dependent variables. As can be seen from 
the Table 5.16, the riskiness regression model has an adjusted R2 = 0.143, which is 
very low and indicates that the data does not fit the model well, and a lot less well 
than the two previous models (the psychometric models).  
Table 5.16: Regression model of riskiness and acceptability onto two factors of risks 
Dependent Variable             Predictors B Std. Error Beta t-value 




(Constant) 3.660 .064  57.620** 
Factor 2 .248 .064 .330 3.890** 





(Constant) 2.063 .068  30.326** 
Factor 1 -.153 .068 -.203 -2.247* 
*P-value<.05;  **P-value<.001 
    
The mean rating for acceptability was also regressed on to the two factors, as shown in 
Table 5.16. But the stepwise regression identified Factor 1 (non-governmental risk) as 
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the only significant variable, excluding factor 2 (governmental risk). So for both 
outcomes factor 1 (non-Governmental risk) is a highly significant predictor of both 
riskiness and acceptability, and the well-defined result of the principal components 
analysis clearly separates governmental and non-governmental risk. But the model 
performs poorly compared with the psychometric procedures described earlier (view 1 
and view 2). This is a confirmation that the psychometric approach – explaining risk 
perception in terms of attributes – carries across well to the political risk domain. In 
the analysis of interviews (Chapter Six) and the discussion (Chapter Seven), the 
question of why governmental and non-governmental risks might be treated 
differently will be re-visited. 
5.4 Demographic analysis 
The demographic analysis is intended to answer RQ1.2 on the influence of 19 firm 
and participant characteristics on managerial political risk perception; this is done by 
linking them with the two dependent variables, Riskiness and Acceptability. The 
effect of type of industry, job title and ownership (which are all nominal variables) are 
analysed using non-parametric methods, while the rest of the variables are analysed 
using parametric methods.  
5.4.1 Demographic non-parametric analysis 
A Kruskal-Wallis test (used when assessing more than two categories) was conducted 
to examine whether there was a significant difference between the type of industry 
categories with respect to riskiness and acceptability. As shown in Table 4.17, no 




Table 5.17: Kruskal – Wallis test between type of industry vs. riskiness and acceptability 




Riskiness       
 
Industry 1.022 .796 
Acceptability   
 
Industry   2.343                   
.504  
*P-value<.05      
The Mann-Whitney U test (used in assessing the differences between two categories 
only) was conducted to check for a significant difference between types of ownership 
(private owned or government owned), job title in terms of specialty (risk manager or 
other kind of manager) and seniority (top managers or non-senior manager) with 
respect to Riskiness and Acceptability. As shown in Table 5.18, there was no 
significant difference between the categories of ownership and job title except in the 
case of risk managers where it significantly affected acceptability at the 0.05 level. 
This may be due to chance as it is an isolated result. 
Table 5.18: Mann-Whitney U test between both ownership and job title vs. riskiness and 
acceptability 
Dependent Variable             Predictors Z-value  Asymp. Sig. 
Riskiness       
Ownership 0.437 0.235 
Job Title- Speciality -1.459 0.145 
Job Title-Seniority -1.557 0.119 
Acceptability   
Ownership -0.088 0.93 
Job Title- Speciality -2.372 .018* 
  Job Title-Seniority -0.063 0.95 




5.4.2 Demographic parametric analysis 
Parametric data analyses for the 16 demographic variables were performed. First the 
correlations among them were calculated, and then condensed using principal 
component analysis. Riskiness and acceptability were regressed against factors from 
the principal components. The correlation matrix is shown in Table 4.19, indicating 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total capital 1 
        
              
Total assets .485** 1 
       
              
% of assets in GCC -.379** -.288** 1 
      
              
% of assets in non 
GCC Arab 
countries 
.187* 0.038 -.399** 1 
     
              
% of assets in non 
Arab developing 
countries 
.299** 0.003 -.506** .627** 1 
    
              
% of Assets in 
Non-Arab 
developed countries 
.221* 0.019 -.416** .256** .380** 1 
   
              
Number of years in 
international 
business activities 
.490** .309** -.329** 0.045 0.095 0.087 1 
  
              
Total number of 
employees 
0.157 .427** 0.026 0.161 -0.039 -0.047 .308** 1 
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% of employees in 
GCC countries 
-.267** -0.039 .404** -.280** -0.055 -0.147 -.368** -0.057 1 
       
% of employees in 
Non GCC Arab 
countries 
0.084 0.055 -0.107 .449** .257** 0.139 0.029 .186* -.382** 1 
      




.220* 0 -.249** .470** .591** .419** 0.12 0.026 -.301** .316** 1 
     




.222* 0.155 -.201* .266** .315** .613** .187* 0.085 -0.158 .196* .409** 1 
    
Number of GCC 
countries in which 
firm operates 
-0.121 0.005 0.141 -0.024 -0.159 -0.056 0.099 .227* -0.165 -0.005 0.141 -0.149 1 
   
Number of non 
GCC Arab 
countries in which 
firm operates 




countries  in which 
firm operates 




countries  in which 
firm operates 
.245** 0.106 -.254** -0.047 0.142 .462** .265** 0.129 -.191* -0.085 .314** .533** 0.12 0.054 0.031 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
    Sample size= 120 
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First step in factor analysis is to calculate the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin coefficient measure 
and Barttett’s test. As shown in the Table 5.20 KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 
0.589, which is more than 0.5. Although it is slightly higher than 0.5, it indicates that 
the data is likely to factor well as this is supported by Bartlett's test of sphericity with 
sig value = 0.000 < 0.001.  Therefore, it is possible to proceed with performing factor 
analysis. 
Table 5.20: KMO and Bartlett's Test for the 16 demographic independent variables 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .589 




Principal components analysis over these 16 variables produced 5 factors as shown in 
















Table 5.21: Factor analysis for the 16 demographic independent variables 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Total capital of firm .456 .135 .162 .501 .592 
Total assets of your firm .276 .008 .023 .882 .186 
Percentage of firms asset in the GCC countries to the total assets of your firm -.635 -.331 -.218 .034 -.386 
Percentage of firms asset in the non GCC Arab countries to the total assets of your 
firm 
.077 .837 .061 .107 .146 
Percentage of firms asset in the non-Arab developing countries to the total assets of 
your firm 
.119 .633 .274 -.053 .436 
Percentage of firms asset in the non-Arab developed countries to the total assets of 
your firm 
.069 .315 .711 -.141 .163 
How many years firm involved in international business activities .663 -.034 .285 .373 -.025 
Total number of employees that your firm employee -.032 .137 .040 .868 -.272 
Percentage of firms employees in the GCC countries to the total number of  
employees 
-.598 -.395 -.097 .011 .269 
Percentage of firms employees in the non GCC Arab countries to the total number 
of employees in  firm 
-.029 .744 -.025 .148 -.169 
Percentage of firms employees in the non-Arab developing countries to the total 
number of  employees 
.123 .641 .476 -.113 -.003 
Percentage of firms employees in the non-Arab developed countries to the total 
number of  employees 
-.088 .284 .834 .090 .064 
In how many GCC countries your firm has facilities such as representative offices, 
subsidiaries etc. 
.186 .013 -.008 .094 -.810 
In how many non GCC Arab countries your firm has facilities such as 
representative offices, subsidiaries etc. 
.930 .075 -.081 .165 -.121 
In how many non-Arab developing countries your firm has facilities such as 
representative offices, subsidiaries etc 
.894 -.113 -.066 .013 .043 
In how many non-Arab developed countries your firm has facilities such as 
representative offices, subsidiaries etc 
.139 -.224 .799 .202 -.066 
   
Two regression models were developed to predict the riskiness and the acceptability 
using these factors. As shown in Table 5.22, the Adjusted R2 for riskiness and 




Table 5.22: Regression model of riskiness and acceptability vs. the five factors 
This indicates that there is very little or no influence of firms’ and respondents’ 
characteristics on managerial political risk perception, in contrast to the psychometric 
model.  
5.5 Open ended question in the questionnaire 
As mentioned in the methodology, an open-ended question in the questionnaire aimed 
to assess the seriousness of respondents towards the questionnaire and the general 
problem of political risk during the Arab Spring. The question was: What is the 
influence of the Arab Spring on the way you think about risk in your firm’s 
international business?  A total of 76 respondents answered this question, out of 120 
valid questionnaires, which represents about 63% of the total respondents, as shown in 
Figure 5.4. The responses were divided into four categories; the categories were: 
 No or minimal impact of the Arab Spring.  
 Significant impact of Arab Spring.  
 More attention given to political risk as a result of the Arab Spring.  
Dependent Variable             Predictors B Std. Error Beta t-value 




(Constant) 3.651 .074  49.372* 
Factor 1 .011 .074 .015 .154 
Factor 2 -.024 .074 -.031 -.326 
 
Factor 3 .015 .074 .020 .206 
 
Factor 4 .140 .074 .182 1.890 
 





(Constant) 2.045 .066  30.830* 
Factor 3 -.192 .067 -.263 -2.880* 
 
Factor 5 .141 .067 .193 2.109* 
*P-value<.05 
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 Irrelevant or incomprehensible responses.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Proportion of open-ended responses in each category 
 
In the first category, 25 out of 76 (33% of questionnaire participants) indicated that 
the Arab Spring has no or minimal impact on the nature of the risk they experience. 
The answers were classified into two sub-groups: those indicating they had no 
business in the affected countries, and those indicating they expected the impact to be 
temporary.  For example, one participant said “no effect - our strategies focus on the 
GCC countries”. Another participant said “yes, some the company’s assets have been 
affected due to such uprisings and especially the company’s assets in Egypt, and it has 
been considered that such impact would be temporary only, that I have full trust that 
these assets will return back to their level in terms of market value after the political 
instability in Egypt ends”.  
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In the second category, the majority of responses, 35 out of 76 (46% of questionnaire 
participants), answered that the Arab Spring was having a significant impact on their 
businesses. These participants talked about avoiding or stopping their business in 
these countries. For example, one participant said “Of course [there has been] a 
significant impact on the real-estate markets, in addition to instability and the fear of 
the fate of investments in these countries; as a result of these risks we have postponed 
any planned investments in these countries.” 
In the third category, 15 out of 76 (20% of questionnaire participants) accepted the 
importance of political risk and the need for assessment. For example, one participant 
said “the company becomes more cautious in selecting investment opportunities with 
focus on the political risk assessment and their reflection on the economics of such 
countries”. 
Generally, then, these responses support the view that most participants at least took 
the questionnaire seriously, and that they had given some thought to the issues 
involved.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the quantitative analysis that addresses Research Question 
One: What are managers’ political risk perceptions in Kuwaiti international firms? 
Firstly, three views were tested to identify the best predictor of risk perception, two of 
which were from the psychometric paradigm and the third view, which did not use 
risk attributes to explain risk perceptions, was used as a contrast.  The main point is 
that the model in view 2 provided a fit to the data that was intermediate between that 
of view 1 (the traditional psychometric paradigm) and view 3. So it can be concluded 
that political risk perceptions are strongly predicted by the traditional psychometric 
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paradigm – and in particular by risk attributes. The least predictive model aggregates 
across these attributes.  
Second, in order to test whether the firms’ and participants’ characteristics 
(demographic variables) can better explain the risk perception when compared to the 
psychometric framework, 19 variables were linked with the two dependent risk 
perception variables. The findings show that there is no evidence of an influence of 
these characteristics on risk perception. Again this confirms the relative usefulness of 
the psychometric approach and the proposition that risk attributes, not demographics, 




CHAPTER SIX: QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS  
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the qualitative data collected via 34 face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews to answer Research Question Two: What is the relationship 
between Kuwaiti managers’ risk perception and the institutionalisation level of 
political risk assessment in international Kuwaiti firms? The analysis was divided into 
two main parts: the first part involved a pre-determined way of categorising the data 
using three main indicators of institutionalisation suggested in the literature, and then 
examining the relationship between this level of institutionalisation and firm 
characteristics. The second part is an inductive thematic analysis of the interviews. 
The principal themes turn out to be: 1) why managers come to be more concerned 
about non-governmental risk; and 2) why they resist quantitative analysis of political 
risk. 
6.2 Institutionalisation of political risk assessment  
Blank et al. (1980, p.7) introduced the term “institutionalisation” as a process through 
which the political risk assessment function becomes “more explicit and systematic 
within corporate organisation.” They argued that institutionalisation is shown by three 
main indicators: the nature of responsibility for risk assessment, the regularity of the 
assessment, and the use of defined assessment methods (qualitative or quantitative). 
Institutionalisation of political risk is a “bipolar continuum” (Kobrin, 1982, p.69), and 
there is a “grey area” through which firms might be ranked from being “less 
institutionalised” to being “more institutionalised” (Blank et al., 1980, p.7). Thus, any 
one firm may have institutionalised according to one or two of the three indicators, but 
not the others (Blank et al., 1980). Three institutionalisation indicators were identified 
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and discussed in the literature survey (see Chapter Three Section 3.6.2). They are as 
follows:  
- Nature of responsibility for political risk assessment: 
o Implicit responsibility 
o Formal allocation of responsibility 
- Regularity of political risk assessment:  
o Assessment carried out only on demand (triggered by external or 
internal events) 
o Assessment carried out on a regular basis 
- Assessment method:   
o Qualitative 
o Both qualitative and quantitative 
The relevance of these indicators to the interviews was supported by the participants’ 
responses as explained next. 
6.2.1 Indicators of institutionalisation  
6.2.1.1 Responsibility for political risk assessment 
The allocation of formal responsibility to a specific individual or group within the 
firm is the minimum requirement to be institutionalised (Blank et al., 1980). Kobrin 
(1982) argued that institutionalisation should itself be a part of the responsibilities 
assigned to some position, and The Institute of Risk Management (2002) recommends 
assigning risk responsibilities throughout an organisation. However, Kobrin (1982) 
found that firms may implicitly conduct political risk assessment, whereby firms 
demonstrate a general sense of responsibility without formal allocation of these 
responsibilities. As Table 6.1 shows, an analysis of the interviews indicates that all 
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organisations had at least some sense of responsibility for conducting political risk 
assessment and most had a formal allocation of responsibility for it.  Three firms were 
found to be less institutionalised as they lacked formal allocation of responsibility, but 
presented evidence that they took some kind of informal assessment seriously. To 
clarify, their assessment involved organizational activity, not just individual judgment. 
For example, RS15 reflected: “The employees in Egypt have a great experience in 
Petroleum field and industry. So they play a big role in understanding the political 
situation.” In comparison, 31 other firms assigned formal responsibility. This was 
reflected in the comments of interviewee RS6: “It’s a committee, as we have to do our 
due diligence with three factors: legal factor, financial factor and visibility study 
factor which include political risk.”  
Table 6.1: Responsibility of assessment 
 Number of firms Percentage 
Sense of responsibility  
(less institutionalised) 
3 8.8 
Assigning formal responsibility 
(More institutionalised) 
31 91.2 
Total 34 100 
 
6.2.1.2 Regularity of political risk assessment 
The regularity of assessment is the second indicator of institutionalisation of political 
risk assessment, and is related to the design of the normal reporting network within 
the corporate organisation (Blank et al., 1980). The more regular assessments of 
political risks are thought to indicate a greater degree of institutionalisation (Blank et 
al., 1980; Al Khattab et al., 2008a). Regular assessments should enable companies to 
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cope with dynamic political environments; for example, changes in governmental 
policies or actions, and economic developments which constantly affect investment 
opportunities (Tsai and Su, 2005).  As shown in Table 6.2, the interviews indicated 
two main approaches regarding regularity of assessments: 1) on demand; and 2) on a 
regular basis.  
Responses that indicated assessments were conducted ‘on demand’ were considered to 
reflect less institutionalisation as the  assessments were triggered by either external 
events, such as war, or by internal events, such as proposals for new international 
business, rather than being carried out on a regular basis. For example, RS15 stated 
“We receive reports from them periodically. It is quarterly; attached to the financial 
reports, but these reports don't include political risks. However if there is any new 
event, we recognize it, we follow it step by step.”  In another example, RS13 said “For 
the credit risk and operational risk we assess them continuously; on a daily basis, 
monthly and quarterly. For political risk, [only] when needed. For example, if 
something [produces an] alert and might affect us.” Some respondents indicated that 
assessment is triggered by internal events; for example, RS21 said: “before each new 
activity [assessments are carried out] by reading reports in newspapers and 
publications like U.B.S (Union Bank of Switzerland)...to prepare reports and 
recommendation to the top management.” 
Responses indicating that assessments are regularly conducted were considered to 
reflect greater institutionalisation because they assess political risks as part of a 
normal reporting network in comparison to the on demand approach. As shown in 
Table 6.2, the majority of respondents (65%) conducted the assessment on a regular 
basis. For example, RS24 commented: “Once the project is there we cannot consider 
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the political risk the same, we are already there in the country, so we assess how 
much impact and how mitigation is required to minimize the effect of such risk on 
quarterly basis.” In another example, RS11 said: “Before the start of the Arab Spring, 
we've already had a very solid process in place in terms of evaluation of risk. .... it is 
an ongoing process; it’s a life process. Therefore the Arab Spring didn’t change the 
way that we went into an assessment process. We didn’t change regularity and the 
way that we went into an assessment process; we didn't need to do special assessment 
for the Arab spring.” 
Table 6.2: Regularity of political risk assessment 




On a regular basis 
(Most institutionalised) 
25 73.5 
Total 34 100 
 
6.2.1.3 Risk assessment method 
The assessment method is divided into two types: qualitative assessment and mixed 
methods (qualitative and quantitative methods). More institutionalised firms are 
considered to use mixed methods (Blank et al., 1980) in which objective measures are 
included in the assessment to minimise bias and subjectivity in human judgments 
(Pahud De Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Brink, 2004). As shown in Table 6.3, the 
majority of respondents (65%) use only qualitative methods in the assessment of 
political risk at their firms. For example RS5 mentioned: “For political risk, it’s 
qualitative based on the reports and the recommendation and of course based on our 
experience as the board members have a considerable experience in the investment 
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field and the real estate.” In one of the firms using mixed methods, RS7 said: “One of 
the tools is the stress test technique, putting some sort of scenario analysis i.e. what if 
a catastrophe took place in Libya. How will it affect our business? Then we monitor 
and measure in a quantitative format the impact on the bank.” The reasons behind 
why most of the firms do not use quantitative assessment methods will be analysed in 
Section 6.3.2.  
Table 6 3: Methods of political risk assessment 




 Mixed (quantitative & qualitative) 
(More institutionalised) 
12 35.3 
Total 34 100 
 
6.2.2 Quantifying the level of institutionalisation  
The aim of this section is to quantify the level of the institutionalisation of political 
risk assessment in the participating firms, using the three indicators.  It will examine 
the relationship between the levels of institutionalisation and firm characteristics that 
was discussed in the literature review (See Chapter Three Section 3.7).  Table 6.4 
illustrates the scoring system that was applied to the firms based on the categories they 
fell into for each indicator. It is extremely simple but it seems reasonable to use a 
cardinal scale and use integers for the levels of institutionalisation associated with 
each category. For the three indicators, the categorisation is mutually exclusive. The 
scores on each dimension are summed up to get an overall rating of institutionalisation 
for each firm. A multiplicative model would mean that, if any of the scores are zero, 
the total would then be zero irrespective of the other scores, and this seems counter-
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intuitive. A more complex model would be inappropriate because the judgments made 
about which category a firm falls into are only approximate ones, and it would be 
misleading to analyse the scores in a sophisticated way. The result can only be an 
approximate, summary understanding, and has to be interpreted on this basis. But it 
allows us to: 1) characterise a firm’s assessment in a simple way; 2) look for evidence 
that they can be explained by the firm’s characteristics. In the previous chapter, it was 
shown that demographics provide a poor explanation of individual risk perceptions, 
and it is interesting to ask whether demographics provide a better explanation of 
organisational risk assessment. 
Table 6.4: Rating scores of classifications for each indicator in the level of institutionalisation 
Indicators Classifications Score  
Assigning 
responsibility 
No responsibility 0 
Sense of responsibility (An informal understanding of 
responsibility) 
1 





On demand 1 
Regular assessment 2 
Assessment 
methods 
No discernible method at all 0 
Qualitative  1 
Mixed (quantitative & qualitative) 2 
 
 
Based on the rating scores of classifications for each indicator, Table 6.5 shows the 
overall rating of the level of institutionalisation for each of the 34 firms. A tick () 
indicates membership of a category. It can be observed that the main differentiating 
indicator with regard to the institutionalisation level related to the type of assessment 
method as 12 out of 34 firms used mixed methods in analysing political risks, and 
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these firms were the ones that presented with a high level of institutionalisation. The 
shaded rows indicate a high level of institutionalisation. 
The next section will examine the relationship between firm characteristics and the 
overall rating of level of institutionalisation. 
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Table 6.5: The overall rating of the level of institutionalisation for each of the 34 firms 
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6.2.3 Level of institutionalisation and firm characteristics 
Previous studies demonstrated the relationship between firm characteristics and the 
level of institutionalisation of political risk as discussed earlier in Chapter Three 
(Section 3.7). These characteristics include: 1) years of experience in the international 
businesses (Kobrin, 1982; Oetzel, 2005; Al Khattab et al., 2008a); 2) the size of the 
firm (Kobrin,1982; Stapenhurst, 1992b;  Al Khattab et al., 2008a); 3) the type of 
industry (De Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Blank et al., 1980); and 4) number of 
countries in which the firm is operating in (Kobrin ,1982; Hashmi and Baker, 1988; Al 
Khattab et al., 2008a).   
Given the research context of the Arab Spring, the relationship between the 
institutionalisation score and the number of Arab countries in which the firm was 
operating was tested instead of the overall number of countries (the fourth 
characteristic). Moreover, the relationship between ownership (private or 
governmental) and the overall rating of the level of institutionalisation was also tested. 
This is because governmental firms in Kuwait are heavily involved in international 
business (Ministry of Finance, 2006) and it seems possible that this will influence the 
institutionalisation of risk assessment procedures. 
As shown in Table 6.6, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for the 
relationship between the level of institutionalisation score and three parametric 
variables: a) overall firm size; b) years of experience in the international businesses; 
and c) number of Arab countries in which the firm was operating. The results showed 
no significant correlation with overall firm size (r = 0.301), years of experience (r = 
0.091) and number of Arab countries (r = 0.167). All these correlations are not 
significant at P-value < 0.05 level. 
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Spearman coefficients were calculated for the relationships between the 
institutionalisation score and two non-parametric variables: a) type of industry; and b) 
ownership. The results showed no significance correlation with type of industry (r = 
0.066) but it showed a slight weak correlation with ownership (r = -0.341) which is 
slightly significant at P-value <0.05 level.  Although the results showed no significant 
relationship between the type of industry and institutionalisation score, all 
government-owned oil firms were highly institutionalised. This specific point is 
unsurprising as oil production is a fundamental industry in Kuwait and the main driver 
of its economy. As participant RS24 stated: “We are concerned about and quantify all 
types of risks including the political risk because our oil industry is the heart of our 
economy”. The thematic analysis of the interviews, described later, will attempt to 
explain what is motivating firms to deal with risks in different ways.  
Table 6.6: Pearson and Spearman correlation between overall rating and firm 
characteristics variables 

























N=34      **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




6.2.4 Influences of the Arab Spring on risk assessment  
The previous section provides a static picture of the institutionalisation of political risk 
assessment. However, the respondents were asked about the influence of the Arab 
Spring, as an important, dynamic aspect of the environment, on the assessment. From 
the interviews, there is some evidence that in five of the firms, political risk 
assessment has changed as a result of the Arab Spring. For example, RS1 talked about 
political risk assessment, including the assessment of non-governmental political 
threats being introduced from 2013 onwards. RS8 similarly talked about including the 
political unrest in detailed assessments after the Arab Spring. 
Some respondents talked about changing the frequency after Arab Spring. For 
example, RS7 said “Since the Arab Spring we conducted several reviews on political 
risks and counter party risk”. RS18 said: “After the A.S we more concentrate on the 
countries [in which we] have operation, we consider the risk of securing people more 
than before by frequent follow up.” He also added: “In the past, we used to study any 
risks every three months .... But today, if four protestors demonstrate in any country 
we take such action into consideration. If clashes happen in one area [this] shall be 
taking into consideration... Before the Arab spring we used to conduct a report every 
three months. The currency rate was steady. Nowadays even the gold rate is highly 
fluctuating.”  
RS18 also referred to a change in the method of analysis: “Before the Arab Spring we 
just mentioned the potential political risk in our report, but now we measure the 




6.3 Thematic analysis of the interviews 
As discussed in the chapter on methodology, the thematic analysis of the interviews 
was conducted to answer Research Question Two, on the relationship between 
Kuwaiti managers’ risk perceptions and the institutionalised levels of political risk 
assessment within their firms. The development of these themes has been divided into 
two main sections. The first section deals with managers’ concerns about political 
risk, explaining in particular the way they emphasise non-governmental risks in their 
perceptions or judgments. The second section investigates what underlies the 
institutionalisation of the assessment, explaining especially why managers often resist 
the use of quantitative methods, and why the Arab Spring often did not lead them to 











Figure 6.1: Thematic analysis of qualitative data 
Sub- Themes 
 Host governments support and maintain 
foreign investments 
 Non-governmental risks are unmanageable 
and uncontrollable 
 Non-governmental risks harm the economy of 
the host country and thereby the prospects for 
the international business 
 Non-governmental risks affect security and 
safety of the international business operations  
 Non-governmental risks affect whole region, 
not just single countries, in which a business 








Political risk is immeasurable 
 Lack of skills for quantifying political risks   
 Political risk is uncontrollable 
 Quantitative political assessment is  

















6.3.1 Theme One: managers are more concerned about non-governmental risks 
The questionnaire analysis (traditional psychometric view) showed that managers were 
more concerned about the non-governmental risks, such as civil wars and revolutions, 
compared to governmental risks, such as taxation and capital repatriations. Based on 
the analysis of qualitative data, the reasons that explain why managers are more 
concerned about the non-governmental risks can be divided into five sub-themes:  
 Host governments support and maintain foreign investments 
 Non-governmental risks are unmanageable and uncontrollable  
 Non-governmental risks harm the economy of the host country and thereby the 
prospects for the international business 
 Non-governmental risks affect security and safety of the international 
business operations 
 Non-governmental risks affect whole regions, not just single countries, in 
which a business might be operating. 
6.3.1.1 Subtheme One: host governments support and maintain foreign investments 
Many respondents pointed to the support often given by a host government to foreign 
investors. RS2, a senior investor manager in the Arab contribution department in a 
holding company, said: “Host governments encourage the foreign investments and 
enact laws for attracting investments. In Tunisia for example, the Electoral programs 
of all parties fully depend on attracting the foreign investments.”  RS16 similarly 
mentioned:  “In general I have noticed that most of these countries in the recent years 
are trying to attract investors by reducing and minimising these risks [governmental 
risk]”. RS16 added that even with the changing laws and regulations in countries like 
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Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, “there are no problems in work and business as all 
these laws [and] changes [are] in favour of investors. So there was no problem”. 
Governments of almost any description exist within a larger economic community of 
nation states and cannot opt out of such a community. Therefore, whatever their 
ideologies, they are restrained from acting in ways that harms international businesses. 
This is clearly evident to the managers of such businesses describing the risks they are 
taking. This was reflected in the opinion of RS23, a legal advisor in real estate 
investment, who said: “changing the regulation as a consequence of changing the 
government is not a concern as that does not relieve the new government of the 
commitments that the previous government took, this is an international rule. In fact 
the new government, to ensure the acceptance of the international community and to 
maintain the current investors, usually announce that they are responsible for all 
previous obligations.” This respondent also said that host governments “give more 
facilities to attract the foreign investors as FDI is very important to revive [their] 
economy.” RS20, a business development group manager in oil and gas company, was 
concerned about “changing the regulations due to changing of the government”, 
which might create “some disturbance”, but it is “not a critical risk as usually they 
[governments] keep their commitment, it just consumes time to get assured again, 
because most of the governments try to attract foreign investors by offering incentives 
and reducing restrictions.” 
In some cases, the foreign investors might need to negotiate with the new governments 
in host countries regarding the changes of rules and regulations. This was mentioned 
by RS9, a chairman of an industrial company, who said, “Every time the regime 
changed in Iraq, [this] causes changes in rules and regulations which lead to 
 162 
 
confusion for some time. But in most cases the regulations will be to our benefit and, if 
not, we can negotiate with them because ultimately it’s for the benefit of their economy 
to keep foreign investors.” 
RS24, a managing director for planning and finance in an oil and gas company, 
provided a recent example of governmental risks in Egypt during the period of the 
Arab Spring which summarised the previous views: “Political risk, such as what is 
happening around the Middle East, may change the regulations such as tax issues, 
repatriation of dividend, repatriation of capital or defaulting in paying the proceeds 
as what happened with Egypt during the period of the Arab Spring. But this issue has 
been solved quickly because the new government and even the previous regime are 
normally aware that the constancy of their rules and obligations are very important 
for them whether in long or short term to maintain with their business developers, 
otherwise nobody would invest in Egypt. Therefore the new government immediately 
paid the proceeds to us”.  
RS6 explained that, even if the change in the government that was initiated by non-
governmental risks such as civil war, “to reach settlement they [the new governments] 
try to attract foreign investors by offering incentives.” RS18, Senior analyst of risk 
management and head of the Arab function in enterprise risk management in an oil and gas 
company, said “even if the government has been changed due to the revolutions or 
elections, for example, these people [new governments] try to maintain the investors”.  
RS8 and RS9 talked about political turbulence in Syria and the expected situation after 
political settlement. However, both respondents were optimistic about the future 
facilities for foreign investors. For example, RS8 observed: “we know that if the 
situation stabilized in Syria, the new government will also give a lot of facilities for the 
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foreign investors whatever the orientation of the new government”. RS9 observed that 
there were opportunities in the Syrian market: “we are arranging to hit the Syrian 
market; there will be big potential opportunities as we are sure that the new 
government will give more incentives and freedom to encourage the private sector and 
the foreign investors to do business”. It should be mentioned, however, that this 
interview took place on October 2013 when the longevity of civil war in Syria may 
still not have been appreciated. 
6.3.1.2 Subtheme Two: non-governmental risks are unmanageable and 
uncontrollable  
Non-governmental risks were considered to be unmanageable and uncontrollable for 
different reasons. The first reason is that governmental risks can be controlled by 
hedging strategies, whereas non-governmental risks cannot. This was indicated by 
RS1, a deputy general manager in a bank, who commented: “Governmental actions, 
such as taxation and currency conversion are controlled by hedging strategies as we 
have hedging strategies to ensure that, if something like this happened, how we can 
respond...but will not stop us from taking the decision to enter the country, but if the 
security threat is very high, it can stop us as we can’t control this”. RS8, the head of 
risk management department in an insurance company, said “there are political risks 
that we can control somehow and there are some that can’t be controlled i.e. the [risk 
of] increase of taxation can be controlled by increasing the [insurance] premium”.  
RS8 also explained that “The political unrest means that everything is delayed in 
terms of the government spending and these risks are out of control”. 
 RS16, an executive manager of investment in a financial institution, said that some 
non-governmental risks cannot be controlled, such as those arising from revolutions 
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and civil war. At the same time, RS16 explained the controllability of governmental 
risks in terms of having partnerships with locals in the host countries who have 
appropriate connections and experience: “As you know, Syria was dominating with 
high bureaucracy and they may impose some restrictions which may cause delay to 
complete the project. But we have had high experience in how to deal with this risk as 
all the contributors were Syrian shareholders and they have a massive connection in 
each sector. Therefore, I can say that there was no risk before the events. We have 
connections in a host country and experience which facilitates the work.” RS6, a 
chairman of a telecommunication company similarly said that local partners can 
reduce and manage these kinds of risks (i.e. governmental risks).  
RS10, the risk management director in a telecommunication company, argued that 
governmental risks, such as taxation increases, are manageable because these will be 
added to their prices. RS10 highlighted: “I’m trying to say that these kinds of risks are 
easy to deal with compared to political turmoil and political unrest which are difficult 
to deal with.” RS30, an internal audit manager operating in GCC countries and Jordan, 
mentioned that factors related to governmental risks like changes in tax laws and 
ownership laws can concern managers, but they are manageable. This respondent also 
commented on the current political unrest by saying “if such kind of political unrest 
that happened in Libya, Egypt or, what is happening in Syria, happens for example in 
Saudi Arabia, then that would be unmanageable for us...Because we cannot really 
control that. There is nothing much we can do”.  
RS31, the risk management director in an industrial company operating in the GCC 
countries and Iraq, summarised all these points when saying: “The law differs from 
one GCC country to another and they may change the regulation suddenly but that 
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will not affect us badly compared to the country instability and the political unrest risk 
for example the instability in Iraq... We might anticipate and be alerted of the new 
regulation through our connection in the host country.  And once you comply with the 
new regulation, the risk is reduced and managed. And if you find it very hard to follow 
the new rules you can exit; I want to say that you can manage these kinds of risk in 
different ways.”  
It seems clear that governmental risks therefore tend to be inherently manageable. 
Most governmental actions affect all market players and competitors (like taxation). 
And governmental risks can often be anticipated and mitigated with influential and 
powerful local partners in the host countries. The majority of respondents talked in a 
much more relaxed tone about governmental risks than non-governmental risks. The 
perceived uncontrollability and unmanageability of non-governmental risks, on the 
other hand, appeared to increase managers’ awareness of such risks considerably. 
6.3.1.3 Subtheme Three: non-governmental risks harm the economy of the host 
country and thereby the prospects for the international business 
The strength of the economy of the host country was an issue for many respondents, 
especially respondents who are working in banks and the financial service industry. 
This economic state was highly vulnerable to non-governmental political risks. RS7, 
the head of a risk management department in one of the banks, said: “the political 
instability affected the economical aspect of these countries, accordingly [it] 
negatively impacted sovereign risk rating of each and every country; i.e. Egypt 
downgraded almost three times since 2011.”  
The deterioration of the economy of the host country, due to non-governmental risks, 
affected the currency exchange rates which negatively influenced foreign investments. 
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RS2 explained: “Before the Arab Spring, Egypt’s economic conditions were normal 
but the Egyptian currency faced sharp devaluation after the Arab Spring and that 
greatly affected our asset values”. RS4, the executive manager of investment and 
development in one of the financial services companies, stated: “For example, our 
real estate value in Egypt declined because their currency declined as result of the 
revolution.” RS28, in a risk management department in a financial services firm, when 
asked about the most important political risks, answered:  “the instability; because it 
affects the value of our investment plus the financial market inside this country”.  
RS26, a manager of the compliance and risk management department in another 
financial services firm, mentioned that “during the civil wars or the revolutions 
usually the stock market does not work and, even if it is acting, there is no value so it 
will be difficult for us to buy and sell, especially sell”. RS15, financial manager in one 
of the industrial companies, explained: “Because of the revolution there is no stability 
in Egypt and that affects our business greatly; more than 90%, as the revolution and 
the instability caused economic deflation and there are few suggested projects, and I 
can say almost that we stopped working there”.  
RS6 described the effect of civil wars which “badly affect the infrastructure and the 
economy in these countries”. RS13, operational risk manager in one of the banks, said 
“the most important political risks are civil war and revolution because, if people 
don’t feel confident, they will not spend money. That will affect our business straight 
away as a bank. People, for example, will not take loans. Today these risks are 
increasing”. RS11, head of a risk management division in a financial services firm, 
similarly argued that: “when you have a social uprising and it is not controlled 
properly, the safety and security decreases, so what happens people will invest less 
and travel there less and it becomes like dominant effect on the economy”. RS29, 
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assistant general manager and financial manager in an insurance company, mentioned 
the economic challenges after the Arab Spring: “because of the currency devaluation 
and the change is so quick... recently the currency rate is changing rapidly on a daily 
basis as a result of the instability.” RS29 also commented: “any country facing 
problems such as the Arab Spring leads to capital escape and consequently that 
affects the currency rate. The conflicted countries, or those expected to face conflicts, 
lead to capital escape.” RS11 also talked about capital flight and said: “if an entity or 
an institution that does business in a country such as this (in social uprising events), 
you will stop doing business there immediately.... you need to get out of there as 
quickly as possible, because otherwise you are going to lose whatever you have.” 
But some participants thought that even exiting the market would be difficult. RS14, a 
senior manager of the risk management department in a financial services company, 
said: “the instability affects many aspects; most importantly is the economy because 
exiting the market will be difficult.....therefore now, the management has less appetite 
to go to the market of Arab countries that have Arab Spring events”. RS28 explained 
“We have a company in Tunisia; automotive industry. It was a very good company, 
but because of the instability there, it has difficulty in sales. So, the sales pre-Arab 
spring was much higher, plus the problem which we are facing now apart from this is 
exiting the market. Our strategy was to get out of this investment after two years from 
investing, but after the Arab Spring we cannot exit easily because no one would buy. 
Plus the liquidity of the buyer; they do not have money to buy. Plus there is no appetite 
for new investors to get inside these regions.” The complexity involved in exiting the 
markets was also mentioned by RS27, head of an internal audit department in one of 
the financial services firms, who said that: “all firms’ major target is to maximize the 
profit. Now it is quite complicated, I cannot easily invest and I cannot easily exit or get 
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my returns. So, now it's complicated. Any other investment company will tell you the 
same thing. It's so complicated”.  
6.3.1.4 Subtheme Four: non-governmental risks affect security and safety of the 
international business operations  
Several participants described how non-governmental risks affected the safety and 
security of workers and goods. This was indicated by RS9, who talked about the 
instability effect on security and safety in Iraq and Syria due to extremists and 
hijackers in certain areas. He argued: “The security risks have increased since the 
instability in Syria. The extremists are occupying the border areas. That is where they 
grow and expand. Their main areas are borders between Syria, Iraq and 
Jordan...when I transport my goods from free zone Amman to Erbil and Baghdad, 
there are the hijackers, bombers and there are so many risks in the way”.  
RS25, a deputy manager director and vice chairman, mentioned that withdrawal 
decisions can be due to security and safety risks, commenting that: “We decided to 
withdraw from Iraq because of the instability there, murders of the workers took 
place, stealing of the equipment took place; the security safety risk was very high 
there.” RS10 mentioned that instability can lead to an unsafe environment for 
employees, so the firm would evacuate them to safety, stating: “we had to evacuate all 
our people from there (Sudan); the situation wasn’t safe at all...Our priority is the 
safety of our employees, therefore we just kept a couple of people there just to keep 
our network”. Also, RS10 mentioned that it is difficult to find people who accept 
going to high security risk areas to work, arguing that: “our people don’t want to go 
and work in Iraq as it’s a risky country; the security risk is very high”.  
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6.3.1.5 Subtheme Five: non-governmental risks affect the whole region, not just 
single countries, in which a business might be operating. 
A small proportion of participants had no business in the Arab Spring countries and 
yet was still affected because non-governmental risk was seen as being regional rather 
than national in nature. RS5, a board member in a real estate firm, explained: “Arab 
Spring is a big political issue all over around the Arabic and Islamic areas and that 
affected the economy of these countries and the region as a whole”. RS28 said that 
“the Arab Spring gives red flags towards these regions so that’s why we avoided such 
regions”. This was supported by RS20, because after the Arab Spring international 
lenders are requiring “a lot of guarantees from our side [the firm]. They want to insure 
that we are stable and we are not been affected with the surrounding events”, and this 
delays bank lending processes “just to assure them we are safe and we are okay” to 
pay back the debit.  
RS1 argued that the effect of the Arab Spring reached non-Arabic countries and this 
would slow down their economic growth: “Turkey, for example, is not an Arab 
country, but the impact will be very high, Syria will impact Turkey, to make a truly 
contagion effect of the countries.” RS29 also talked about the Turkish economy, 
saying “Syria situation has affected the Turkish economy. Demonstrations organized 
by the youths in Turkey in August and September caused problems; as a result the 
stock exchange went down.” RS34, an advisory risk manager in a bank, said “the Arab 
Spring and the escalating tensions with Syria is an issue today. Things are really 
aggravated; one could lead to another and the entire region may be vulnerable”. 
RS21, an Investment manager in an insurance firm, mentioned “the escalation of 
tensions between Iran the United States” would affect the whole region “even though 
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we do not have any business in these countries, any political instability in the region 
will affect our business”.  RS34 pointed out that “we are also watching sanctions 
against Iran.... if anything happens in the Strait of Hormuz, the whole global 
[economy] will be affected because oil prices will go up. The oil prices, when go up, 
will affect everything, it will change the equation.”  
6.3.1.6 Summary of Main Theme One 
There were several factors that influenced managers’ judgments that non-
governmental risks were a distinct category of risk, and that such risks tended to be 
higher than risks in the governmental category. Non-governmental risks were seen as 
especially uncontrollable and unmanageable, they created safety and security 
problems, and they were regional in nature. In contrast, governmental risks were seen 
as being less important because it was clearly in a host government’s interest not to 
create them and, even when they did, it was easier to influence them through local 
contacts and partners.  
However, this general analysis was contradicted in a small number of cases. 
Respondents like RS3 and RS21 disagreed with the effect of governmental risks. RS21 
argued that, political risks in “stabilized countries, Europe and American” are 
“tolerable”, whereas in Arab countries they were intolerable due to frequent “changes 
in the regulations”. RS3 also indicated that even “Before the Arab spring events, we 
were against any decision to invest in Arab countries, because there are no fixed 
regulations, the regulations are always changing overnight. Add to that the official 
abuse”. So the basic division between the two types of political risk – governmental 
and non-governmental – was a useful heuristic for most of the informants when 
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making their risk assessments. But it is only a heuristic: a rule that may accurately 
reflect their own specific experience, but not every firm’s experience. 
6.3.2 Theme Two: managers resist quantitative assessment methods  
With reference to section 6.2.1.3, it has been found that the majority of the managers 
(64.7%) were using subjective assessment methods even after the start of the Arab 
Spring. In this second theme, there are four reasons explaining why managers resist 
quantitative assessment. These are presented in this section as four subthemes: a) 
political risk is immeasurable; b) lack of skills for quantifying political risks; c) 
political risk is uncontrollable; and d) quantitative political assessment is unnecessary 
given lack of exposure.   
6.3.2.1 Subtheme One: political risk is immeasurable  
With reference to the interviews, managers believe that political risk is immeasurable 
for two reasons. The first is that politics are so volatile, making it impossible to follow 
political events quantitatively. The second is that managers believed that 
quantification cannot adequately capture or summarise their experiences in previous 
political events and the intuitions they gain from these. RS15, for instance, 
commented: “How can [we] assess the political risks quantitatively? I cannot 
determine the political risk; you cannot determine the event that will happen 
tomorrow. It’s unpredictable… the expectation is difficult as you cannot follow the 
political events, and you cannot determine the recovery time. The situation is 
changing overnight and this makes it difficult to follow and quantify political risk; 
there were two revolutions in Egypt in two years”. Similarly RS9 said, “To reach 
success you need to have guts, initiative, and calculated risks, but not for political risk 
as it cannot be calculated; in Iraq the risk is happening every day”. The respondent’s 
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view that “risk is happening every day” could be taken as being a reference to the 
repeated experience of the same risk every day, but the assertion that it cannot be 
calculated suggests that the risk is somehow different every day, and that what is 
meant by ‘risk’ is not a stable probability of a specified outcome. RS16 made the 
following observation: “It is quantitative in terms of the financial risk side as we have 
to do some ratio analysis. But not for political risk as it’s difficult to trace the political 
events; the political situation may suddenly change; who would have expected that all 
this will happen to Syria? RS14 added that “For political risks, it’s qualitative. We 
can’t quantify what will happen. But we can quantify what is our exposure there, as 
that helps us making decisions whether to continue or not.” This suggests that one 
component of the risk (the ‘exposure’) is quantifiable but another (the threat, 
presumably) is not.  
The second reason why managers consider political risk immeasurable is that they 
believe quantification cannot express their observations in a satisfactory way. RS26, 
for instance, indicated that it is only after facing political incidences that the firms can 
take corrective actions and change future plans: “Political risk, such as the social 
uprising, is beyond measure; it’s not about something we can measure, it’s about 
something we can see. We look at how it’s affecting our investments, would it affect 
our plan? How would it affect it? And would it impact our decision on future 
investments in that country?” RS34, an advisory risk manager in a bank, explained 
that, after experiencing political events, it is managers’ intuition that is used to 
evaluate the consequences of the future political events, not the use of quantitative 
methods: “We watch and see, we watch all of the situation, and we have the sense of 
what it can lead to... we have our take, as it cannot be a quantitative model driving 
everything. The point is that we have our take, if tomorrow it happens what do we do? 
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So it is more of qualitative”. There is also an indication here that what is important is 
knowing how to act or do, not having an analysis. Although analysis may be seen as a 
way of choosing actions, it does not capture the idea of ‘watch and see’ that RS34 
expresses.  Similarly, RS16 indicated that the primary job is to listen to the source of 
information networks that are embedded in the place where risk is occurring, not to 
perform a calculation: “For political risks, we have many relations with businessmen 
and qualified people in the republic of Syria, which give us ideas of the situations 
there as they are on the ground; they know better about risks because political risk 
can’t be evaluated quantitatively.” RS15 argued in the same way that their employees 
in Egypt had great experience and played an important role in understanding the 
political situation. RS9 also indicated: “one of the ways to overcome these risks is 
qualified managers i.e. the manager in Karbala sent me a report that there are risks 
to have an office there and he advised to close our office there and go back to 
Baghdad, and it was a right advice”. The emphasis is on human sources of continued 
understanding of risky situations, not formal, snapshot analyses. 
RS11 expressed scepticism about the effectiveness of quantitative models used in risk 
assessment in well-regulated countries: “In the West they had very well regulated 
procedures and financial institutions had risk management department and 
quantitative models and everything to prevent financial crisis. But it didn’t prevent 
[such a crisis].” 
6.3.2.2 Subtheme Two: lack of skills for quantifying political risks 
Lack of skills for assessing political risk quantitatively was another reason for the 
rejection of quantification. RS1 mentioned that “we haven’t the skills to cover 
political risk” and they have “a full reliance on third parties to provide us [the 
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company] with the political studies”. RS12, a venture development manager in an oil 
and gas company, commented: “the outside consultant provides us with these ratings 
as we don’t have qualified people to provide us with the rating.” RS13 said: “We 
don’t have experts in political risk, my experience is financial and my colleague is 
expert in operational risk, therefore we do financial risk analysis and operational risk 
analysis quantitatively and qualitatively in house. But for political risk we rely on 
outsource such as News, market intelligence and rating reports such as World Bank 
Report”. RS25 added that “it’s very difficult to find employees who have the ability to 
assess political risk quantitatively”. Consequently, managers took a purely qualitative 
approach to assessment by “discussing what’s happening, what problems we are faced 
[with], [have] the problems increased or decreased”. He also mentioned that “we 
decide to stay away from unstable areas; we refused to start business in Bahrain, we 
moved away from Iraq, we feel that it’s the right decision”. This was seen as in some 
way making quantitative assessment unnecessary, a prior kind of filtering that was so 
clearly right that it did not need assessment to justify it. 
Outsourcing was clearly for some a solution for handling the lack of quantification 
skills. RS22, head of the enterprise risk management (ERM) department in a bank 
said: “Do you think banks in Kuwait have the capability to do a country risk 
assessment as compared to Economist Intelligence Unit E.I.U.? They are specialists. 
And the report we get from economists or the specialist is perfect”. However, RS33, a 
team leader of the ERM department in a governmental oil and gas firm, said: “When 
we established the ERM department, which was in 2007, we hired specialised 
consultants from America and Britain to help us in establishing the risk register and 
for building the model and also to train our employees. But not anymore; we become 
an expert, we have analysts, and we can help ourselves. But of course we are still 
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attending training courses, inside and outside Kuwait, to improve ourselves.” 
Similarly, RS24, the managing director for planning and finance in a governmental oil 
and gas firm, said: “these quantifications are done by our qualified employees who 
have undergone intensive training courses to make them eligible for it” So, for the 
majority of the firms, the lack of analytical skills led to a neglect of quantitative 
assessment and relying on external expertise.  
6.3.2.3 Subtheme Three: political risk is uncontrollable  
Another reason for rejecting quantitative assessment was the idea that even when risks 
could be measured they might not be capable of being controlled.  RS30 commented 
that: “It [political risk] is not something that we can control as a private business 
enterprise. We have to live with the political risk that is there; there is a certain 
amount of political risk but we have to live with that… Because we cannot really 
control that; there is nothing much we can do to prevent such event from happening. 
So we do not really focus on that, we leave it to government of the region to basically 
worry about that, to make sure that is really a stable peaceful environment where 
people can live and businesses can flourish”.  RS16 said: “I want to say that the 
political risk or the force majeure is beyond control by either the investor or the 
country; the environment itself may change. Any investor must know that everything 
might go positive or negative.” The term “force majeure” is very clearly an 
expression of something beyond the firm’s control, and the respondent appears to be 
equating political risks with force majeure.  
RS1 argued: “If the security threat is very high, it can stop us, as we can’t control 
this...how can we manage something like this?” RS8 added: “The political unrest 
means that everything is delayed in terms of the government spending and these risks 
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are out of control”. RS13 contrasted the controllability of other risks with political 
risk: “We manage operational risk and credit risk in house because we can control 
these kinds of risks. But we are not focusing on political risk. We manage what we 
control and political risk is uncontrollable.” 
Some respondents saw ‘insurance’ as the solution to the uncontrollability of political 
risks. RS9 said: “the only thing I can do for political risk is insurance as this kind of 
risk is hard to control; without insurance I can’t work in Iraq. Who has the guts to 
work in Iraq?” RS16 stated: “we just protect our business from these kinds of risks by 
insurance”. The point about insurance is that in some degree it transfers risks to 
another party (the insurer) which controls its exposure by pooling multiple risks from 
multiple firms. Individual risks may be uncontrollable and therefore not worth 
assessing to the risk bearer. But the risk of a pool of such risks may be more 
controllable and it may be more quantifiable. However, insurance was not a universal 
solution. RS5 mentioned that the high cost of insurance to cover the political risks 
required them to deal with the political risk by withdrawal from an attractive project in 
Yemen. The respondent observed: “because of the instability we decided to stop the 
business there. Even though there is an Arabic organisation [insurance company] that 
can cover the risk by insurance to encourage investing in Arab countries, the cost of 
the insurance is very high”.  
6.3.2.4 Subtheme Four: quantitative political assessment is unnecessary given lack 
of exposure  
Assessment was claimed to be unnecessary due to the low exposure to political risks. 
This low exposure can happen due to two reasons, including the firm having only 
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limited activities in the potentially unstable countries, or the firm deciding to stop 
investing in countries in which instability emerged. 
 RS2 who was asked about the change in the assessment of political risk commented: 
“No. it remains the same, as I told you earlier our investments in these Arab countries 
were extremely weak; most of our investments in developed countries and here is no 
need to quantify the political risk for non-risky countries.” RS3 claimed that the Arab 
Spring did not change the assessment as most of the firm’s investments were in 
developed countries: “Nothing has changed. 90% of our [firm’s] projects are in 
developed countries and these are very stable countries and we haven’t faced any 
problem with them since we have started business there in 1993. ...We have no risk at 
all; zero risk.” RS21 commented: “We don’t need to do quantitative assessment 
because we do not have investments in these [unstable] countries ... We focus on 
stabilized countries, Europe and American, and for political risks we believed that this 
risk is a tolerable risk in these countries. And we were very cautious even before the 
Arab Spring to invest outside the GCC countries and the US and Europe and we still 
very cautious.”  RS31 said, “No, quantitative assessment is not in our plan, because 
most of our businesses are in the GCC countries and these countries are stable; we 
haven’t faced any problem there”.  
RS30 talked about the history of political issues in Saudi Arabia and argued: “since 
we haven’t faced any political issue [in Saudi Arabia] we do not have to tackle any 
major political risk.” Of course it could be argued that this division between stable 
and unstable countries, especially where it is based on a single firm’s experience, 
could be misleading. But the responses suggested that respondents thought stability 
was itself a stable property: that countries or regions that had been stable would 
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continue to be stable. But as RS34 and RS16 indicated, Egypt and Syria had been 
stable countries for a long time and no one expected that the sudden events these 
countries experienced as part of the Arab Spring would happen. RS34 said: “Nobody 
ever imagined that Egypt could suddenly go under this revolution in very short time; 
we thought that Egypt is the safest place in the Middle East.” RS16 said: “The 
political situation may suddenly change; who would have expected that all this will 
happen to Syria?” 
RS30 said that the firm has low exposure in an unstable country like Iraq, which is a 
small market for them, and, thus, did not motivate the firm to change their method of 
assessment. The respondent stated: “We do not need to change the method to analyse 
political risk quantitatively...for our sales in Iraq, even though the sales have reduced 
significantly due to the political instability there, but this has not affected the overall 
sales because Iraq is small market for our company.” RS28 commented: “We do not 
give it too much weight to the political risk because it is too minor as the percentage 
of our business in unstable countries is very low. For example, it is half a million 
Kuwaiti Dinar out of our total equities [so it] is nothing. So, the cost of doing in depth 
political risk assessment is more than the benefit.” RS28 added: “Our strategy is to 
focus on low risk regions such as the UK. which has a minor political risk. And that 
does not force us to do a full political risk assessment.” RS34 also said that firms are 
not motivated to move to a more quantitative assessment method in small markets like 
Tunisia: “The method remains the same. We did not lose too much because of the 
events. For example in Tunisia it is only half million dollars balance sheet, so 
compared to our program it is a small operation.” RS12 indicated: “Our company 
wasn’t affected that much by the Arab Spring, therefore, nothing [the assessment] has 
changed after the Arab Spring. Before the events in Syria by a few months there was a 
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study to start some activities there but we were lucky, the events escalated before we 
became involved.” However, this respondent also commented: “Our company was 
more affected by the financial crisis than the Arab Spring, therefore since the 
financial crisis we give more attention to the financial aspects”. This clearly indicates 
that such firms prioritise classes of risk before conducting any risk assessment, rather 
than using risk assessment itself to perform this prioritisation. 
As this research was conducted during the Arab Spring events, it might be expected 
that this event made a difference in political risk assessment in terms of encouraging 
quantitative assessment. But instead it led firms to completely avoid or quit operations 
in unstable countries. The decision to quit did not come about because of a risk 
assessment, but instead preceded any consideration of the need for risk assessment. 
RS11 said: “The biggest impact now is Syria, it is a crisis, so - do I want to start a 
new business there? Or rather go somewhere else. And for that you don’t need a 
quantitative model, and if you already have something there, it's an issue of - what do 
I do? – do I leave it or do I get out? ...obviously I need to get out of there as quickly as 
possible, because otherwise I’m going to lose whatever I have”.  RS12 said: “We 
don’t need to do complicated analysis as our new company policy is to avoid  the so 
called high risk and high return countries or projects because extremely risky projects 
may have low benefits or even losses.” RS4 and RS5 similarly decided to “avoid” 
unstable countries. RS4 stated: “It [the Arab Spring] affects our decision as we 
decided to avoid unstable countries and focus in the Gulf area because we think that 
the Gulf is more stable.” Similarly, RS14 said “It doesn’t need as much assessment. I 
do have a political issue in those countries and I have an existing investment there. I 
will not be willing to invest more. The only thing I can do is just wait and maintain 
our current investment.” RS5 argued: “Our decision is to continue avoiding these 
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areas and expanding in the GCC countries. Maybe other companies that having 
business or planning to enter these countries need to assess political risk 
quantitatively”. Leaving the unstable country was also supported by RS3 who said: 
“We do not need to do quantitative risk assessment in that sense, if the situation in 
Bahrain is not stable, so we want to stop there. We don’t have a formal political risk 
assessment.” 
But this instinctive risk aversion was not universal. RS18 and RS34 talked about 
opportunities in risky countries. For example, RS18 talked about investments in Sudan 
and Myanmar which are suffering from sanctions, so no US or European firms are 
operating there. Such countries, for this reason, are characterised by less competition: 
“The instability in some countries might have a privilege for us... Give you an 
example, Sudan, it is one country that the American companies farm out [subcontract 
to Kuwaiti firms] due to their government decision. Another example is Myanmar, 
there is a sanction from the United States and the political situation is quite high risk, 
but it might be an opportunity to us. As I told you the restrictions on some companies 
by the government, due to the political instability, give us an opportunity to compete.”  
RS34 similarly commented: “Once you take a decision to invest in a country such as 
Iraq, you buy those risks; I mean you accept such risks. The chaos is not always bad, 
sometimes chaos gives you opportunities, so businessmen are more looking for 
opportunities and [they] see the returns of the opportunities.” 
 RS34 further explained that opportunities in unstable countries are appealing when 
compared to developed countries like UK and US based on the level of competition 
and the country’s growth rate: “Do you think our experience as a Kuwaiti bank can 
compete with banks in mature economy countries…? Kuwaiti bank cannot for 
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example bring anything to the US and the UK. Besides, the growth rates are very low 
in these countries and the opportunities are very low. So why would we want to be 
there if does not make economic sense even though it is a stable environment.” RS6 
commented: “In developed countries there are a lot of competition; many of 
international firms are there and it’s very difficult to compete with them where as 
there are less competition in emerging markets. In emerging markets always have 
high investment return and therefore we accept the risk. We have an equation in 
investment saying that High risk... High return. Sometimes we accept the risks if the 
return is High.” 
RS6, RS34 and RS18 clearly correlated risk and benefit positively. However, RS12 
argued that risk and benefit are inversely correlated, he said: “extremely risky projects 
may have low benefits or even losses”, therefore their new company policy was to 
avoid the so called high risk and high return countries. This is interesting because 
previous literature (see Chapter Tow Section 2.5) suggested that the relationship 
between risk and benefit is positively correlated in the world, but when there is an 
emotional engagement – otherwise known as affect – they are negatively correlated 
(Alhakami and Slovic, 1994, Slovic and Västfjäll 2010). 
Overall, the respondents appeared to say that they made a basic commitment to 
investing in a particular region or country or not. This commitment was a judgment, 
and most described this judgment in a way that suggested it was completely obvious 
to them. It did not need a process of quantitative assessment. And when the judgment 
was to avoid commitment then there was no need for a quantitative assessment. In this 
sense, the risk perception associated with a fundamental decision (like whether to 
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invest in a certain country) always preceded risk assessment, often making it 
unnecessary.   
6.3.2.5 Summary of Main Theme Two 
Managers have several justifications for resisting the quantitative assessment of 
political risk: 
1. The belief that political risk is immeasurable for two reasons. The first is that 
politics are so volatile, making it impossible to follow political events 
quantitatively. The second is that quantitative assessment cannot adequately 
capture or summarise their experiences in previous political events and the 
intuitions they gain from these.  
2. The belief that a firm lacks the expertise to assess political risk quantitatively. 
3. The belief that the causes of political risk are uncontrollable, and why assess 
something you will have no control over? 
4. The belief that avoidance of threatening situations (generally unstable 
countries) makes assessment unnecessary. 
Together, these findings suggest that firms make the perception of political risk 
primary and the assessment of risk secondary. But it is important to say that managers 
stressed the role of knowledgeable human sources of understanding, and the process 
of regularly consulting these to update their understanding of risks as they were 
emerging.  So ‘risk perception’ among managers should not be seen as an irregular 
process of stating an opinion (in the way that the psychometric risk perception 
questionnaire is administered). Instead, it is a process of active engagement with 
intelligence sources and active decision making in which commitments are always 
under review. The most important criterion in this process of continual review, 
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according to the first main theme in this chapter, was whether a risk was governmental 
or non-governmental in origin. 
Political risks involve causes (e.g. revolutions and wars) and consequences (e.g. loss 
of investment). Managers in my study referred to the uncontrollability of the causes, 
but not the consequences; they spoke about controlling the latter by avoiding unstable 
countries and taking out insurance to mitigate the consequences. This may suggest 




CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
As previously stated, the aim of this research is to examine how political risks are 
responded to in terms of individuals’ perceptions and organisational assessment 
processes. This was carried out in the context of the extensive political changes which 
took place during the ‘Arab Spring’. In order to achieve the aim of the research, two 
objectives were formulated: the first was to study managerial political risk perceptions 
in Kuwaiti international firms based on the ‘psychometric approach’; the second was  
to study the firms’ political risk assessment and how this relates to political risk 
perception, through conducting interviews. In this chapter, the discussion will be 
divided into two main parts, following the two objectives.  
7.2 Discussion of the questionnaire survey findings 
In the psychometric paradigm, it is the risk attributes, not individuals’ attributes, that 
are expected to determine people’s risk perceptions. Thus, the participants were asked 
to rate a list of risks on such attributes, later condensed into main factors using 
principal component analysis. These factors were given interpretive names and used to 
plot the different risks on a ‘cognitive map’ showing the relative status of the different 
risks. Then, risk perceptions were regressed against factor scores to determine how 
well the factors accounted for variance in risk perceptions. 
The previous studies applying the psychometric paradigm have focused on a variety of 
risks such as  technological and environmental risks (Fischhoff et al., 1978;  Marris et 
al.,1997; Marris et al.,1998; Langford et al., 1999; Siegrist et al., 2005; Willies et al., 
2005; Bronfman et al., 2007). However, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge, 
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none has used the psychometric paradigm specifically to study the perception of 
political risks. One of the contributions of this research therefore is to examine the 
applicability of the psychometric approach to political risks. To achieve this, three 
views of the same dataset from the questionnaires were tested: 
 View (1): Attributes against risks – aggregated across participants (the 
traditional approach). Individual differences between participants are ‘washed 
out’ (Bronfman et al., 2007) in this approach.  
 View (2): Attributes against participants - aggregated across risks. Differences 
between the natures of the risks, other than what is expressed by the attributes, 
are lost in this approach. 
 View (3): Risks against participants - aggregated across the attributes. The 
effect of the attributes is lost in this approach, so it is clearly different from the 
basic principle of the psychometric paradigm. 
7.2.1 The psychometric model applied to political risk perceptions 
As shown in Chapter Five, principal component analysis resulted in grouping the 12 
attributes into two factors: factor 1 included 11 attributes, and factor 2 included only 1 
attribute. The result of this study is different from all previous traditional studies about 
technological and environmental risks, such as Fischhoff et al. (1978) , Marris et al. 
(1997), Bronfman and Cifuentes (2003) and Siegrist et al. (2005). In these studies, the 
results showed a much clearer balance of attributes across the factors. In this study, 
severity of consequences loaded most highly on factor 1 so it was named ‘severity of 
consequences’. Factor 2 included only ‘increasing-ness’. 
When these two factors were used to plot the 14 political risks in a factor space (see 
Figure 5.1 in Chapter Five), it was found that risks in the first quadrant, which were 
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high in terms of both severity of consequences and increasing-ness, were all non-
governmental risks. These risks included demonstrations and riots, revolutions, 
terrorism, civil wars, economic sanctions, and wars. This indicates that there are clear 
differences in managers’ perceptions of governmental and non-governmental risks: 
higher risk perceptions are associated with non-governmental risk compared to 
governmental risk. Although this research was conducted during the Arab Spring 
period, which witnessed very serious non-governmental risks, the results are in line 
with Al Khattab et al. (2007) who found, in a period long before the Arab Spring, that 
managers were less concerned about host government risk than host society risk and 
interstate risk. Al Khattab et al. (2007) did not use the psychometric approach so, 
although they found the separation of governmental and societal risk, they did not 
explain it in terms of risk attributes.  Instead, the authors asked the participants to rate 
their concerns about each risk on a five-point rating scale. In the previous literature, 
the managers’ lesser concern about non-governmental risks has been arguably due to 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) related policies in the host countries, which have 
tried to attract foreign investors by offering financial and tax incentives (Li, 2006; Al 
Khataab et al., 2007; Baek and Qian, 2011). Host governments have therefore been 
seen as providing opportunities to international firms rather than as being sources of 
risk. This was supported by the results from the interview analysis, which also 
indicated that managers are more concerned about non-governmental risk for various 
reasons, including the reason that the host governments support and maintain foreign 
investments (see section7.3.2.1). This consistency between prior findings, the 
interviews and the clustering produced in the psychometric analysis, further supports 
the strength of the psychometric approach in the domain of political risk. 
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Furthermore, the factor space (Figure 5.1) illustrates that two types of risk i.e. breach 
of contract by a host government and expropriation and/or confiscation, are located in 
the fourth quadrant, so high in severity of consequence, but low in increasing-ness. 
These results are in agreement with the assertion of Hood and Nawaz (2004) that 
expropriation has been decreasing in recent years. This has been reportedly due to its 
potential negative consequences to the host countries, such as international economic 
isolation and end of support from the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank (Hood and Nawaz, 2004). The above finding is also supported by Ramarmurti 
and Doh (2004) and Slaughter (2003).  
The analysis in Chapter Six proceeded to assess the explanatory power of the two 
factors (severity of consequence and increasing-ness) in predicting risk perception. 
Hence, two dependent variables (riskiness and acceptability) were regressed onto the 
two factors. This showed that the two factors made a strong contribution in explaining 
variation in judgments of riskiness and acceptability (R2 = 0.966 and R2 = 0.903 
respectively). This also helped support the validity of this procedure in studying 
political risk perception.  
7.2.2 Two other views of risk characteristic data 
From the literature in Chapter two, the traditional approach has been criticised for 
focusing on the differences among risks while ignoring the differences among the 
individuals. This arguably obscures differences among participants and inflates the 
explanatory power of the psychometric paradigm (Gardner et al.,1982; Gardner and 
Gould, 1989; Sjöberg,1996;  Marris et al.,1998). To address this critique, two more 




The first analysis examined risk perception by looking at the relationship between the 
participants and the risk attributes so the focus of analysis moved from the risks to the 
participants. Variation between participants is retained whereas variation across risks 
is lost, so now the analysis looks at what explains variation in risk perceptions across 
perceivers, instead of across perceived risks. Principal component analysis condensed 
the 12 attributes into four factors; when the two main factors were used to plot 120 
participants in a factor space  on the two most important factors, the map showed no 
obvious clustering among the participants (see figure 5.2 in Chapter Five). The lack of 
clustering indicates that the participants are variants within one population of risk 
perceivers.  
In order to assess the explanatory power of the four factors in predicting risk 
perception, the two dependent variables (riskiness and acceptability) were regressed 
onto them. The adjusted R2 indicated a weaker contribution in predicting the riskiness 
and the acceptability than the traditional approach (R2 equals 0.346 and 0.316 
respectively). This finding is in line with Bronfman et al. (2007), Willis et al. (2005), 
Savadori et al. (2004) and Barnett and Breakwell (2001).  Bronfman et al (2007, 
p.530), for example, concluded that “psychometric dimensions are less useful for 
explaining differences among participants than explaining differences among 
hazards”.   
In the second alternative analysis, the risks were scored in terms of the average level 
across all the attributes, for each participant. So the principal components analysis is 
based on how the risks tend to correlate with one another in terms of average attribute 
strengths, given individual participants as the unit of analysis. This grouped the 14 
risks into two factors. Factor 1 included risks that were not imposed directly from the 
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host government policy, and was accordingly named ‘Non-governmental risk’. Factor 
2, which included risks that are related to governmental policy, was named 
‘Governmental risk’. When the two factors were used to plot 120 participants in a 
cognitive map, again there was no clustering among the participants. Similar to view 
two, this view therefore did not show group differences among the participants 
regarding political risk perception. A regression model that linked the two factors to 
the same two dependent variables as earlier (riskiness and acceptability) was even 
weaker than the previous analysis (R2 = 0.143 and 0.033 respectively).  
It can therefore reasonably be concluded that political risk perception is strongly 
explained by the traditional psychometric paradigm, despite the great differences in 
context. Furthermore, political risk perception can be understood using the attributes 
similar to those used in previous studies that focused on technological and 
environmental risks (Fischhoff et al., 1978;  Marris et al., 1997; Marris et al., 1998; 
Langford et al., 1999; Siegrist et al., 2005; Willies et al., 2005; Bronfman et al., 2007). 
This suggests that those attributes have a wide general applicability, irrespective of the 
context: they are not only useful for explaining how lay people perceive technological 
and environmental risks, but also for explaining how organisational managers 
perceive political risk to their organisations. Political risk perception appears to have 
much in common with risk perception of different technologies and activities. 
However, the factor structures look different. When the participants looked across the 
range of political risks (taxation risk, currency risk etc.), the ways in which one 
relevant attribute (voluntariness, immediacy etc.) correlated with another looked very 
different to the way they correlated in the case of societal safety and health risks 
(nuclear waste, recombinant DNA technology etc.). It is very difficult to think of an 
explanation for this different and unusual structure. There is no obvious, intuitive 
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explanation and there is no explanation that has emerged from the qualitative analysis 
of interviews discussed below. In the Conclusion this is suggested as a topic for 
further research. 
7.2.3 Firms’ and managers’ characteristics and perception of risk 
The foregoing discussion has so far emphasised the role of risk attributes in explaining 
variation in risk perception. However, as earlier observed, the previous literature 
pointed to the relationship between firm characteristics and political risks (see Chapter 
Three, Section 3.5 and 3.7). The relevant firm characteristics mentioned in the 
literature were used to construct the demographic items in the questionnaire, and the 
aim was to test whether these characteristics could explain the variation in risk 
perception better than the psychometric framework. 
The correlation between these demographic characteristics and the two dependent 
variables, as shown in Chapter Five (Section 5.4), revealed no significant statistical 
relationship. This suggests very little influence of firms’ and managers’ characteristics 
on managerial political risk perception. It therefore further supports the application of 
the psychometric approach, which   assumes that it is the risk attributes, not 
individuals’ or firms’ characteristics, that explain variations in risk perception. 
Previous studies of political risk have specifically found some relationship between 
demographic variables and political risks, even in the same region in which this study 
was carried out, in countries like Jordan (Al Khattab et al., 2007). However, these 
studies were conducted before the occurrence of the Arab Spring and it is plausible 
that the strong influence of political events during the Arab Spring has made the 
attributes of risks more important than the demographics of the perceivers in forming 
risk perceptions.  
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7.3 Discussion of the interview findings  
In order to evaluate the political risk assessment in relation to political risk perception, 
an analysis of qualitative interview data was conducted and the results are discussed in 
this section. This discussion is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section 
(7.3.1) specifically concerns the institutionalisation level of political risk assessment 
in Kuwaiti international firms. The second sub-section (7.3.2) discusses the outcomes 
of the thematic analysis and the two main themes that emerged. 
7.3.1 Institutionalisation level of political risk assessment of Kuwaiti 
international firms 
 An important line of work in the previous literature is to look at political risk 
assessment in terms of its institutionalisation. As described earlier, institutionalisation 
“describes the process by which political risk assessment becomes more explicit and 
systematic” within a firm (Blank et al., 1980; p.7). It refers to the extent to which the 
assessment has become part of the formal organisational processes. Institutionalisation 
denotes a process that belongs to the organisation, not simply to individuals, and 
serves organisational goals and is conducted according to organisational standards. An 
institutionalised risk assessment process is therefore, by definition, different from a 
risk perception process. Risk perception processes relate to individuals, whereas 
institutionalised processes relate to organisations. In the literature, institutionalisation 
has essentially been seen as an indicator of how seriously political risk is treated and 
of how mature an organisation’s approach to it is. In this study, it is seen as expressing 
the balance that organisational decision makers set between formal, analytical 
approaches and their own intuitions about political risk.  
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The results in the previous chapter provided descriptive findings regarding the firms’ 
level of institutionalisation and also the correlation between levels of 
institutionalisation and firm characteristics. These were based on previous researchers’ 
(e.g. Blank et al., 1980) use of three indicators: allocation of responsibility, regularity 
of assessment and assessment method.  The results indicated that 31 of 34 firms 
formally allocated responsibility, and the remaining three at least expressed a strong 
sense of responsibility for considering political risk; so in this sense 
institutionalisation was fairly strong.  
In terms of regularity as an indicator, previous researchers like Al Khattab et al. 
(2008b) and Brink (2004) have argued that high regularity allows organisations to 
cope with environmental changes and detect unfavourable events that negatively 
affect their activities. In this study, it was found that the majority of the respondents 
assessed political risk routinely (25 firms – 74%). This is different from previous 
studies in which political risk assessment was found to be strongly crisis-oriented 
rather than regular (e.g. Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Oetzel, 2005). Even in 
previous research in the same geographical environment, e.g. in Jordan, political risk 
assessment was found to be “on demand” rather than a regular activity. 
This difference between the findings and the previous literature can be explained from 
a cultural point of view. It is sometimes argued that in countries in the Middle East, 
people tend to be more fatalistic (Welsh and Raven, 2006), thinking that they have 
little control over risk and that long-term planning and precautionary actions are not 
worthwhile (Aykan et al., 2000; Slovic, 1999). The regularity of political risk 
assessment in this study’s Kuwaiti sample suggests a less fatalistic outlook and, 
indeed, the Kuwaiti culture is said to be unique in relation to that of its local 
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counterparts in tending towards Western culture (Ali, 1988,).  Kuwaiti individuals are 
said to be widely travelled and more exposed to different cultures (Al-Kazemi and Ali, 
2002). Moreover, although some studies in Western cultures (e.g. Pahud de Mortanges 
and Allers, 1996) also found that political risk assessment is not conducted regularly, 
Kuwait is located in a politically unstable environment with aggressive neighbours 
like Iraq and Iran (Al-Kazemi and Ali, 2002). Kuwait also reportedly leads the rest of 
the countries in the GCC and the Arab world in terms of Foreign Direct Investment 
(UNCTAD report, 2014). It is probably for these reasons that Kuwaiti organisations 
tend to be proactive, assessing political risk regularly and not simply waiting for 
threatening events to emerge.  
However, the results showed that 22 firms out of 34 (65%) used qualitative methods 
alone in the assessment of political risk. These firms are regarded as less 
institutionalised because a lack of quantitative assessment is thought to make the 
process of investment more susceptible to some degree of bias: managers and experts 
may, for example, encourage investments for personal reasons such as existing 
relationships with key people in the host government (Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 
1996). It is recognized that the use of quantitative assessment arguably has 
shortcomings: for example, it could be based on obsolete data that leads to wrong 
decisions (Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996). So the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods in combination is seen as being the most institutionalised method 
(e.g. Blank et al., 1980; Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996). In this study only 12 
firms (35% of the sample) used such mixed methods. These results, which show a 
preponderance of qualitative assessment, are in line with previous studies (e.g. Hood 
and Nawaz, 2004; Rice and Mahmoud, 1990; Al Khattab et al., 2011). It turned out 
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that the explanation of why managers resist quantitative analysis was one of the main 
themes in the thematic analysis, so this question is discussed later, in section 7.3.2.  
As described in the results, the next stage was to examine whether there was any 
relationship between institutionalisation in general and the firms’ characteristics, in 
particular the type of industry (e.g. Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996), years of 
experience in international business (e.g. Al Khattab et al., 2008a), number of 
countries the firm operates in (e.g. Kobrin, 1982; Al Khattab et al., 2008a) and size of 
the firm (e.g. Kobrin, 1982; Stapenhurst, 1992a). Such a relationship would indicate 
that the nature of an organisation, rather than the risks it faces, is what most directly 
influences the way it responds to political risks. As described in Chapter Six (Section 
6.2.3), the results showed that the overall score for institutionalisation is not 
significantly correlated with any of the firm characteristics except a weak correlation 
with ownership. This correlation could be attributed to the fact that all of the 
governmental oil firms (four firms) were found to be highly institutionalised. An 
explanation suggested in Chapter Six was that the oil industry is considered to be the 
heart of the Kuwait economy so managers come under strong influence to demonstrate 
that they take political risk seriously at an organisational level. Recent research has 
shown how the Kuwaiti government’s heavy reliance on gas and oil has forced it to 
concentrate heavily on this sector and pay less attention to others (Al-Najem, 2013).  
The results showed demographics fail to explain both the risk perception and the 
institutionalised level of assessment. How the managers in this study explain the way 
they think about and assess political risk was illuminated more by the thematic 
analysis, the results of which were described in the second part of Chapter Six and this 
is discussed in the next section. 
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7.3.2 Discussion of the thematic analysis results  
From the analysis in the previous chapter, two main themes emerged: 1) managers are 
more concerned about non-governmental risks; and 2) managers resist quantitative 
assessment methods. Figure 7.1 shows the structure of the thematic analysis which 
includes the main themes and sub-themes that emerged from the data analysis. This is 
a hierarchy of beliefs expressed in the interviews and the reasons that are used to 











Figure 7.1: Outcomes of the thematic analysis 
 
Figure 7.1: Structure of the thematic analysis 
 
7.3.2.1 Theme one: managers are more concerned about non-governmental risks  
The first main theme was that managers differentiate between risks based on the 
source of risks they perceive. In particular they place more emphasis on non-
governmental risks (e.g. civil wars and revolutions) than governmental ones (e.g. 
taxation and capital repatriations).  According to the literature, governmental risks 
harm foreign businesses within the existing system i.e. political, economic and 
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legislative (Rugman and Collinson, 2009), while non-governmental risks, by 
definition, remain outside the governmental and legal system (Rugman and Collinson, 
2009). Five reasons emerged regarding this point, four of which reflected 
characteristics related to non-governmental risks as indicated in Figure 7.1. 
 The first reason for being less concerned about governmental risks was the prediction 
that it was in the host governments’ interests to support foreign investors instead of 
restricting them. Foreign direct investment was expected to be seen as being important 
to economic growth and development. As described in Chapter Six, interviewees 
claimed that, in some cases, there can be a change in government initiated by a non-
governmental risk such as civil war. However, a new government is still likely to try 
to incentivise and attract or maintain foreign investors in order to regain stability. 
Respondents argued that, even if the change in government led to changes in 
regulations, firms could still negotiate with new governments in host countries. This 
again is consistent with the literature (Minor, 2003; Baek and Qian, 2011).   
Although the majority of the interviewees highlighted the positive role of host 
government regarding international firms, this view was contradicted by two 
respondents. They expressed concern over the host governments of developing 
countries due to sudden changes in the laws and regulations when compared to stable 
countries like the USA and EU. They emphasised that they could not support 
investing in developing countries even before the Arab Spring due to the discontinuity 
of regulations that they experienced there. Related to this, Hood and Nawaz (2004) 
explained that, unlike in the developed countries, governmental regulations in 
developing countries could change abruptly. There was no obvious difference in the 
nature of these two firms to explain the difference in understanding from the majority. 
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So the basic principle of distinguishing governmental and non-governmental risk, and 
regarding the former as being inherently lower, should be seen as a tendency but not a 
universal rule. Firms have specific experiences and specific interests that sometimes 
resist generalisation. 
The other four reasons why managers were more concerned with non-governmental 
risks were related to the characteristics of those risks. The first characteristics were 
unmanageability and uncontrollability of non-governmental risks, in contrast to 
governmental risks, which are controllable to some extent because they are related to 
the investing firms’ internal capabilities. It was reported that international firms can 
adapt to the changes and amend their strategies. Such adaptation can, for example, be 
implemented through hedging strategies and increasing prices in order to manage the 
risk of additional taxation.   Also, firms can manage governmental risk by using their 
relationships with influential and powerful local partners in host countries. This is 
described in previous studies, which argued that relationships with the host 
governments can reduce the chance or impact of less favourable changes in policy 
(Shen et al., 2001; Ling and Hoi, 2006). The interviewees, however, stressed that non-
governmental risks, in contrast, are beyond any similar kind of influence.  Thus 
political risks are perceived by managers not just in terms of probability and impact 
but in terms of controllability, and the possibility of being able to observe and act on 
unfolding events. This concern with controllability is also found in the psychometric 
framework, where it is one of the risk attributes used to explain risk judgments. 
The second characteristic linked to non-governmental risks was the potential harm to 
the host economy and, in consequence, to international business. For example, it was 
claimed that social unrest produced economic deflation, including the halting of on-
 198 
 
going and potential government projects. Social unrest made people feel less confident 
and adversely affected their spending patterns. This is in line with previous literature 
which argues that non-governmental risks lead to political and economic instability 
(Minor, 2003; Brink, 2004; Buss and Hefeker, 2007). Furthermore, some respondents 
revealed that the disintegration of the local economy as a result of non-governmental 
risks led to the termination of foreign investments. This is in agreement with the 
previous studies, which assert that civil wars force international firms to leave the host 
countries (e.g. Tayeb, 2000). 
The third characteristic of non-governmental risks that causes more concern to 
managers was their adverse effect on the security and safety within host countries, 
both of personnel and goods. Interviewees, for example, explained that the perpetual 
instability in Iraq and its effect on security led to the withdrawal of foreign investors. 
In relation to this, the previous literature has similarly shown that non-governmental 
risks, like military conflicts, can destroy international factories and manufacturers’ 
assets, besides causing workers’ death or injuries (Jensen, 2008; Bussmann, 2010).  
The fourth characteristic identified in the analysis was that non-governmental risks 
often have no boundaries. Interviewees reported that these risks can spread across a 
region without regard to state or country borders. A similar observation was made in 
the literature, which indicated that non-governmental risks such as civil war have an 
influence on nearby nations (Murdoch and Sandler, 2004). Respondents argued that 
the Arab Spring had affected neighbouring countries such as, Turkey.  
7.3.2.2 Theme two: managers resist quantitative assessment methods 
It is well documented that quantitative approaches to political risk assessment are not 
common (Kobrin et al., 1980, Hashmi and Guvenli, 1992). Burmester (2000) has 
 199 
 
attempted to explain this as being due either to a lack of awareness of political risks or 
to firms resisting the idea that political risk is open to analysis. It would be expected 
that extreme political instability, like that found during the Arab Spring, should lead to 
more emphasis on detailed, explicit risk assessments.The findings in Chapter Five and 
Six show a high awareness of political risk (especially for non-governmental risks) 
and yet also a continued resistance to quantitative assessment. Kuwaiti managers 
described four reasons behind their resistance to this type of assessment: political risk 
is immeasurable, there is a lack of skills for quantifying political risks, political risk is 
uncontrollable, and quantitative assessment of political risk is unnecessary.  
The first reason which respondents used to justify their view was the immeasurability 
of political risk, due to the inherently volatile nature of political events – especially 
non-governmental ones. This meant that attempts by managers to somehow quantify 
the risks arising from political events would fail to represent their complex and rapidly 
changing nature. Earlier observations on the preference for qualitative analysis in the 
literature (Al Khattab et al., 2011) have stressed that qualitative methods are quicker 
than the quantitative ones; however, the interviews indicated that the problem was not 
speed of assessment but the speed of change in what was being assessed.  Moreover, 
interviewees believed that political risk was immeasurable due to their belief that 
quantification cannot express their observations in a satisfactory way. Therefore, after 
experiencing political events, it is managers’ intuition that is used to evaluate the risk 
of future political events, not the use of quantitative methods. 
The second reason provided by other respondents for resisting the quantitative 
assessment was related to the lack of skills needed to quantify risks. This reportedly 
means that they rely on external sources. This outsourcing of analytical expertise is 
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described in the literature (Pahud De Mortanges and Allers, 1996). But it is probably 
not just the possibility of outsourcing that is relevant here. It seems likely that Kuwaiti 
firms do not invest in analytical skills because of a fatalistic culture. This leads to 
consider investment in employee training as unnecessary because of an assumption 
that, by nature, employees can never be changed (Aykan et al., 2000). However, the 
outsourcing of analysis rather than the complete neglect of analysis suggests that this 
fatalism is moderated. Earlier researchers have established that a fatalistic attitude is 
becoming less prevalent for those travelling more frequently outside the Middle East 
and interacting with people from different backgrounds (e.g. Welsh and Raven, 2006).  
The exception to the resistance to quantitative assessment was found in government 
oil firms, whose managers talked about the importance of training their employees on 
quantitative risk assessment. Within the analysis of the level of institutionalisation of 
political risk assessment all the government oil firms were rated highly (see Chapter 
Six Section 6.2.3).  It seems highly likely that the acceptance of a more analytical 
approach to political risk assessments comes both from the influence of the Kuwaiti 
government as an owner, and perhaps also from the oil industry which has had a 
tradition of using quantitative risk assessment.  
The uncontrollability of political risk was the third reason given for resisting 
quantification of risk assessment.  This was also earlier highlighted as a reason behind 
managers’ concerns about non-governmental risks. But there was a distinction 
between the uncontrollability of events and the uncontrollability of the impact of those 
events on a business. So some respondents described the use of insurance as a means 
of limiting the impact of uncontrollable political events. This finding is in line with 
Nawaz and Hood (2004) who argued that insurance can provide partial protection but 
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is not a comprehensive solution. In fact, some respondents dismissed insurance due to 
its cost; they argued that withdrawing their investments from politically risky 
countries was the best solution.  
On its own a lack of controllability does not, necessarily, make risk assessment 
pointless. The uncontrollability of political risk could, in theory, lead equally to 
analysing risk more intensively, or less intensively. The reluctance to engage in more 
intensive analysis could be seen as another example of a fatalistic culture, but the fact 
that they do attempt some qualitative assessment, and consider insurance as one way 
of dealing with risks, shows that this is only moderately fatalistic.  
The fourth reason for resisting quantitative assessment is managers’  belief that it is 
unnecessary because they had limited or no activities in unstable countries, including 
those that witnessed the Arab Spring. They claimed that the majority of their 
investments were in developed countries, which were relatively politically stable, e.g. 
in Europe and USA. It should be acknowledged, however, that firms in developed 
countries may also face political risks. Cantwell (2014) argued that host governments 
in both developed and developing nations can manipulate regulatory structures, which 
might repel or attract international projects. Similarly, since 9/11 attacks, political 
risks have become more pronounced in developed countries (Baek and Qian, 2011). 
Managers divided the Arab countries into GCC and non-GCC countries and, based on 
their past experience, found the GCC countries to be more stable, requiring no 
quantitative assessment. The question is for how long GCC countries will remain 
stable, however. Some respondents admitted that they had been surprised by how 
political instability cropped up in Egypt and Syria, which previously had been 
considered stable. But this is not surprising as the previous literature shows that 
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political risks are volatile in nature and situations can change suddenly (Brink, 2004; 
Baek and Qian, 2011). 
In some cases, respondents argued that quantitative risk assessment was unnecessary 
because they had decided to avoid investing in unstable countries. It might be 
expected that the Arab Spring would have encouraged firms to carry out more 
quantitative assessment, but the findings indicated that it simply led them to avoid, 
and walk away from, unstable countries to focus on more politically stable regions 
like UK, US and GCC countries. 
Overall, the respondents’ reasoning often left little room for formal risk assessment. 
They argued it was unnecessary because, either the host country is stable and poses 
few political risks, with those few risks tending to be governmental and therefore 
unlikely to damage investor interests; or, when the host country is unstable, the 
quantitative assessment is incapable of representing highly volatile situations or is 
made unnecessary because the firm simply pulls out of the country altogether. 
However, it would be wrong to say the firms avoided risk assessment because they 
were risk averse. Three respondents talked about investing in unstable countries such 
as Myanmar and Sudan as an important opportunity. They argued that the level of 
competition and growth in emerging countries is less than those in developed 
countries, so incurring the related risks produced corresponding benefits. In 
connection with this, Nawaz and Hood (2004) argued that avoidance has to be 
balanced against losing opportunities to make profits, by accepting a certain degree of 
political risk. Respondents made the same argument, saying that risk can be 
acceptable if the return is high. There is an interesting connection here with the 
literature on risk perception, and the role of emotion in this perception. It has been 
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found that, in reality, risk and benefit are positively correlated (e.g. Fischhoff et al., 
1978). Yet, especially in the case of highly emotive risks, people’s risk perceptions 
exhibit a negative correlation between risk and benefit. They expect activities with 
high risk to have low benefit, and expect highly beneficial activities to have low risk 
(Alhakami and Slovic, 1994). In some of the interviews, respondents said that they 
would rather avoid the so-called high risk-high benefit countries because they seemed 
to think the higher level of risk meant lower benefits and or losses. If the literature is 
correct that the negative correlation of risk and benefit is associated with an emotional 
response, this deviates from our expectation that managers making organisational 
decisions should do so without particular emotion.   
The above three respondents showed some degree of risk acceptance. However, two 
of them indicated that they used qualitative assessment methods only. The failure to 
conduct quantitative assessment seems to contradict the suggestion by Nawaz and 
Hood (2004) who proposed that accepting a degree of risk should be accompanied by 
effective risk management. The two respondents said that the level of competition and 
the growth rates are more favorable in emerging countries than those in developed 
countries, and they therefore accepted the risk. This implies that doing rigorous 
assessment doesn’t necessarily relate to accepting or avoiding risks.  The managers 
may overlook the political risk because of the low competition and high growth rate of 
the host country; whatever political risk there was, they would accept it. 
7.4 A synthesis of the two studies 
As explained earlier, this research utilised a mixed methods approach. This included a 
quantitative method using a questionnaire survey to look at managerial risk perception 
and a qualitative method using interviews to look at the way firms responded to 
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political risk. In principle, the two studies looked at different things (individual 
judgments and organisational processes) at different levels of analysis (individuals and 
organisations). However, although for the questionnaire survey the unit of analysis is 
the individual, individuals’ views are shaped by the organisation of which they are 
part. The questionnaire was filled in by 120 individuals but they came from 44 
organisations. These individuals were not isolated: they were individuals who are 
shaped by the same regional (e.g. GCC country) and business (e.g. international firm) 
contexts. In relation to the interviews, the unit of analysis is the firm because the 
interview questions were specifically about the firm’s processes of responding to 
political risks, and the explanations were about the nature and workings of the 
organisation – not the psychology of individuals. But the way respondents think about 
a company’s assessment process is still individualised. Different people are likely to 
have different views of the same procedure, and have different individual experiences 
that they use to justify a procedure. 
Despite the differences between the units of analysis, the questionnaire and the 
interview produced common results. The cognitive map in the traditional 
psychometric paradigm (see Chapter Five, Figure 5.1) indicates clear differences in 
managers’ perceptions between governmental and non-governmental risks, with high 
perceptions of non-governmental risk compared to governmental risk. This was also 
the first main theme of the interview analysis, which showed why managers made this 
basic distinction between these two categories of risk. This distinction seemed to be a 
kind of entry point: if managers are asked about political risk, their first consideration 
is whether it is governmental or non-governmental. It appeared to be a useful heuristic 
guide for most managers when making their risk assessments. Furthermore, the 
finding that interviewees were concerned about non-governmental risks, due to the 
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scale and nature of their consequences, supported the result of the survey 
questionnaire, which indicated that the first main factor arising from the principal 
components analysis was highly correlated with severity of consequences (see Chapter 
Five, section 5.3.1). Similarly, one of the main reasons given by the interviewees for 
resisting measurable assessment was the uncontrollability of non-governmental risks. 
Uncontrollability was also identified in the questionnaire study as one of the risk 
attributes that affects perception. 
The model in Figure 7.2 summarises the relationship between individual perception 
and organisational assessment. Both connect a subject (a manager in an international 
business) with an object (political risk arising from their investments). The findings 
outlined there show that there are certain factors which affect both political risk 
perception and assessment, as indicated by the thick edged shapes in Figure 7.3. These 
factors include the dichotomisation of governmental and non-governmental risk, and 
one of the psychometric attributes i.e. controllability. But it doesn’t exclude the 
possibility that other attributes might emerge in future studies. The findings also show 
that certain factors affect perception only, while others affect assessment only. For 
example, attitude to the assessment method (e.g. quantitative assessment is 
unnecessary) and the potential cultural influences were found to affect assessment 
only. However, there is no evidence from the psychometric study of the influence of 
the culture on risk perception as the psychometric study is not designed to determine 
cultural factors. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether culture does influence the 
perception or not. The culture is important here because this study is about a specific 
region in the world where there is a claim that the culture is fatalistic, and this is very 
relevant with regard to risk. What can be said is that three factors were found to 
influence perception and not assessment. These were the general psychometric 
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attributes, and, as emerged from the interviews, psychological influences (i.e. affect) 



















Figure 7.2: A model of the main processes of political risk response 
 
This chapter has provided a detailed discussion of the findings from both a 
questionnaire survey and interviews and how both the interview and questionnaire 
findings come together to answer the research objectives. At the end of the chapter, 
the relationship between individual perception and organisational assessment was 
discussed and illustrated in a model. The next chapter (Chapter eight) will provide the 
















































































CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to explore managers’ political risk perception and firms’ 
risk assessment in Kuwaiti international firms. Although political risk is not a new 
topic, this current research addresses it because of the very significant political risks 
caused by the recent events in the Middle East, referred to collectively as the Arab 
Spring. These events are characterised by extremely high levels of political instability 
and so seriously affect any firm trying to operate, or already having operations, in this 
region. Therefore, this research investigated whether the Arab Spring made 
international firms take political risk more seriously, or made any difference to the 
way firms approach risk. This is especially important given that the literature on 
political risk reveals that there is a low standard of political risk assessment carried out 
by international firms as it tends to be reactive and subjective. Any reaction by firms 
to risk consists of two elements: 1) individuals who are responding to risk based on 
their judgement and perception; and 2) organisational processes of assessing these 
risks. This study looked at these elements in parallel. It did so because it could be 
argued that how managers perceive risk is important to the subsequent processes of 
assessing such risk However, the literature on risk perception and the literature on risk 
assessment have not been connected, especially in relation to political risk.  There is a 
well-established body of literature on risk perception using, and indeed, supporting the 
relevance of the psychometric framework. And, although this framework has been 
successfully applied to other risks (e.g. technological and environmental), it has not 
yet been applied to political risk in particular. Since the existing political risk literature 
has not used any established framework to enhance our knowledge about managerial 
perception of such risk, it was deemed important, in this study, to investigate whether 
the psychometric framework is equally applicable to this kind of risk. In so doing, this 
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study was mainly intended to connect the political risk literature and risk perception 
literature. 
This study focussed particularly on Kuwaiti international firms – a relatively small 
population of firms that belong to the Arabian region. Although Kuwait was not 
directly involved in the Arab Spring, its international firms have to make decisions 
about their investments and operations in countries that were; and Kuwait frequently 
leads the rest of the Arab world in terms of Foreign Direct Investment. This study 
used a mixed methods approach involving a questionnaire survey and interviews, with 
both data sets collected around the same time. The questionnaire survey data was 
collected from 120 managers from across 44 firms with the aim of enabling a response 
to research question one, which sought to explore the managers’ political risk 
perceptions based on three dimensions: political risks, risk attributes and participants. 
The interview data was collected through face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with 
34 managers from Kuwaiti firms, with each manager representing a firm. Part of the 
interview data was analysed quantitatively to establish the level of institutionalisation 
of political risk assessment of the firms studied. The remaining part was analysed 
qualitatively through a thematic analysis, focusing on both risk perception and risk 
assessment. More specifically, besides validating the questionnaire survey results, the 
interview study responded to the second research question, which sought to explore 
the relationship between Kuwaiti managers’ risk perception and the political risk 
assessment in international Kuwaiti firms.  
The findings of this study, which were earlier discussed in depth in Chapter Seven, 
will be further summarised in the next section. The contribution of the thesis to the 
literature will also be highlighted. Thereafter, this chapter will explain the practical 
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implications, followed by an outline of the study limitations and suggestions for 
potential future research.  
8.1 Summary of the finding  
To begin with, on exploring the applicability of the psychometric framework to 
political risk perception, the questionnaire survey findings revealed that the risk 
attributes in the traditional psychometric approach are highly applicable to political 
risk.  The two factors that emerged from the principle component analysis of the 12 
risk attributes (severity of consequences and increasing-ness) when regressed against 
the dependent variables (acceptability and riskiness) both showed a very high 
prediction (of more than 90%) for both dependent variables. Both ‘severity of 
consequences’ and ‘increasing-ness’ were used to plot the 14 political risks in a 
cognitive map to understand whether managers differentiate between political risks on 
the basis of the two factors. The cognitive map showed that risks which were 
positioned in the quadrant representing very high levels in both severity of 
consequences and increasing-ness were all non-governmental risks. This indicated 
clear differences in managers’ perception of governmental and non-governmental 
risks, with higher risk perceptions being associated with non-governmental risk.  
The validity of the psychometric framework as a procedure for investigating risk 
perception in the context of political risk was further supported by theme one in the 
interview. Managers were found to differentiate between risks based on the source of 
risks they perceived. Managers gave more emphasis to the non-governmental risks 
than governmental risks based on the comparison between these categories of risks. 
Managers argued that the non-governmental risks are uncontrollable, unlike 
governmental risks which they indicated can be managed. This differentiation 
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between governmental and non-governmental risk is likely to be universal and not 
specifically characteristic of the experience of the Arab Spring as Al Khattab et al. 
(2007) found a similar position in their argument that managers are less concerned 
about host government risk than host society risk and interstate risk. The authors 
however never used the psychometric approach; instead, they asked the respondents to 
rate their concerns about each political risk on a five-point rating scale. This 
consistency with the previous literature on specific findings, as well as the support 
from the interview findings, added to the general validity of the psychometric 
approach as a procedure for investigating risk perception in the context of political 
risk.  
This traditional approach has been critiqued for focusing on the differences among 
risks while ignoring the differences among the individuals. This arguably obscures 
differences among participants and inflates the explanatory power of the psychometric 
paradigm (Gardner et al.,1982; Gardner and Gould, 1989; Sjöberg,1996; Marris et 
al.,1998). Based on this, it was deemed important, in this study, to conduct a further 
analysis that focuses on the relationship between the participants and the risk 
attributes. This meant shifting the focus from the risks to the participants, to establish 
whether participants who use high values of a particular attribute also use high values 
of another attribute. The principal component analysis grouped the 12 attributes into 
four factors. When the two main factors were used to plot 120 participants in a 
cognitive map, the map showed no obvious clustering among the participants. This 
indicated that there is no difference among participants regarding political risk 
perception. And when the four factors that emerged from the 12 attributes were 
regressed on to two dependent variables (riskiness and acceptability), the predictive 
power was lower (34.6% and 31.6% respectively) when compared with that of the 
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traditional psychometric approach. This finding is in line with Bronfman et al. (2007), 
Willis et al. (2005), Savadori et al. (2004) and Barnett and Breakwell (2001). 
Bronfman et al (2007, p.530) for example concluded that “psychometric dimensions 
are less useful for explaining differences among participants than explaining 
differences among hazards.”   
In order to further establish the usefulness of the risk attributes in risk perception, a 
third analysis was made that looked at the relationship between the participants and 
the risks, ignoring the difference between the attributes. This meant focusing on 
whether participants giving high attribute ratings of a certain risk also tend to give 
high attribute ratings to another risk. The principal component analysis grouped the 14 
risks into two factors, which were used to plot 120 participants in a cognitive map. 
Similar to the second analysis described above, there was no clustering among the 
participants, meaning there were no group differences among the participants 
regarding political risk perception. Again, using a regression of the two risk factors 
into two dependent variables (riskiness and acceptability), it showed a very low 
contribution in comparison with the previous two analyses (i.e. 14.3% and 3.3% 
respectively). Overall, the results from the three kinds of analyses, when compared, 
confirm that the risk attributes (emphasised in the traditional psychometric approach) 
are strongly applicable to understanding political risk perception.  
Furthermore, the previous literature indicated that a relationship exists between firm 
characteristics and political risks. Thus, a further analysis was conducted by linking 19 
demographic variables with the two dependent variables (i.e. riskiness and 
acceptability). But these demographic characteristics of the respondent firms and 
managers were found to have no significant statistical relationship with managerial 
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political risk perception. This further supported the assumption of the psychometric 
approach that it is the risk attributes, not individuals’ or firms’ characteristics, that 
explain the variations in risk perception.  
As mentioned earlier, this study also sought to explore the relationship between 
Kuwaiti managers’ risk perception and the institutionalisation of political risk 
assessment, and whether the Arab Spring made international firms take political risk 
more seriously and made any difference to the way firms approach risk. This was the 
core aim of conducting the interview study. To establish the institutionalisation level 
of political risk assessment, interview data was analysed quantitatively using 
numerical scores assigned to three indicators of the level of institutionalisation that 
were identified from the literature. These indicators are: responsibility for political 
risk assessment, regularity of assessment and the assessment method. The findings 
revealed that all of the interview firms met the minimum requirements of the 
institutionalisation of political risk assessment. Of the 34 respondent firms, 31 firms 
reported that they assigned formal responsibility while three firms had just a sense of 
responsibility. This means that, in the three firms, there was at least an effort and a 
process carried out regarding political risk assessment, though not formalised. A 
slightly higher degree of institutionalisation than firms’ responsibility for political risk 
assessment is arguably shown by the regularity of performing the assessments. From 
the findings, the majority of the respondents (25 out of the 34 firms) reported that they 
assessed political risk routinely rather than on-demand. These two findings indicate 
that all of the interview firms take risk seriously.  This contradicts the idea that Arabic 
cultures tend to be fatalistic and suggests that Kuwaiti culture is less fatalistic and, 
indeed, the Kuwaiti culture is said to be unique in relation to that of its local 
counterparts in tending towards Western culture (Ali, 1988). In regard to method, the 
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literature indicates that firms using both qualitative and quantitative methods are 
generally considered to be more institutionalised than those employing qualitative 
methods only. It was expected that the Arab Spring should be a strong impetus to 
increase the use of more rigorous political risk assessment. This study indicates that 
this was not the case as only 12 firms were found to use mixed methods.  
The previous literature indicates that a relationship exists between the level of 
institutionalisation of political risk assessment and firm characteristics. Thus, having 
established the firms’ level of institutionalisation of political risk assessment in this 
study, it was deemed important to establish how this relates to firms’ characteristics. 
This was done on the assumption that there could be other factors, other than political 
risk perception, that influence the assessment processes. In general, the findings show 
that the level of institutionalisation is not significantly correlated with any of the firm 
characteristics. Institutionalisation of risk assessment appeared almost random, except 
that a distinct sub-population – the government-owned oil firms – was clearly more 
institutionalised. This is probably due to their importance in the Kuwaiti economy, 
and the political pressure they come under from the Kuwaiti government and society 
to be seen to take political risks seriously, particularly in light of the Kuwaiti 
government’s heavy reliance on gas and oil. 
The thematic analysis of interviews was conducted to investigate the relationship 
between Kuwaiti managers’ risk perception and the institutionalisation of political risk 
assessment. The data revealed two major themes: the first was that managers are more 
concerned about non-governmental risks and the second was that managers resist 
quantitative assessment, meaning they resist the highest level of institutionalisation. 
As mentioned earlier, managers were more concerned with non-governmental risks 
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than governmental risks because governmental risks can be controlled and managed 
e.g. by amending their strategies and using their relationships with influential and 
powerful local partners in host countries. Furthermore, managers argued that the host 
governments support foreign investors instead of restricting them e.g. by providing 
incentives. In addition, managers were concerned about non-governmental risks due to 
their consequences. For example, managers claimed that non-governmental risks 
adversely affect the host economy, security and safety of host countries, and that non-
governmental risks have no boundaries as these risks affect the whole region, not just 
single countries, in which a business might be operating. More generally, both the 
questionnaire survey and interview results suggested that, if managers are asked about 
political risk, they first consider whether it is governmental or non-governmental risk 
and then express their greater concern for the latter. 
On the second theme, which explained why managers resist quantitative assessment 
process (the highest level of institutionalisation), despite their high awareness of 
political risk (especially for non-governmental risks) as summarised above, managers 
gave four main reasons. The first reason was that political risk is immeasurable; 
managers believe that the assessment of political risk is based on intuition and 
experience rather than quantification. The second reason was the lack of skilled 
employees to carry out the quantification. The third reason was that political risk is 
uncontrollable, while the fourth reason was that quantitative political assessment is 
unnecessary. Generally, the finding showed that Kuwaiti managers believe that the 
assessment of political risk is based on intuition and experience rather than 
quantification. In addition, managers indicated that it was difficult to quantify political 
risk due to a lack of skilled employees to do quantification.   
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The uncontrollability that was highlighted as a reason for resisting quantification of 
risk assessment was also highlighted as a reason as to why managers were concerned 
about non-governmental risks. In other words, this factor affects both perception and 
assessment. Some managers, however, argued that quantitative political risk 
assessment was unnecessary since they had limited activities in unstable countries and 
also avoided investing in unstable countries e.g. the non GCC countries. While, it was 
initially anticipated that the Arab Spring made a difference in political risk assessment 
by encouraging firms to do quantitative assessment, the findings showed that it did 
not. Instead, firms opted to avoid and walk away from unstable countries to focus on 
more politically stable regions like UK, US and GCC countries. A few managers, 
however, indicated that they would consider investing in unstable countries such as 
Myanmar and Sudan as an opportunity. These managers argued that risk and benefit 
are positively correlated. However, other respondents said that they would rather 
avoid the so-called high risk-high benefit countries because, to them, the higher level 
of risk actually meant lower benefits and/or losses. According to risk perception 
literature, risk and benefit are, in fact, positively correlated and the negative 
correlation of risk and benefit is associated with an emotional response. This suggests 
that emotion plays a role in risk perception among some of the managers.  
Overall, this study found that both risk perception and assessment have something in 
common; particular factors affect both political risk perception and assessment. These 
factors include the dichotomisation of governmental and non-governmental risk, and 
one of the psychometric attributes i.e. controllability (see the thick edged shapes in 
Figure 7.3). These distinctions seemed to be a kind of entry point: if managers are 
asked about political risks, their first considerations are whether they are 
governmental or non-governmental, and whether they are controllable or 
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uncontrollable. These appeared to be a useful heuristic guide for most managers when 
making their risk assessments. The findings also show that certain factors affect 
perception only, while others affect assessment only. For example, attitude to the 
assessment method (e.g. quantitative assessment is unnecessary) and the potential 
cultural influences were found to affect assessment only. Three factors were found to 
influence perception and not assessment. These were the general psychometric 
attributes, and, as emerged from the interviews, psychological influences (i.e. affect) 
and potential benefits from host governments. 
8.2 Contribution to literature 
The findings of this study have made two intended contributions to the literature.  
First, there are established literature streams on risk perception and political risk but 
these have been isolated from each other. The literature on risk perception has 
explored and demonstrated the usefulness of established frameworks, such as the 
psychometric framework, to explain how people react to risk. And the psychometric 
paradigm based framework has been applied to understand the perception of different 
risks such as technological risks and environmental risks (e.g. Marris et al.,1998; 
Langford et al., 1999; Siegrist et al., 2005; Willies et al., 2005; Bronfman et al., 2007). 
However, this framework has not been used to understand political risks. The current 
globalisation of firms, coupled with the emerging important political events that 
aggravate risk, such as the recent Arab Spring, means that the phenomenon of political 
risk and its potential impact on international firms’ decisions, deserve important 
consideration. However, the literature reviewed in Chapter Three indicates that, 
besides failure to apply the psychometric paradigm on political risk, no other 
established framework has so far been used to understand political risk perception. 
This thesis therefore contributes to the literature by showing the applicability of the 
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psychometric framework to political risk. The findings have shown that the traditional 
psychometric framework strongly applies to political risk perception. The risk 
characteristics in the framework contributed to over 90% of the variation in political 
risk perception. This study, in demonstrating the applicability of the framework to 
managers reacting to political risks, suggests it is a very general framework.  
Remarkably, it shows that the same framework, with the same set of risk attributes, 
works equally well for lay perceptions of societal safety risks as for managerial 
perceptions of political risk to a business.  
The previous studies applying the traditional psychometric approach to technological 
and environmental risks have found more of a balance of risk attributes across 
different factors (e.g.  Fischhoff et al., 1978; Marris et al., 1997; Bronfman and 
Cifuentes, 2003; Siegrist et al., 2005). However, this thesis found an unbalanced 
factor structure whereby 11 attributes were highly correlated to ‘severity of 
consequences’ forming factor 1, but factor 2 included only one factor: ‘increasing-
ness’. This means that, although political risk perception can be understood using the 
attributes similar to those used in previous studies that focused on technological and 
environmental risks, the factor structures looked different, meaning the way risk 
attributes correlated with one another emerged differently. This indicates that, 
although these attributes look universal, they fit together differently when they are 
applied to different domains. The same attributes apply to political risk because we are 
looking at constants in human risk perception, but the different nature of the risks may 
account for the different way these attributes are correlated. This would be a 
worthwhile subject for future study. In general, this study has not only extended the 
applicability of the psychometric framework to facilitate understanding of political 
risk, but also showed the connection between political risk literature and risk 
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perception literature, which as indicated in Chapter Two and Three have previously 
been isolated. 
Second, the processes of risk perception and political risk assessment have not been 
linked together in the previous literature. As mentioned earlier, there is an established 
line of work that looks at risk perception and there is also another important line of 
work that looks at political risk assessment in terms of its institutionalisation. It is 
expected that the processes of risk perception and assessment should be connected. 
Both of these processes involve the same subject and the same object (i.e. a manager 
trying to understand political risk). However, these processes look different as risk 
perception is based on human psychological process while risk assessment is based on 
a rational organisational process. Risk assessment denotes a process that belongs to 
the organisation, not simply to individuals although they are conducted by individuals 
on behalf of their organisations. Risk perception concerns the psychology of the 
individuals but this is influenced by other factors, including the type of organisations 
such individuals represent. This study found that the Arab Spring influenced the risk 
perception but not the assessment as most of the firms remained resistant to 
quantitative assessment. Therefore, the pertinent contribution here is the detailed work 
that explained why managers resist quantitative assessment. The dichotomisation 
between governmental and non-governmental risk that managers made, and the 
uncontrollability consideration of non-governmental risk, were found to be the main 
reason for the resistance. Other reasons were also revealed in this study including: the 
belief that political risk is immeasurable, due to the fact that quantification cannot 
express managers’ observations in a satisfactory way; and the fact that political risk is 
based on firms’ intuition and experiences in previous political events, rather than 
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quantification. Furthermore, there was the belief that avoidance of threatening 
unstable countries makes assessment unnecessary. 
8.3 Implications for practice  
With regard to practical contributions, the research can benefit international firms as 
well as host countries in significant ways. Firstly, the connection between political 
risk perception and assessment established in this study might help managers in 
international firms to consider the relationship between their judgment (their intuitive 
perception) and their organisational assessment processes. Managers could use the 
psychometric framework to check whether the outcomes from the assessment and the 
perception are consistent or whether they are going in different directions. Formal risk 
assessments look mainly at probabilities and consequences; however, the 
psychometric framework captures aspects of risk, namely risk attributes, which, in a 
formal risk assessment, are ignored. These aspects were found to be important. If the 
outcome from the perception and assessment is different, this might indicate that 
something more needs to be taken into account in the assessment process.     
Secondly, understanding the reasons why managers dichotomise governmental and 
no-governmental risk has practical importance, as it helps firms to reflect on their 
circumstances and assess whether this dichotomisation works in these circumstances. 
Similarly, the variety of reasons provided in the interviews to justify the assessment 
procedure are very important as they might help managers to understand how others 
rationalise the use, or non-use, of quantitative assessment. They thereby allow 
managers to assess whether such reasons fit their own problems and so come to a 
deeper understanding of how much formal assessment of political risk is appropriate 
to their situation.  
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Furthermore, this study finds that the traditional psychometric framework significantly 
predicts political risk perception. This finding can help the host countries wishing to 
attract and retain foreign investments in identifying the most important risks that are 
of concern to the managers of international companies. Based on this, the host 
governments can look for ways of incentivising investors, or participate in assessing 
such risks (e.g. through assisting the firms in managing the outcomes of such risks) in 
order to help the investors make rational decisions. Besides its use by the host 
countries, the psychometric framework can provides a way of helping managers 
predict the risk perception of other managers who they may have to persuade or 
negotiate with. 
Finally, the psychometric framework can be used to provide managers with a list of 
risks that are important and relevant to their firms. This list can offer a basis for 
assessing risks – either qualitatively or quantitatively.  
8.4 Study limitations and implications for future research 
This study has had some important limitations. The first involves the generalisability 
of findings. This study was conducted in Kuwait where there are only 138 firms 
participating in international business; and only 44 of these firms responded to the 
survey. This is a limitation in a sense that the firms may not be completely 
representative, as they are only 1/3 of the relevant population. And since the study was 
done in only Kuwaiti firms, there are questions of external validity – it is possible that 
the findings may not be generally applicable in other different contexts. But, 
importantly, findings in this study provide a starting point for further similar studies in 
other different and similar contexts to ascertain generalisability. 
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Another limitation of this study is the possible sampling bias, due to the self-selection 
process (where people chose to respond or not to respond) as the potential respondents 
had to first be contacted to confirm their willingness to participate due to the size of 
the questionnaire (20 pages). However, this was important to enhance the response 
rate as the previous studies have indicated that respondents were reluctant to 
participate because of the length of the psychometric questionnaire. Related to this is 
the use of a single respondent manager per firm in the interview study. This in itself is 
a potential limitation, as it means the study relies in most cases on using one informant 
to determine what happens in a particular organisation. Two or more respondents per 
firm would allow for the triangulation of data across respondents to ascertain 
consistency of the data in every firm. However, this study used managers who had 
busy schedules and it was therefore difficult to get more than one manager from every 
company. Nonetheless, the study used multiple firms and two sources of data (i.e. 
questionnaire survey and interviews) and their complementarity improved the validity 
of findings.  
This study investigates the potential effect of the characteristic of managerial position 
on political risk perception. This also is acknowledged as a methodological limitation 
as other characteristics, for example age, gender and education, can potentially affect 
risk perception also. However, managerial position is considered in this study due to 
its relevance, as explained earlier. It is therefore recommended that future studies 
consider other characteristics such as age, gender and education, and their effect on 
managerial political risk perception. 
In this study, some potentially interesting findings emerged, but it was difficult to get 
further explanations for them from the data. For example, the principle component 
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analysis of risk attributes in the use of the traditional psychometric approach resulted 
in an unbalanced factor structure, where 11 attributes loaded on ‘severity of 
consequences’ forming factor 1, while factor 2 included only ‘increasing-ness’. This 
was a departure from the traditional studies applying the psychometric approach e.g. 
to technological and environmental risks, that showed more of a balance of attributes 
across the different factors. This study could not find an appropriate explanation for 
this deviation and future research could investigate this further, especially by using 
interviews to get in-depth explanation.  
Another limitation pertains to the cross-sectional nature of this study. As this study 
investigates managers’ perceptions and its relation to risk assessment, it would be 
expected processes would evolve over time, and the cross-sectional study does not 
capture that. Perhaps the most important direction for future work could be a 
longitudinal study. And it could be conducted by using the psychometric instrument at 
regular intervals of time, and also re-interviewing mangers at regular intervals of time, 
to look at how the perception and the assessment processes develop.  
Further, this study was constrained by the literature in the sense that it adopted an 
already existing framework: the psychometric framework. The potential for future 
research is perhaps to refine the psychometric framework and revisit all its attributes. 
Although the existing attributes are shown to be applicable and significant in this 
study, there were other factors that emerged from the interviews that went beyond it 
e.g. affect. The interview findings indicate that affect is probably important in risk 
perception because some managers noted that the relationship between risk and 
benefit is positive, while others regarded them as inversely related, and the literature 
has shown that this inverse relationship is related to affect. This therefore suggests that 
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the high explanatory power of the traditional psychometric framework does not mean 
that we cannot develop it further. 
Another avenue for further work is to use more sophisticated psychometric 
approaches like 3MPCA, as suggested by Siegrist et al. (2005). In using 3MPCA, the 
data is analysed without aggregating among one mode (such as among participants in 
the traditional approach), and without performing separate analyses for each item in 
one mode (such as for each risk in participant-focused at disaggregated level). But the 
question is perhaps what value this adds as, it is not clear how 3MPCA is able to 
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Appendix 1: participant information sheet and consent form 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
September, 2013 
 
Political risk perception and assessment of Kuwaiti international firms during the ‘Arab 
Spring’ 
My name is Sundus Alyatama and I am conducting this research as part of my PhD in 
Management Science Department at Lancaster University Management School, 
Lancaster, United Kingdom. 
 
You are being invited to participate in a research study. Please read the following 
carefully and feel free to ask us if you would like more information.  
 
1. The purpose of this study is to examine the managerial perception of political 
risk and the institutionalisation level of political risk assessment within 
Kuwaiti international firms in the context of the Arab Spring. 
 
2. You have been approached because the study requires information from 
managers who have been involved in international business activities. 
3. Your participation in this study is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw 
at any time. If you withdraw up to 2 weeks after the interview, the data will be 
destroyed and not used. But after this point the data will remain in the study. 
 
4. The information you provide is confidential.  The audio file will be deleted 
from the recorder as quickly as possible when the data has been transferred to 
secure storage. The secure storage includes encrypted, password protected 
laptop. The data collected for this study, whether in a form of recorded tapes or 
hand written notes, will be stored securely and only the researchers conducting 
this study will have access to this data. The data that will be extracted from the 




If you have any questions about the study, please contact the researcher:  
Sundus Alyatama, PhD Student at Lancaster University 
alyatama@exchange.lancs.ac.uk   
 
Also you can contact the researcher’s supervisor: Jerry Busby, Senior Lecturer of 
Management Science at Lancaster University, j.s.busby@lancaster.ac.uk 
  
If you wish to make a complaint or raise concerns about any aspect of this study and 
do not want to speak to the researcher, you can contact:  
Prof. Mike Pidd 
PhD Research Director  
Management Science Department 
Email: m.pidd@lancaster.ac.uk 
Tel: (01524) 593870 




Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
 







Name of Researchers: Sundus Alyatama, PhD Student at Lancaster University 
Management School; Jerry Busby, Senior Lecturer of Management science at 
Lancaster University.  
 
 (Please put √ for agreement and X for disagreement) 
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 
September 2013 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason. But if I withdraw after 2 weeks of the 
interview, the data will remain in the study.  
  
3. I understand that any information given by me may be used in future reports, 
articles, researcher’s thesis or presentations by the research team. 
  
4. I understand that my name will not appear in any published reports, articles or 
presentations, unless further consent is sought. 
 
5. I agree that my interview with the researcher(s) will be tape recorded. 
 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study.        
 
 
                                           
 
 
________________________          ________________             ________________ 
Name of Participant                             Date                                Signature 
  
  
_________________________        ________________             ________________ 






Permission from the firm 
 
My name is Sundus Alyatama and I am conducting my research as part of my PhD in 
Management Science Department at Lancaster University Management School, 
Lancaster, United Kingdom. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the managerial perception of political risk 
and the institutionalisation level of political risk assessment within Kuwaiti 
international firms in the context of the Arab Spring. 
 
Your firm has been approached because the study requires information from 
managers who have been involved in international business activities. 
The information you provide is confidential.  The data that will be extracted from 
the interview for use in any kind of publication will not contain your company 
name. 
 
I would appreciate if you give permission to conduct my research by 
administrating a written survey to your employees and also conducting face-to-
face interviews with managers in your company. 
 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact the researcher:  
Sundus Alyatama, PhD Student at Lancaster University 
alyatama@exchange.lancs.ac.uk   
 
Also you can contact the researcher’s supervisor: Jerry Busby, Senior Lecturer of 
Management science at Lancaster University, j.s.busby@lancaster.ac.uk 
  
 
If you wish to make a complaint or raise concerns about any aspect of this study and 
do not want to speak to the researcher, you can contact:  
Prof. Mike Pidd 
PhD Research Director  
Management Science Department 
Email: m.pidd@lancaster.ac.uk 
Tel: (01524) 593870 
Lancaster University  





To whom it may concern 
 
On behalf of ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------, I am writing to formally indicate our awareness of the 
research proposed by Mrs Sundus Alyatama, a PhD student at Lancaster University. 
We are aware that she would like to examine the managerial perception of political 
risk and the institutionalisation level of political risk assessment within Kuwaiti 
international firms in the context of the Arab Spring. We are also aware that Mrs 
Alyatama intends to conduct her research by administrating a written survey to our 
employees and also conducting face-to-face interviews with managers and decision 
makers. 
I, ---------------------------------------------------, give Mrs Alyatama permission to 
conduct her research in our company.  






Appendix 2: Interview Guide 
1. What is your position? 
2. Can you tell me about your firm? For example, what kind of international 
business your firm is involved in? Which type of industry your firm belong to 
e.g. Oil & Gas, Real Estate, Industrial, investments Instruments?         
3. How many years has your firm been involved in international business 
activities?  
4. In how many Arab countries does your firm have facilities such as 
representative office, branch, subsidiary, affiliate, franchise agreement, joint 
venture and strategic alliance? 
5. What are the most important political risks that you are concerned about at the 
moment? Why?  How have these risks changed since the beginning of the 
Arab Spring? 
6. Does your firm assign formal responsibility for Individual(s) to analyse 
potential risks associated with firm’s international activity? If yes, since when? 
And how?  
7. How often do you assess potential risks associated with your firm’s 
international business activities? Why? How has this changed since the 
beginning of the Arab Spring? 
8. What type of methods do you use to assess political risks that are associated to 
your international business activities? Why? How have these methods changed 
since the beginning of the Arab Spring? 
9. How do you use the results that you obtain from these methods to assess 
political risks; i.e. do you quantify the outcomes of the qualitative analysis? 
10. What kind of inputs do you get from third party providers and how do you use 
them to take an action? 
11. Is the process of PRA helpful to the firm in avoiding or at least reducing risk? 
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Appendix 4: Political risk perception questionnaire 
 
 
Managerial political risk perception questionnaire survey 
ةيسايسلا رطاخملا كاردإ ةنابتسا 
  
 
  دد يا     دد ى ةحب عوىددسايح ا بيرب لب يرب لإدد ا دددحص فحىدد حب حدد ثحب ا ددهي
 فدد حب  دد  ي  حب يىلعدديحب فددا   د ى ةحب عوىددساحب ط دد ا ح فددة ياحب لاىدداحب  ىادضص
 ةحب عوىدسايح ا بيرب لب يرب طدها .  ح ي  ي ىجت يىوىين ىهي ح   ىدةي  دد   د ى
   ددد  قدد يات  ددديعو  دد   ددثث م قدددا   ددب ا فددا  ل ىددديايح  ا ددفاحب يىددم   حب
 ي دجحب     حىد حب  يعان دةاحب  دم مدل ىدفيأ   ىةت ا   ح ثحب جئى ن .عوىساحب
 .  ح  حب طهحىا أ هجب ت  د ف حب    ى ةحب عوىساحب طها دي  
  قدمىعت ا د  س  ل داحب يىدم يعاحب  اىل نأ  م  لأ حب فجعي يىدم يعم ىدهنأ ددي
 . نىث  لاىا ل ىياحب لإسيحب  ي   دي  اعع حب وع يي لا   يع  
 
 ب ادا .حد ثحب جئى ن  م   نىجم  سةن مم  ب كح   ي ، نىث  لاب     فا ل ىيال 
 ق دد ىا حب مىا  دد ب فددجعي ،يىددم يعاحب   دد  قددنم دددي  م ددع حىا ىددا هم مددنل
 .  نىجاحب ك سةن زج ح ،  حى حب 
 
 ى  خب( ط لاب............................................................. :)ا 
............................................................ :فن ع  حلاب  يعثحب 
 
The current research aims to examine the managerial perception of 
political risk and the institutionalisation level of political risk 
assessment within Kuwaiti firms that have international business 
activities. Understanding managerial perception of political risks may 
help host governments to contribute to a favourable business 
environment by reducing such risks. The research findings would also 
help both current and new investors to understand political risk that 
may face their international business. 
Please be assured that all information given will be regarded as strictly 
confidential and no personal identification is necessary. 
 
As a participant of this questionnaire, you are entitled to receive a free 
copy of the research findings. If you are interested in obtaining such 
information, please complete your details below, to reserve your free 
copy. 
 
Name (Optional): ................................................................ 
Email Address: .................................................................... 
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Section One: Information about you and your firm  :لولأا مسقلاكتسسؤم نعو كنع تامولعم  
Please read the following definitions before completing section one. 
International business activity: any business activity that is conducted across 
national borders, and it includes exporting and/or importing services and/or goods 
and /or producing services and/or goods in countries other than Kuwait.  
Political risks: These are risks from political or administrative changes (e.g. 
Taxation restrictions, Import and/or export restrictions, ownership restrictions, wars) 
or events in society (e.g. riots, revolutions, demonstrations, civil wars) which could 
cause unfavourable consequences for a firm. 
لولأا مسقلا ةئبعت لبق ةيلاتلا تافيرعتلا ةءارق يجري 
 : ةيلودلا ةيراجتلا تاطاشنلاعي عت يىم خ  اف ي  يمثحب عث  هيعجت ا ىجت وىين اأ   أ/ 
 .مي  حب امسا اعخب  ح ي فا لي   أ/  يىم خ جى نب  أ/  لئىفا  أ/  يبع   ب 
:ةيااسايسلا رطااخملا  فد  ةحب يبعدد   حب  د   بددةىن عوىددسم ي دد احب يمنددم(  دي بيرب  أ   دد ى
 فددا  ب دد  ب  أ )ف عدد حب ، د  ياحب دددي  ي دد احب ،عي دع حب  أ/  يبع  دد لاب ي دد د ،  ثيعدفحب
 نأ   ااحب  م ف حب )  ي  ب ف ع حب  يبع ىظاحب  يب  نحب  ب يحب مىا أ يمنم( لا جاحب
 . لعييح  ثث م ع غ جئى ن فا بثة ت 
1. What is your job title? 
 
1. ؟فا ظ حب لزلعم    ىم 
2. How much is the total capital of the firm? (in Kuwaiti 
Dinars) 
 2. ؟)ف ي  حب ىني حىا(  لعيحب مىم سأ    ات طل 
3. How much are the total assets of your firm 
(approximate – in Kuwaiti Dinar)? 
 3. ص ىثيعات طل ؟)ف ي  حب ىني حىا(  لعيحب م  أ فحىاج 
4. What is the percentage of the firm’s assets in the GCC 
countries to the total assets of your firm?   
4.  فا  لعيحب م  أ  ثةن قنات طلج يسحب م ي  م  أ فحىاجص  م
؟ لعيحب 
5. What is the percentage of the firm’s assets in the non GCC 
Arab countries to the total assets of your firm? 
 5.  فا  لعيحب م  أ  ثةن قنات طلم  حب   اععحب   ج يسحب ع غ   م
؟ لعيحب م  أ فحىاجص 
6. What is the percentage of the firm’s assets in the non Arab 
developing countries to the total assets of your firm? 
 6.  فا  لعيحب م  أ  ثةن قنات طلم  حب   مىنحب   اععحب ع غ   فحىاجص  م
؟ لعيحب م  أ 
7. What is the percentage of the firm’s assets in the non Arab 
developed countries to the total assets of your firm? 
 7. عيحب م  أ  ثةن قنات طل فا  لم  حب  م ا احب   اععحب ع غ   م
؟ لعيحب م  أ فحىاجص 
8. For how many years has your firm been involved in 
international business activities?  
8. ؟فح ي ا ىجت وىين م أا  لعيحب مى د  نم سعثسحب يب ن  ي     ات طل 
9. Approximately; what is the total number of employees that 
your firm employs? 
 9. ؟ لعيحب   اظ اح في حب ي عحب ىثيعات طل 
10. What is the percentage of your firm’s employees in the GCC 
 
10.  م  ثةن قنات طل فا ك لعة   اظج يسحب م ي  في حب ع اجاحب  م
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countries to the total number of employees? ؟  اظ ايح 
11. What is the percentage of your firm’s employees in the non-
GCC Arab countries to the total number of employees? 
 11.  فا ك لعة   اظ م  ثةن قنات طلم  حب   اععحب   ج يسحب ع غ   م
؟  اظ ايح في حب ع اجاحب 
12. What is the percentage of your firm’s employees in the non-
Arab developing countries to the total number of employees? 
 12.  فا ك لعة   اظ م  ثةن قنات طلم  حب   مىنحب   اععحب ع غ   م
؟  اظ ايح في حب ع اجاحب 
13. What is the percentage of your firm’s employees is in the 
non-Arab developed countries to the total number of 
employees? 
 13.  فا ك لعة   اظ م  ثةن قنات طلم  حب  م ا احب   اععحب ع غ   م
؟  اظ ايح في حب ع اجاحب 
14. In how many GCC countries does your firm have facilities 
such as representative offices, subsidiaries, branches, 
affiliates, franchise agreement, joint ventures and strategic 
alliance? 
 14. م  حب ي   طل   ج يسحب    ح ي  ي ىجت يىوىين  لعيحب ىه ا كيات ف حب
 , ا ي حب يىلعيحب ,ع عاحب , عاى حب يىلعيحب ,  ي نا حب بتى احىل
ملاب ,لإ خبع حب , لع ياحب لي ىياحب؟فج تبع  رب ف ي حب ,زى   
15. In how many non GCC Arab countries does your firm have 
facilities such as representative offices, subsidiaries, 
branches, affiliates, franchise agreement, joint ventures and 
strategic alliance? 
 15. م  حب ي   طل   اععحب يسحب ع غ  ج   يىوىين  لعيحب ىه ا كيات ف حب
 يىلعيحب ,ع عاحب , عاى حب يىلعيحب ,  ي نا حب بتى احىل   ح ي  ي ىجت
 ف ي حب ,زى  ملاب ,لإ خبع حب , لع ياحب لي ىياحب , ا ي حب
؟فج تبع  رب 
16. In how many non-Arab developing countries does your firm 
have facilities such as representative offices, subsidiaries, 
branches, affiliates, franchise agreement, joint ventures and 
strategic alliance? 
 16. م  حب ي   طل   مىنحب   اععحب ع غ  يىوىين  لعيحب ىه ا كيات ف حب
 يىلعيحب ,ع عاحب , عاى حب يىلعيحب ,  ي نا حب بتى احىل   ح ي  ي ىجت
, ا ي حب فج تبع  رب ف ي حب ,زى  ملاب ,لإ خبع حب , لع ياحب لي ىياحب 
17. In how many non-Arab developed countries does your firm 
have facilities such as representative offices, subsidiaries, 
branches, affiliates, franchise agreement, joint ventures and 
strategic alliance? 
 17. م  حب ي   طل حب   اععحب ع غم ا ا   يىوىين  لعيحب ىه ا كيات ف حب
 يىلعيحب ,ع عاحب , عاى حب يىلعيحب ,  ي نا حب بتى احىل   ح ي  ي ىجت
فج تبع  رب ف ي حب ,زى  ملاب ,لإ خبع حب , لع ياحب لي ىياحب , ا ي حب 
18. Which of the following type of shareholders best represents your 
firm’s majority ownership? (Please tick (  ) one box only) 
18. ( س ىةص لض   ىجعحب( ؟ ط  لعة    يم ف نعت   اي   حى حب يى ىااحب اأ دحص فا )
)طاا   ب  لاعم 
 Private      صىخ عىاد 
 Government    فم    عىاد 
    
 250 
 
    
    
    
    
 
19. Which of the following categories best represents your firm’s primary 
industry? 
(Please tick () one box only) 
19. ؟يساسلأا ةكرشلا طاشن فنصت نأ نكمي ةيعانصلا تاعاطقلا نم عون يأ 
 ( ةراشإ عضو ءاجرلا( عبرم يف ))طقف دحاو 
 Industrial   يعانص 
 Banking    كونب 
 Oil & Gas     زاغلاو طفنلا 
 Real Estate          تاراقع 
 Insurance    نيمأت 
 Financial Service   ةيلام تامدخ 
  Telecommunications     تلااصتلاا 
  Others, Please specify …..    اهركذا ،يرخأ…… 
    
20. What is the influence of Arab Spring on the way you think about risks 
in your firm’s international businesses? 
20.  تاطاشن يف رطاخملا راعشتسا يف مكريكفت ةقيرط ىلع يبرعلا عيبرلا ريثأت وه ام 
مكتكرش ؟ةيلودلا 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - -  - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - -  - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - -  - - - -  - -   - - - -- - - - - --  
- - - - - - - - - -  - - -  - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - -  - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - -  - - - -  - -   - - - -- - - - - --  








Section Two: Managerial Political Risk Perception ةيسايسلا ةيرادلإا رطاخملا كاردإ :يناثلا مسقلا 
 
In this Section of the questionnaire there are twelve parts. Each 
part asks you about a particular attribute of political risk; these 
attributes are: voluntariness, immediacy of effect, knowledge 
about risk, control over risk, newness, catastrophic potential, 
common – dread, unanticipated consequences, preventability, 
increasing, duration of effect and severity.  
Please rate the listed political risks in relation to each attribute as 
explained in the following parts:  
 
  ن عم   ىخ م ىن ي  زج قل . زج عي  فنثب  ج ي نى ث  لاب  م طةاحب ب   فا
 :ف  صب سحب      .   ى ةحب عوىسايح  ،ع ثأ حب  ي  ا  ،عوىساحب     و  اععاحب
 بدب    ،عزاحب  ،  ث ى حب مىا  ب  ، ثب  حب  ،عوىساحب دي  سعا ةحب  ،عوىساحىا
ىيزحب  ، يىد حب   نى مص  ، عد  م ع غ.س يحب  ج ي  ع ثأ حب س م  ،سي 
 فا حض م    ىال   ىخ ق ا  يع ي ىا ا  ج  احب    ى ةحب عوىساحب ط  ات فجعي







Part 1:  
Voluntariness of risk: Do you consider the following risk issues to be 
voluntary? That is, do you have a choice about your international 
business activity being affected by them? If you think you have a 
choice then they are voluntary risks, but if you believe that you have 
no or little choice then they are involuntary risks. For each item, please 
indicate an appropriate position on the 5-point scale. 
 
 ءزجلا1: 
:رطاخملا ةيعوط  كي ح ق  ،فنعاا ب   ؟    و   حى حب عوىساحب نأ  ا عت ق 
 نأ  ا عت منل ب ص ؟عوىساحب   ها فح  حب ا ىج حب كوىين عثأت لإسي ىا ا  ى  خب
 ،    و عوىسم ن  ت  حى حب     ىهناا   حى حب عوىسايح ضعع حب فا  ى  خلاب كي ح
  خب لا هنأ  ا عت منل ب ص   ح      فا ىهناا  ى  خلاب  م ق ياحب كي ح نأ  أ كي ح  ى
  ج  حىا   حى حب ي نثحب  م  نا قل ط  ات فجعي .    و ع غ عوىسم ن  ت  حى حب












ف  و  و ىثحىغ ف   مب   ىا ف  و  م يد ف  و ف  و ع غ 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host government  1 2 3 4 5 
 حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان ا فاحب  ح  
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel restrictions  1 2 3 4 5    ياحب دي  ي  د    اظ احب    عت  أ/  
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 
Wars 1 2 3 4 5 






Immediacy of Effect: to what extent do you consider the following 
risks have immediate consequences to your international business? Do 
these risks affect your business activity straight away or are they 
delayed in time? For each item, please indicate an appropriate position 
on the 5-point scale. 
 :ءزجلا2  
:ريثأتلا ةيروف  ا ىج حب كوىين دي  ا  ا ع ثأت ىهح   حى حب عوىساحب نأ  ا عت ا م اأ دحص
 حب قع  ةي ع ثأ حب نأ  أ ا  ا ق يا ا ىج حب كوىين دي  عوىساحب     عثيت ق  ؟فح 
























ب ج ا  ا ع ثأت  ا  ا ع ثأت 
 ا  ا ع ثأت
م  عم 
عخأ م ع ثأت  ب ج عخأ م ع ثأت 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel 
restrictions  
1 2 3 4 5 
   اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 
















































Knowledge about Risk: to what extent do you know about the 
following risks? Do you know all about them or are they unknown to 
you? For each risk, please indicate an appropriate position on the 5-
point scale. 
 :ءزجلا3 
:رطاخملاب ةفرعملا  اعدعت قد  ؟ د حى حب عوىدساحب نأديا  داععم كي دح ا دم اأ فحب
ىدددهنأ مأ ىهدد  عسا  فددة قددل    ددد   ددم عدداخ قدد ح ؟كدددح  ثددةنحىا  ددم يعم عدد غ











  د ا  م يعم    عا    دحب  م يعم 
ق يا   م يعم 
ط   م 
 ق يا  م يعم
ف او 
 م يعم ع غ 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان  
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د   اظ احب   
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 








Part: 4  
Control over Risk: If your firm is exposed to the following risk issues, 
to what extent do you consider the following risk issues to be 
controllable? For each item, please indicate an appropriate position on 
the 5 point scale. 
 :ءزجلا4 
:رطاخملا يلع ةرطيسلا  ا م اأ فحب ،  حى حب عوىسايح  ضععم ك لعة منىل ب ب
 ؟ىه ي  سعا ةحب   اي   حى حب عوىساحب عث عت   حى حب ي نثحب  م  نا قل ط  ات فجعي













 عا ةم ع غ
ىه ي   
 ىه ي  عا ةم
م يد 
 ىه ي  عا ةم 
 ىه ي  عا ةم
ب ج 
 ىه ي  عا ةم
ىمىات 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
ي  احب حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel 
restrictions  
1 2 3 4 5 
   اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5 /  ط مأ حب س يىعاحب  أ 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5 ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب   






Part: 5  
Newness: Are the below risk issues new to your international business 
activity or are they old risks that you have known about for quite some 
time? For each item, please indicate an appropriate position on the 5 point 
scale. 
 :ءزجلا5 
:ةثادحلا  ىهنأ مأ ، فح  حب ا ىج حب كوىينح  ثةنحىا س ي ج   حى حب عوىساحب ق 
 ؟سع ا  نم ىها طيعت  اي د عوىسم  ج  حىا   حى حب ي نثحب  م  نا قل ط  ات فجعي












ىمىات س ي ج 
    دحب س ي ج
  عا 
ط   م ق يا س ي ج م يد س ي ج  اي د 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel restrictions  1 2 3 4 5    اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 




Part: 6  
Catastrophic potential: A risk with catastrophic potential is one that is 
likely to affect large numbers of international business activity at once. 
For each item, please indicate an appropriate position on the 5 point scale. 
 :ءزجلا6 
:ةيثراكلا لامتحا  نأ قا  احب  م ا حب عاسحب      ث ى حب مىا  ب    عاسحب
فا   ح  حب  ي ىج حب يىوىينحب  م سع ثل يب  أ دي  عثيي   .  ب  مد  فجعي

















potential اسحب ع 
  ث ى حىا مىا  ب لا  ق يد   ث ى حب مىا  ب ط   م   ث ى حب مىا  ب  ىثحىغ   ث ى حب مىا  ب 
   ث ى حب مىا  ب
 مىت ق يا 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
 دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب
 ثع   يا  
Breach of contract by a 
host government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit 
repatriation restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب
حىا  ب 
Import and/or export 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د عي  
Ownership and/or 
personnel restrictions  
1 2 3 4 5 
   اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or 
confiscation  
1 2 3 4 5 
 س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحبب  
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 




7. Common - Dread:  
Are the following risk issues ones that your firm has learnt to cope with and 
can think about calmly? Or are they ones that are greatly dreaded to your 
international business. For each item, please indicate an appropriate position 
on the 5 point scale. 
 :ءزجلا7 
:عزفم 
عدة مدايعت فد حب عوىدساحب  م   حى حب عوىساحب ق   د اي  ىدهعم قدمىع حب ك ل
 كددحىا    ثدةنحىا عدد ثل  د  فددحب  د زام عوىددسم ىدهنأ  ب ؟   ددها ىدها عد  ا حب

















dreaded  عاسحب 
عزام ع غ  م يد عزام  ط   م ق يا عزام عزام  ب ج   زام 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host government  1 2 3 4 5 
اعحب ضان ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م   
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel restrictions  1 2 3 4 5 ي  د    اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5  حب  ي  ب ف ع 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 







To what extent the following risk issues will lead to unanticipated effects 
in regards to your international business activity. For each item, please 
indicate an appropriate position on the 5 point scale. 
 :ءزجلا8 
:ةعقوتم ريغ بقاوع 
 عد  م ع غ يبع ثأت فحب   حى حب عوىساحب اييت ا   ا م اأ فحب   كوىين دي 
.فح  دحب ا ىدج حب ى حب ي دنثحب  دم  دنا قدل ط د ات فدجعي ىدداا   دائماحب  دج  حىا  د ح














  عد  م ع غ   عد  مم يد  
 ق يا لد  م
ط   م 
 دحب  عد  م
   عا    
ىمىات  عد  م 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel 
restrictions  
1 2 3 4 5 
   اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5 ىا اعحب  ييىع دلاب ي 







Preventability: The extent to which the following risk issues can be 
prevented in your international business activity. For each item, please 
indicate an appropriate position on the 5 point scale. 
 :ءزجلا9 
:ةياقولا ةيناكمإ 
 .فح  دحب ا ىدج حب كوىدين فدا   حى حب عوىساحب  م  يىد حب   اي ا م اأ فحب فدجعي















 لا ىهئىاتب   اي
ىدموب 
 ىهئىاتب   اي
م يد 
 ق يا ىهئىاتب   اي
 ط   م 
 ىهئىاتب   اي
  عا    دحب 
 ىهئىاتب   اي
ىمىات 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب 
Breach of contract by a host 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5 ي  د  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  
Ownership and/or personnel 
restrictions  
1 2 3 4 5 
   اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 






Increasing: The extent to which the following risk issues are 
increasing over time in regards to your international business activity. 
For each item, please indicate an appropriate position on the 5 point 
scale. 
 :ءزجلا10 
 :ةدايزلا   حى حب عوىساحب  يبز ت ا م اأ فحبفح  حب ا ىج حب كوىين دي     عم لم















increasing   عاسحب 
س يا لإدىن ت  م يد لإدىن ت   اىث م يد  يبز ت  س يا  يبز ت 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel restrictions  1 2 3 4 5    اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 
Wars 1 2 3 4 5 






Duration of Effect: How long do the effects of the following risk issues 
last in regards to your international business activity? For each item,  
please indicate an appropriate position on the 5 point scale. 
 :ءزجلا11 
 :ريثأتلا ةدم   حى حب عوىساحب ع ثأت س م عا ةت ا م اأ فحب ا ىج حب كوىين دي 
















 س اح ع ثأت
سع عد 
 ح  عم س اح ع ثأت 
 س اح ع ثأت
 يي و 
 س اح ع ثأت
ب ج  يي و 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5 حب قي  ت دي  ي  احب ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياع 
Breach of contract by a host government  1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel restrictions  1 2 3 4 5    اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 
Wars 1 2 3 4 5 





Severity: The extent to which the consequences of exposure to the 
following risk issues are severe among your international business. For 
each item, please indicate an appropriate position on the 5 point scale. 
 :ءزجلا12 
 :ةدشلا ةجرد عوىسايح فح  حب ا ىج حب كوىين ضععت بدب   س ة ا م ىم














 severe  عاسحب 
 س ي ة ع غ
 ىدموب 
س يحب  ي يد ط   م ق يا س ي ة 
    دحب س ي ة
  عا 
ىمىات س ي ة 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel restrictions  1 2 3 4 5    اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 









Section Three:  Two different definitions of risk perception 
In this section we would like you to rate the following risk issues on two 
different definitions of risk perceptions namely Riskiness and Acceptability.  
Part 1: 
Riskiness: How risky are the following risk issues to your international 
business activity? For each item, please indicate an appropriate position on the 
scale. 
 رطخلا كاردلإ نيفلتخم نيفرعت :ثلاثلا مسقلا 
 ب ف نعت كنم ي ن طةاحب ب   فا ،عوىساحب لب ير   ايعع ح ىاا    حى حب عوىساح
 .م ثاحب   نى مص  سعوىساحب ىا   لاأ 
 ءزجلا1 : 
:ةرطاخملا  ؟فح  حب ا ىج حب كوىين دي    حى حب عوىساحب س  اخ ا م    ىم
.سى اايح ىاا   ائماحب  ج  حىا   حى حب ي نثحب  م  نا قل ط  ات فجعي 
Risk issue 




سعاخ ع غ م يد سعاخ ط   م ق يا سعاخ  س  اسحب   حى  
   حى  س  اخ
ب ج 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  ثع   يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب 
Breach of contract by a host government  1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
حىا  ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احب 
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5 ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د عي  
Ownership and/or personnel restrictions  1 2 3 4 5    اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحبب  
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 











Acceptability: How acceptable are the following risk issues to your 
firm? For each item, please indicate an appropriate position on the 
scale. 
 ءزجلا2: 
 :لوبقلا ةيناكمإ ؟  حى حب عوىسايح ك لعة قثات ا م ىم  م  نا قل ط  ات فجعي














ىمىات  ح ثام ع غ 
ع غ ق يا  ح ثام
ط   م 
 لا   ح ثام لا
  ض اعم 
 ق يا  ح ثام
ط   م 
ىمىات  ح ثام 
Taxation restrictions  1 2 3 4 5   ثيعفحب ي  احب 
Currency exchange restrictions 1 2 3 4 5 
  يا  دحص   ي احب  ياعحب قي  ت دي  ي  احب
 ثع  
Breach of contract by a host 
government  
1 2 3 4 5 
 ا فاحب  ح  حب قثد  م  اعحب ضان 
 
Capital and/or Profit repatriation 
restrictions 
1 2 3 4 5 
ب  أ/  مىاحب سأ  سيى ص دي  ي  احبحىا   
Import and/or export restrictions 1 2 3 4 5  عي ع حب  أ يبع   لاب دي  ي  د 
Ownership and/or personnel 
restrictions  
1 2 3 4 5 
   اظ احب    عت  أ/     ياحب دي  ي  د 
Expropriation and/or confiscation  1 2 3 4 5  س يىعاحب  أ/  ط مأ حب 
Corruption  1 2 3 4 5  يىةاحب 
Demonstrations  and riots     1 2 3 4 5 ب يحب مىا أ  يبع ىظاحب 
Revolutions  1 2 3 4 5  يب  نحب 
civil wars 1 2 3 4 5   ي  ب ف ع حب 
Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5  فى  رب 
Economic sanctions 1 2 3 4 5   ييىع دلاب يىا اعحب 












Thank You Very Much for Your Time and Help 




Jerry Busby, Senior Lecturer of Management science at Lancaster 
University 
 E-mail: j.s.busby@lancaster.ac.uk 
 
Sundus Alyatama, PhD student at Lancaster University 
alyatama@exchange.lancs.ac.ukmail: -E  
 
